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**Country programmes and related matters**

**Draft country programme document for Libya (2019-2020)**

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## I. Programme rationale

1. Libya, with an estimated population of 6 million, continues to face myriad challenges in its transition to democratic rule in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution. The period following the end of the authoritarian regime saw a weakening of central government authority, causing the emergence of rival claimants to political authority; the fragmentation of the security sector; and severe economic decline due to decreased oil production and exports linked both to the deteriorating political and security situation and the decline in oil prices. While Libya’s Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.716[[1]](#footnote-1) categorizes it as a high human development country, its HDI ranking fell 35 places to 102 of 188 countries between 2010 and 2015. This drop in HDI performance is felt by Libya’s people mainly through the collapse of public services, especially education and health, higher prices through cuts to food and fuel subsidies, conflict-related loss of shelter and livelihoods and major setbacks in ensuring the safety of citizens and the rule of law.
2. Although Libya successfully held elections in 2012 and 2014, they did not resolve issues surrounding control of public institutions and security structures. The rivalry over control of these institutions eventually resulted in a national conflict that effectively divided the country into two competing polities including the House of Representatives and Interim Government in the east and the General National Congress with the Salvation Government in the west. The competition between these entities divided national institutions and further fragmented the security sector, which undermined efforts to consolidate revolutionary and professional security actors under one structure.[[2]](#footnote-2) These conflict dynamics were further exacerbated by the uncontrolled proliferation of weapons.
3. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) successfully brokered a dialogue process in 2015 intended to unify the parallel institutions, end civil strife and chart a course to guide the country’s governance and security structures through the remainder of the transition period, resulting in a new constitution and national elections.[[3]](#footnote-3) This effort led to the Libya Political Agreement, which resulted in the establishment of a Government of National Accord and the United Nations recognition of the House of Representatives, elected in 2014, as the legitimate legislative authority. However, political and institutional unity remained elusive, prompting the Secretary-General in 2017 to launch a Libyan Action Plan to address the shortcomings of the Libyan Political Agreement and help create the necessary conditions for elections.[[4]](#footnote-4)
4. For Libya to progress along the path of sustained peace and increased prosperity, the theory of change suggests it will be necessary to overcome the lack of political, social and economic inclusion and cohesion. This will be dependent upon the emergence of a unified, legitimate governing authority which is able to exert control over institutions of governance, security and the economy. The near-term development priorities include improving the effectiveness, oversight and reach of existing public institutions; securing the rule of law; improving public services; expanding civic engagement and participation in political and development processes; and increasing economic opportunities. These are key elements to building the trust and confidence among communities ̶, and between communities and the Government ̶ necessary to build legitimacy for a unified State. However, the legacy of authoritarian rule and absence of effective and accountable governance institutions, combined with the tribal aspects of governance, the discriminatory elements of traditional norms and values that govern Libyan society and a flourishing “economy of predation”, pose significant structural challenges to State-building and addressing inequalities.[[5]](#footnote-5)
5. Libya has yet to develop a national development strategy and lacks a framework within which to align and coordinate priority actions towards achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. Libya also requires additional capacity to collect and analyse the data necessary to develop such strategies and monitor progress.[[6]](#footnote-6) Given the proposed two-year timeframe, the focus of the country programme will be on implementing initiatives which contribute to the objectives of the Action Plan for Libya, while also building the foundation for sustained capacity development support to begin to address Libya’s long-term development challenges within an eventual national development/Sustainable Development Goal strategy.
6. The weakening of central government institutions is illustrated by the decline in Libya’s performance in recent years across a range of governance indicators,[[7]](#footnote-7) resulting in a diminished ability of central ministries to provide key public services and law enforcement. Local governance structures have increasingly taken on responsibility for basic services, security, reconciliation and justice, but without sufficient support from central authorities, thereby weakening the vertical linkages between national and subnational institutions.[[8]](#footnote-8) At the same time, only 10 per cent of members of the constitutional drafting committee were women, 16 per cent of parliamentary members are female, 12 per cent of all local councilors in Libya are women and 38 per cent of eligible women voters participated in local elections.[[9]](#footnote-9) To re-establish legitimate and effective national institutions it will be necessary to strengthen national ownership and governance capacity, rebuild the relationship between national authorities and local institutions, build capacity to provide local services and enhance community resilience and participation, and advance the rule of law through statutory reforms and capacity-building of formal law enforcement mechanisms.[[10]](#footnote-10)
7. Following the transition in 2011, Libya’s formal justice institutions further unraveled, resulting in parallel delivery of justice and security services.[[11]](#footnote-11) Of particular concern is the lack of security for justice actors who have been subjected to threats and attacks.[[12]](#footnote-12) In addition, many Libyans have been placed in prolonged pretrial detention following the transition, a result of the limited access to justice services.[[13]](#footnote-13) Reporting structures for female victims of violence are weak due to a lack of social support and specialized staff, fear of reprisals and lack of trust and confidence in the justice system. In the absence of unified political and security arrangements, there is still a need for institutional support and capacity-building of justice actors across the criminal justice chain; support for a coordination mechanism among criminal justice actors; strengthening community security; and security sector reform.
8. Community conflicts in Libya are often addressed locally by traditional leaders, building upon customary arbitration practices outside of the formal justice system. These peace efforts are Libyan-owned mechanisms for building stability, ahead of efforts to address the structural causes of conflict. Linking local community efforts with those of central and local authorities on peacebuilding and reconciliation can provide an environment that is more conducive to engaging a wider range of citizens in reconciliation processes, developing local capacity in conflict resolution and the improvement of public service delivery.
9. Despite its relatively high HDI, Libya is a rentier economy highly dependent on hydrocarbons, which generate over 95 per cent of exports, 90 per cent of government revenues and over 70 per cent of gross domestic product, the wealth from which accrued primarily to the ruling elite. While there are no reliable statistics on poverty and inequality,[[14]](#footnote-14) the high dependence on hydrocarbons increases Libya’s economic vulnerability to internal and external shocks, especially as the vast majority of the employed work in the public sector.[[15]](#footnote-15) Libya went from being a welfare State under which people had subsidized food, inexpensive housing and free medical care and education, to a State that no longer guaranteed these conditions.[[16]](#footnote-16) For example, a recent survey shows that 17 per cent of the public hospitals and 20 per cent of the primary health care facilities are damaged and non-functional,[[17]](#footnote-17) and according to data collected in 2016 from the Ministry of Education in the east and west of Libya, over 10 per cent of schools are affected by the crisis, negatively affecting an estimated 279,000 children. The instability exacerbated vulnerability, resulting in reduced government revenues, fewer public services, increased unemployment, rising inflation and budget deficits.[[18]](#footnote-18) Only 29 per cent of women are reported to participate in the formal labour force, virtually all of them in the public sector. Women also experience higher rates of unemployment and receive less pay than men.[[19]](#footnote-19) Young people aged 15–34 represent half of Libya’s workforce and yet experience much higher rates of unemployment, standing at 48 per cent in 2015, of which girls account for 68 per cent.[[20]](#footnote-20)
10. In addition to broader economic vulnerabilities, certain groups experience specific forms of exclusion. Approximately 1.3 million people, including internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, vulnerable non-displaced Libyans, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, access to services and jobs. Migrants in Libya are highly vulnerable, facing sexual violence and other violations and abuses.[[21]](#footnote-21) Increased violence against women is also a feature of the conflict and a consequence of violent extremism. Women in areas under control of the so-called Islamic State confirm violations of women’s fundamental human rights, including slavery, conflict-related sexual violence and other forms of abuse.[[22]](#footnote-22)
11. During the previous programme period, UNDP provided critical support in three areas. First, UNDP supported the High Commission for National Elections to organize nationwide elections in 2012 and 2014,[[23]](#footnote-23) and supported UNSMIL to facilitate political dialogue and provide technical and logistical support for the Constitution drafting process. Second, together with UNSMIL, other United Nations agencies and civil society partners under the Stabilization Facility for Libya, UNDP provided tangible benefits to people in nine regions for: refurbishment and re-equipping of public service infrastructure, including 11 hospitals and medical centres and 16 schools, and improved performance of electrical substations, water and sewage systems; strengthened capacities of national institutions to connect with municipalities; and improved local capacities for conflict monitoring, management and mediation. Third, UNDP supported civic engagement and dialogue through partnerships between selected municipalities and civil society in the west, east and south of Libya to build resilience and improve community stability, security and socioeconomic conditions.
12. Two key lessons can be highlighted from the previous programme period.[[24]](#footnote-24) First, while improvements in institutional effectiveness, service delivery and reconciliation are meaningful contributions to building trust, true legitimacy will come only with an overall political settlement. Secondly, as long as local arrangements do not pose obstacles for key actors at the national level or encourage fissiparous tendencies, it is possible to support conflict reduction, social cohesion and improved service delivery by focusing on specific geographic areas and target groups. This will require UNDP to ensure that conflict analysis continues to be embedded in its programming and continuously updated. UNDP has established its value-added role in Libya through its ability to coordinate and manage (with UNSMIL) the implementation of large, complex initiatives for infrastructure improvements in difficult-to-access areas through third-party implementing partners (Aktis Strategy Ltd., Peaceful Change Initiative, etc.,). Similarly, the convening power of UNDP ensured that rehabilitation of public services is accompanied by community outreach and conflict-sensitive approaches, which increases local buy-in and sustainability.

## II. Programme priorities and partnerships

1. The country programme benefited from consultations with government and civil society counterparts, United Nations and international partners. The United Nations Country Team (UNCT) has developed the United Nations Strategic Framework (UNSF) 2019-2020, a “light” high-level framework to be signed with the Government that uses the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals as the guiding logic of its results architecture. In the absence of a national development strategy, the UNSF and the UNDP country programme will align with national planning processes through the government-led International Coordination Framework for Technical Cooperation. The two-year duration of the UNSF and UNDP country programme will focus efforts on the most critical needs, which will address the humanitarian-development-peace nexus through alignment between the UNSF and UNSMIL Plan of Action. This would help set the political foundation for longer-term, inclusive and sustainable development and localization of the Sustainable Development Goals.
2. UNDP will broaden its partnership beyond governmental actors to include innovative women’s and youth organizations and the private sector (Toyota and Tatweer), as well as international oil companies, to build entrepreneurship skills and expand job opportunities. UNDP will promote South-South and triangular cooperation with countries within the region, such as Tunisia on electoral support and Sudan on security and rule of law. UNDP will explore possibilities to expand collaboration with the World Bank and African Development Bank on subnational governance, anti-corruption and public financial management strategies. UNDP will preserve and further expand partnerships with non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations (CSOs).
3. Based on the UNDP comparative advantage in Libya and global network of knowledge and expertise, the country programme will contribute to two of the three UNSF outcome areas: strengthening governance and rule of law; and supporting sustained basic social services. UNDP will provide support to transitional governance, strengthening the capacity of public institutions, promoting civic and political engagement, restoration of social infrastructure and services, spurring local economic recovery and building individual, community and institutional resilience and social cohesion. The country programme will contribute to the aim of the Strategic Plan, 2018-2022 to build resilience to shocks and crises via signature solutions 1 (keeping people out of poverty), 2 (strengthen effective, inclusive and accountable governance), 3 (enhance national prevention and recovery capacities for resilient societies) and 6 (strengthen gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls). In line with the Strategic Plan, the country programme will continue to offer a country-level operational platform for the wider United Nations system.

### **Effective, inclusive and accountable governance institutions**

1. UNDP will continue supporting transitional governance mechanisms, strengthen core government functions for critical state institutions at central and local levels, contribute to confidence-building and reconciliation and increase access to justice, prioritizing groups most affected by the conflict.
2. In the area of transitional governance, UNDP, together with UNSMIL, will continue providing technical support to the constitution-making process, and with UNSMIL, the European Union and other international partners, will continue technical and advisory support to the High Commission for National Elections to prepare and conduct a constitutional referendum and elections. Through partnerships with CSOs, UNDP will support civic/voter education programming that promotes inclusiveness and targets vulnerable groups.
3. UNDP, in cooperation with UNSMIL, will strengthen peacebuilding processes by supporting inclusive and neutral platforms for continued political dialogue. At the national level, UNDP will work with the Presidential Council and other government institutions to provide policy and technical advice on long-term peacebuilding initiatives and undertake advocacy to ensure the implementation of reconciliation agreements. The capacities of local and national government institutions will be reinforced on topics such as transitional justice, responding to victims’ needs and providing guarantees and safeguards of non-recurrence of violence.
4. UNDP will strengthen central and local governments to operationalize reconciliation mechanisms based on a coherent strategy and legal framework. A comprehensive assessment of existing government institutions, legal frameworks and committees related to reconciliation (Preparatory Committee for a National Reconciliation Commission, National Reparations Fund, etc.) will first be undertaken. At the local level, UNDP will support local authorities to better engage in local dispute mediation to address issues such as the return of IDPs, arbitrary detention, reparations, service delivery and security.
5. In cooperation with UNSMIL and municipalities within the framework of the Stabilization Facility, UNDP will develop dialogue initiatives nationwide to contribute to stabilizing Libya through a bottom-up approach to reconciliation, involving local authorities, religious and tribal leaders, CSOs, youth and women representatives, academics and private sector actors. These activities aim to support the political processes that lead to more inclusive and legitimate governance structures and are reinforced by the concrete improvements and peace dividends to be delivered at community level, thus laying the groundwork for reconciliation and sustained reconstruction and development. In partnership with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UNDP will build the capacity of media professionals in conflict-sensitive journalism to create an environment favourable to the peaceful resolution of local conflict, and offer communities options for civic engagement. This approach to dialogue would facilitate linkage between peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive development and include engagement with civil society to build their capacities in areas such as conflict-sensitive development and early recovery.
6. Together with the Ministry of Justice, High Judicial Institute and Judicial Council, UNDP will strengthen transitional justice mechanisms with a focus on capacity-building of the judiciary. UNDP will reinforce the role of civil society through capacity-building in monitoring local transitional justice processes and monitoring the return of IDPs. UNDP will support the expansion of access to justice by expanding formal justice service to the most remote areas, including training of judges, judicial police from the Ministries of the Interior and of Justice and other related professionals, and promoting the reform of discriminatory laws.
7. To complement efforts to increase access to justice, UNDP in partnership with UNSMIL will support the reform of the Ministry of Interior and security forces (police) to meet international operational standards and respect human rights by providing appropriate training, developing strategic planning capacities, improving budget development and implementation, human resources management and procurement systems. UNDP aims to support the development of a national strategy for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. Promotion of human rights through advocacy and education will be central to interventions related to the Ministries of the Interior and of Justice and will be aligned with the Global Focal Point arrangement for Police, Justice and Corrections.
8. UNDP, in partnership with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), will provide technical support to the Office of Audit and the National Anti-Corruption Commission to improve oversight capacities, as well as advocate for the introduction of anti-corruption laws, rules and regulations in collaboration with judicial authorities to ensure their enforcement. UNDP will also work towards increasing public participation in civic and political processes and promoting people’s rights to information to enhance government accountability.
9. In cooperation with UNSMIL and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), UNDP will promote women’s participation in municipal councils and legislative bodies, including the establishment of a women’s caucus in the parliament to advocate for women’s rights, gender-sensitive policies and more inclusive governance processes. UNDP will explore partnerships with local Women’s Networks for Peace to integrate gender-sensitive conflict analysis in programmes. A UNDP Gender Task Force has been established to mainstream gender throughout programme interventions.

**Inclusive access to public services and economic opportunities**

1. To address the basic needs of the population and build community and social cohesion, UNDP, in partnership with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and World Health Organization (WHO), will build on its comparative advantage in supporting the re-establishment of public service delivery. UNDP interventions under the Stabilization Facility will support the Government in delivering public goods and sustainable benefits – a peace dividend – through rehabilitation of social infrastructure for improved access, mainly in the health, education and water and waste sectors. This will be linked to UNDP support to both the national political process and inclusive local planning and the development of local conflict reduction and social peace programmes, thereby increasing the legitimacy of the national authorities and their capability to lead Libya to sustained peace. This will include support for the modernization of public administration with a focus on human resources management and norms and procedures that comply with international standards. UNDP will work with the Ministry of Planning and other government partners to improve coordination between local and national planning mechanisms for more effective use of budgetary resources.
2. To improve the accessibility of local public services and address the needs of those “furthest behind”, UNDP will strengthen local government capacities to engage key groups and community members in the planning, delivery and monitoring of services. UNDP will focus efforts on population groups[[25]](#footnote-25) and areas most affected by conflict. UNDP will continue to work in communities on key migration routes – from Sabha and Murzuq, to Kufra and Sabratha, not least Benghazi and Tripoli – engaging local municipalities, identifying entry points to integrate key community members, enhancing local stability and community security, advancing municipal socioeconomic development and providing income-generating opportunities for communities. Community empowerment, focusing on marginalized groups, will be prioritized along with an emphasis on including survivors of gender-based violence in livelihood activities. UNDP will build on its comparative advantage of linking service provision with multisectoral, conflict-sensitive and risk-informed development interventions for more sustainable community-based stabilization and peacebuilding structures.
3. UNDP will continue its innovative partnership with the Ministry of Health, the General Electric Company of Libya (GECOL) and Renewable Energy Authority of Libya (REAOL) to build the resilience of public services through utilization of solar energy in a number of primary health care facilities, hospitals and other medical centres. Coordination with the Ministry of Health will be critical for selection and prioritization of facilities for rehabilitation and to ensure sustainability through training for operation and maintenance of the facilities. This will provide a more sustainable power source in the context of intermittent electricity supply nationwide and provide experience on which to draw in considering further solar-based solutions.
4. UNDP will support economic growth and recovery strategies to promote income generation and emergency employment and create sustainable and decent jobs. UNDP and its local partner Tatweer Research will establish start-up incubators in Benghazi, Sabha and Tripoli, specifically targeting women and unemployed youth to provide a means of economic empowerment. In parallel, UNDP in partnership with Toyota will explore establishing vocational training programmes and helping with employment for youth among the IDP and returnee populations in selected localities, to promote durable solutions and resilience.

# III. Programme and risk management

1. This country programme document outlines UNDP contributions to national results and serves as the primary unit of accountability to the Executive Board for results alignment and resources assigned to the programme at the country level. Accountabilities of managers at the country, regional and headquarters levels with respect to country programmes are prescribed in the programme and operations policies and procedures and the internal control framework. In accordance with Executive Board decision 2013/9, all direct costs associated with project implementation should be charged to the concerned projects.
2. The country programme will be nationally executed by the Ministry of Planning. However, given the volatile context and the capacity gaps of national partners that may pose delivery and fiduciary risks, UNDP will implement this programme through direct implementation modality, as well as through third-party implementation with vetted partners already acting in the affected geographical areas (where UNDP may not have direct access). The UNDP response, monitoring, and validation mechanism will provide quality control and risk mitigation for civil works through a process of field monitoring (including by third parties) and multi-layered verification. UNDP will also contribute to broader UNCT efforts to build the capacity of selected partners to ensure that United Nations programming can move towards full national implementation modality with partners that demonstrate capacity improvements. A country programme board will be established with national counterparts as the primary governance mechanism for the country programme. UNDP will work in partnership with UNSMIL to tap the Mission’s assets and mechanisms to support programme implementation and staff security. Lastly, UNDP will preserve existing and introduce new communication channels, both formal and informal, to make sure its donors and partners are briefed on the risks and challenges of operating in a complex environment.
3. UNDP will increase international staff presence in Libya to normalize programme and operations functions, which have been split between Tripoli and Tunis since 2014. Staff will return first to Tripoli and later to Benghazi, while exploring options to expand further. This implies the need to retain programmatic and operational flexibility based on sound risk assessment for UNDP to scale up (or down) activities as conditions allow in line with the evolving situation. UNDP will carry out an organizational review to ensure that the country office has adequate staff capacity, structures and management systems.
4. The successful implementation of the programme is dependent upon management of four interrelated risks. The first risk is the continued institutional fragmentation and non-resolution of the national political arrangement. Given the competing claims to authority in different parts of the country, this risk will be mitigated through carefully considered engagement and communication with local actors to reinforce the UNDP objective of providing assistance to people and communities in need. UNDP will emphasize conflict-sensitivity in project design to safeguard transactional gains at project level in the event of political instability and use its convening role to engage partners in sustaining focus on peacebuilding priorities to help prevent further human development losses.
5. A second risk is the tenuous security situation throughout the country, which may affect access to areas intended for UNDP assistance and the ability of UNDP to oversee programme implementation. Whilst the return of programme management capacities to Tripoli will improve engagement with national counterparts, it will also increase security risks to staff. UNDP will address this risk through strict implementation of United Nations security protocols, in coordination with UNSMIL, continued use of third-party implementation and use of local partners (municipal and tribal leaders) for programme monitoring. UNDP will work closely with UNSMIL to monitor the political and security situation through existing early-warning mechanisms and utilize every option to access operationally challenging areas. UNDP will also undertake regular programme criticality reviews to develop appropriate responses.
6. A third risk is the extreme logistical challenge posed by the operating environment in Libya, which will require the country office to retain some operations management in Tunis, particularly banking, to ensure programme delivery. To mitigate this risk, UNDP will carefully consider business continuity plans, establish reliable communications links and redundancies to ensure goods and materials may be procured and delivered where required. The UNDP office in Tripoli will lead coordination efforts with UNSMIL and the UNCT to ensure most effective use of United Nations communications and transportation arrangements.
7. To address the fourth risk – mobilizing insufficient resources for the programme due to continued instability – UNDP will develop resource mobilization and partnership strategies to strengthen relationships with existing bilateral and multilateral development partners, including the Government. It is estimated that government resources will also be available despite the recent crises as the country possesses significant resources to be assigned to development initiatives. UNDP will also diversify its resource base, exploring opportunities for innovative partnerships, particularly South-South, triangular and private sector cooperation.
8. The programme will expand use of corporate project quality assurance standards and tools to ensure linkages to the UNSF and the principle of “reaching the furthest behind first” are embedded in project design, especially the inclusion target groups in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of projects. UNDP will train staff and inform national counterparts regarding the application of social and environmental standards and accountability mechanisms, as required.

# IV. Monitoring and evaluation

1. The lack of reliable statistical data constitutes a major constraint to formulating, monitoring and evaluating development policies and strategies given the weak capacity of the national statistics authority to collect, process and analyse data. Given the inadequacies of national statistical systems, the UNSF outcomes do not contain specific indicators.
2. Consequently, the country programme will be monitored primarily through data generated internally by UNDP. Priority will be given, however, to allocating resources to ensure that project design and results frameworks include indicators disaggregated by sex and other variables where possible and identify data gaps to be addressed for quality monitoring of results and to identify opportunities to establish baseline data to help monitor progress in future years. UNDP will use innovative project monitoring mechanisms in partnership with municipal councils, tribal leaders and civil society to ensure downward accountability toward beneficiaries. These include geo-tagged photography of UNDP civil works projects to map and monitor progress and increased monitoring of local social media commentary about UNDP projects.
3. UNDP will invest in building in-house capacity and will explore possibilities to build national counterparts’ capabilities for data collection. UNDP will build on its past cooperation with government and international partners in undertaking sectoral assessments[[26]](#footnote-26) to help build the knowledge base in the country for the benefit of all partners.
4. UNDP will ensure review of project evaluations to draw appropriate lessons from interventions, test the underlying programme strategy and inform future programming. Similarly, the country office will improve gender analysis within the projects to better target women beneficiaries and utilize the UNDP gender marker to monitor expenditure and improve gender-based planning and decision-making. Monitoring and evaluation costs will be covered from project budgets.
5. UNDP will supplement project board meetings and annual project reviews with systems for continuous dynamic programme oversight through project monitoring visits (with increased participation of donors, civil society and beneficiaries), financial spot-checks and informal engagement with project and counterpart staff and civil society to identify substantive or operational risks to project implementation.
6. To increase the transparency, visibility and impact of UNDP interventions, UNDP will intensify efforts to communicate development results to stakeholders, beneficiaries and partners.

**Annex. Results and resources framework for Libya (2019-2020)**

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **NATIONAL PRIORITY OR GOAL: Not available** | | | | |
| **Sustainable Development Goals: 16, 10 and 5** | | | | |
| **UNSF outcome involving UNDP No. 1:** **By late 2020, core government functions will be strengthened and Libyan institutions and civil society, at all levels, will be better able to respond to the needs of the people (Libyans, migrants and refugees) through transparent, inclusive gender-sensitive decision-making processes abiding by the democratic principles of division of power and rule of law** | | | | |
| **RELATED STRATEGIC OUTCOME:** Strengthening resilience to shocks and crises | | | | |
| **UNSF outcome indicators, baselines, and targets** | **Data source and frequency of data collection, and responsibilities** | **Indicative country programme outputs *(including indicators, baselines and targets)*** | **Major partners/ partnerships** | **Indicative resources by outcome ($)** |
| Indicators are being developed as part of the UNSF | In house, varies according to annual workplans, project team | **Output 1.1 Space for national reconciliation is created addressing community needs and mutual interests**  ***Indicator 1.1.1. Number of reconciliation dialogues created at the national level***  Baseline: 1 (East), 1 (West), 2 (South)  Target: 8 (East), 8 (West), 8 (South)  Source: UNDP  ***Indicator 1.1.2 Percentage of community initiatives based on the dialogue agreements***  Baseline: 0%  Target: 50%  Source: UNDP  ***Indicator 1.1.3 Number of media professionals reached out for conflict-sensitive journalism and communication enhancement***  Baseline: 0  Target: 50  Source: UNDP  ***Indicator 1.1.4.*** ***Number of municipalities with conflict mediation capacity strengthened***  Baseline: 8 (Ubari, Sirt, Sabha, Bani Walid, Tripoli, Murzuq, Kufra, Sabratha)  Target: 10 (those above, plus Tawergha, Ajdabiya)  Source: UNDP | Ministries of Justice and of Interior, Judicial Council, Presidential Council, High National Electoral Commission, High Judicial Institute, Office of Audit, National Anti-Corruption Commission, municipalities  UNSMIL, UN-Women, UNICEF, UNODC  Media, CSOs  European Union | **Regular**  **$145, 280**  **Other**  **$29,100,000** |
|  | **Output 1.2: High Commission for National Elections (HNEC) capacity to conduct inclusive, credible and transparent elections enhanced**  ***Indicator 1.2. 1: Percentage of HNEC local representations in place***  Baseline: 20%  Target: 80%  Source: UNDP/HNEC  ***Indicator 1.2.2: Number of initiatives adopted by the HNEC to increase the political participation of vulnerable groups, women and youth***  Baseline: 0  Target: 2  Source: UNDP/HNEC |  |
|  |  | **Output 1. 3 Existing transitional justice mechanisms strengthened**  ***Indicator 1.3.1. Number of transitional justice strategies developed at local or regional level***  Baseline: 1  Target: 3  Source: UNDP  ***Indicator 1.3.2. Number of judges trained on addressing serious international crimes***  Baseline: 2  Target: 6  Source: UNDP  ***Indicator 1.3.3. Number of prosecutors trained on addressing serious international crimes***  Baseline: 10  Target: 30  Source: UNDP |  |  |
| **Output 1.4. National capacities to advance safety and security improved, including through more effective and community-oriented policing and rule of law services.**  ***Indicator 1.4.1 Ministries with support to enhanced management of finances, assets, human resources and procurement***  Baseline: 0  Target: 1  Source: UNDP  ***Indicator 1.4.2 Number of technical support initiatives for anti-corruption***  Baseline: 0  Target: 2  Source: UNDP  ***Indicator 1.4.3 Draft of the National DDR strategy***  Baseline: 0  Target: 1  Source: UNDP |
|  |  | **Output 1.5. Enhanced integration of women's rights in transitional institutions**  ***Indicator 1.5.1 Number of women in key institutions with increased skills to perform their functions.***  Baseline: 90  Target: 180  Source: UNDP/UNSMIL  ***Indicator 1.5.2. Women’s caucus established in the parliament***  Baseline: 0  Target: 1  Source: UNDP/UNSMIL  ***Indicator 1.5.3 Number of legal or policy frameworks to promote gender equality***  Baseline: 0  Target: 2.  Source: UNDP/UNSMIL |  |  |
| **Output 1.6.** **Mechanisms for civil society participation are in place**  ***Indicator 1.6.1. Number of CSO-Government dialogue mechanisms created***  Baseline: 0  Target: 1 national, 1 local  Source: UNDP/UNSMIL |
| **National priority or goal: Not available** | | | | |
| **Sustainable Development Goals 10, 5 and 1** | | | | |
| **UNSF outcome involving UNDP No. 3 By late 2020, relevant Libyan institutions improved their capacity to design, develop and implement social policies that focus on quality social services delivery for all women and girls, men and boys (including vulnerable groups, migrants and refugees) in Libya towards enhancing human security and reducing inequalities.** | | | | |
| **RELATED STRATEGIC PLAN OUTCOME:** Strengthening resilience to shocks and crises | | | | |
| Indicators are being developed as part of the UNSF | In house, varies according to annual workplans, project team | **Output 3.1. Improved local public services and upgraded infrastructure to enhance accessibility and boost resilient local economic development, in targeted regions of the country**  ***Indicator 3.1.1. Number of municipalities supported for public service delivery***  Baseline: 7  Target: 20  Source: UNDP  ***Indicator 3.1.2.*** ***Number of people with improved access to public services in the ten targeted areas affected by conflict.***  Baseline: 800,000  Target: 1.1 million (of which 49% women, 30% youth, 15% IDPs/refugees)  Source: UNDP  **Output 3.2 Local economic recovery/development supported**  ***Indicator 3.2.1. Number of demand-driven apprenticeship programmes organized in partnership with private sector companies***  Baseline: one  Target: at least two  Source: UNDP  ***Indicator 3.2.2 Number of start-ups supported in Libya***  Baseline: 0  Target: 90  Source: UNDP  ***Indicator 3.2.3 Number of local business incubators/economic literacy centres are established and fully functional.***  Baseline: 1 (Benghazi)  Target: 3 (Tripoli, Sabha – based on the security situation) - First round of business incubators expected in 2018.  Source: UNDP  ***Indicator 3.2.4 Number of*** new ***jobs created with UNDP support, including share of women, youth***  Baseline (2018): 0  Target: Total - 1,000, Women – 200, men -800; youth  Source: UNDP | Ministry of Health, GECOL, REAOL, municipalities, local councils  UNSMIL, UNICEF, WHO  CSOs, tribal leaders, private sector companies (Toyota)  *Bilateral and multilateral partners:* European Union | **Regular:**  **$308,720**  **Other:**  **$62,500,00** |

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1. UNDP, *Human Development Report*, 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. United Nations Country Team Libya (UNCT), Joint *Common Assessment,* 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. International Crisis Group, *The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for a Reset,* 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. UNCT Libya, 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Bradburys, *Conflict Analysis of the Libyan Civil War,* 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Of 1,352 development indicators tracked by the World Bank, just 120 show updated information for Libya. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Mo Ibrahim Foundation, *Index of African Governance Report,* 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. UNCT Libya, 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. United Nations, World Bank, European Union, *Libya Risk and Resilience Assessment (draft),* 2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. UNDP, *Rule of Law and Access to Justice Assessment,* 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, February 2018 (S/2018/140). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. A recent Human Rights Watch report cited 1,900 out of 2,400 such detainees have been held for over four years. (HRW, *The Endless Wait: Long-Term Arbitrary Detentions and Torture in West Libya*, 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Recent estimates indicate approximately one third of the population lives below the poverty line. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. 84 per cent in 2012 (International Labour Organization estimate). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Helen Chapin Metz, ed., *Libya: A Country Study*, Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. World Health Organization, *Service Availability and Readiness Assessment,* 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. UNCT Libya, 2017. However, the recent rise in oil prices has helped to stabilize the situation. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. United Nations Population Fund, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Net Med Youth, *National Consultation About Youth Peace and Security - Libya Case: Study on Youth, Social Integration and Participation in Building Peace and Security,* 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. *Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Libya (*A/HRC/34/42), 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. *Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence,* (S/2016/361), 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. UNDP, evaluation of the Libyan Electoral Assistance Project, 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Country office’s own observations. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. These may include, but are not limited to, migrants, IDPs, returnees, tribal minorities, women, youth and persons with disabilities. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Previous assessments cover public administration, local governance and security sector reform. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)