




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LIVELIHOODS IN YEMEN

A mapping of needs and current support
December 2024



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Foreword

Throughout its long history, Yemen has always been a centre of economic and cultural exchange. Graced by a strategic geographical position, its people have been exposed to influences and innovations, cultural and economic trends, recreating and passing them on to neighbouring and distant countries and cultures.

After nine years of conflict, the resilience of Yemeni communities continues but the situation in the country remains critical for many, with 18 million people in need of humanitarian assistance.

Once more, Yemen and its communities are impacted by external events, risking a reversal in the incremental achievements so laboriously reached in past years. Those achievements should be preserved with our utmost capacity. The humanitarian interventions provided in past years have greatly limited and contained the devastating effects of the crisis.

The report we are presenting here illustrates pathways not only to preserve but to build on the efforts and results of humanitarian interventions of recent years, and to best support the economic resilience of Yemeni communities. It highlights the need to support the economic resilience of households through access to more predictable and stable forms of income to substantially reduce communities' vulnerability.

It is through the ability of private sector actors to rely on a more predictable and enabling environment and the ability of local authorities to provide services to their communities that economic development achievements can become sustainable. Wherever possible, it is imperative to put the greatest effort into making that possible.

Through a humanitarian-development-peace nexus, UNDP has been and will continue to work with Yemeni communities, the private sector, civil society organizations, and local and central authorities to consolidate achievements and support inclusive and sustainable economic recovery and stability for the Yemeni people.

Zena Ali Ahmad

UNDP Yemen Resident Representative

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Acronyms

BMZ	Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (Germany)
CERF	United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund
DFA	De-facto authorities in control of northern governorates (including Sana'a)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FSLA	Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment
GDP	Gross domestic product
GIZ	German Corporation for International Cooperation
HDDS	Household Dietary Diversity Score
HHS	Household Hunger Scale
IDPs	Internally displaced persons
ILO	International Labour Organization
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
IRG	Internationally recognized Government of Yemen in control of the southern governorates (including Aden)
KfW	Credit Institute for Reconstruction (Germany)
MSME	Micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPP	Purchasing power parity
PWP	Public Works Project
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SFD	Social Fund for Development
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SME	Small and medium-sized enterprises
SMEPS	Small and Microenterprise Promotion Service
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
YRRF	Yemen Relief and Reconstruction Foundation



Executive summary

Executive summary

Introduction

This report provides a critical mapping and overview of livelihood interventions from 2018 to 2023 to inform the development of a UNDP strategy on livelihoods. The mapping is backed by analysis of available data and interviews with key development partners, implementing agencies and government institutions. The report is not intended to provide an in-depth analysis of Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) data collected by the Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA).

Such data are scarce and mostly inaccessible. It is important to note that the FSLA data analysed in this report are not raw data but provide percentages of households or population shares for key indicators at the district level.

In depth analysis of livelihoods in Yemen would still require access to additional existing data and the generation of new data through more fit-for-purpose designed surveys (e.g., households' income and expenditure surveys). A comprehensive evaluation and/or impact assessment of various projects and interventions in Yemen is also beyond the scope of this report.

IPC indicators of food security and livelihoods measure the current state at the time of the data collection, which is result of combined effects of many factors, such as conflict, inflation, availability of goods and services (including food) in the markets, exchange rate, and various taxes and customs. Isolating each of these factors and analyzing their impact, while needed, requires more disaggregated data and is beyond the scope of this report. Isolating each factor and analysing its impacts, while needed, requires more disaggregated data. IPC indicators take into account differences in purchasing power parity (PPP) and real prices between areas of Yemen controlled by the internationally recognized government (IRG) and de facto authorities (DFA). Future analysis of livelihoods in Yemen will require access to additional existing data and the generation of new data through more fit-for-purpose surveys (e.g., household income and expenditure surveys).

Most projects mentioned in this report are ongoing. Independent impact assessments and evaluations of projects are scarce, with few exceptions, making it difficult to assess project results and impacts.

Background

Yemen is facing a severe humanitarian crisis, exacerbated by ongoing conflict, economic collapse and natural disasters. Even before the conflict, Yemen was classified as a least developed country struggling with poverty and limited economic opportunities. Conflict has fragmented the country into two distinct economic zones with significant disparities. Food production, particularly of cereals, has declined dramatically. Dependence on imported food has increased, leading to higher vulnerability amid fluctuating exchange rates. The expiration of the United Nations-sponsored truce and recent developments in the Red Sea have pushed the economy further into recession.

Food security

Despite some initial progress in the first months of 2023, Yemen has regressed into heightened food insecurity since June 2023. IPC analysis suggests that 45 percent (approximately 4.6 million) of people in IRG areas are likely to experience crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity in 2024. Rural areas have higher poverty rates compared to urban areas. Larger households and those with disabled members experience greater poverty.

IPC food security indicators vary significantly across southern governorates and districts. According to FSLA data, Ma'rib recorded the highest percentage of households (20 percent) based on the Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS) of Phase 3 (crisis). It also showed the highest percentage of households on the Household Hunger Scale (HHS) of Phase 3 (22 percent), Phase 4 (4 percent) and Phase 5 (2 percent). At the other end of the spectrum, residents of Aden and Socotra seemed to score relatively better than other governorates based on Food Consumption Score (FCS) as well as HDDS and HHS indicators.

Food insecurity in DFA-controlled areas is more severe compared to the southern governorates under the IRG. On average, higher percentages of households/individuals are categorized in IPC Phases 3, 4 and 5 for all indicators across all governorates and districts in DFA-controlled areas compared to IRG-controlled ones. Al Jawf governorate has the highest percentage of households in HDDS Phase 5 (16 percent), followed by Raymah (8 percent), and Sa'dah and Sana'a City (7 percent each).

PPP varies between IRG- and DFA-controlled areas. When comparing the prices of food stuff or goods in both areas, the currency/value of the money used to purchase items is different, and in many cases, cheaper in areas under IRG control. Additionally, 90 percent of wheat and all rice are imported. Significant shares of other agricultural products are also imported. This puts governorates in DFA-controlled areas at a disadvantage due to restrictions on imports and financial transactions. The DFA charges additional customs for goods and commodities imported through IRG-controlled ports, increasing prices.

Correlation analysis indicates a very weak or no correlation among the FCS, HDDS and HHS indicators across all districts in Yemen, which is possible since the indicators measure various aspects of household food security using different methodologies. Stark variations across districts and governorates may be explained by several factors, including internal migration; high numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs); considerable differences in access to livelihood opportunities, infrastructure and public services, as well as the intensity and impact of armed conflict; and the random violence and/or armed conflicts that arise in some areas, disrupting livelihoods and causing further population displacement. Further analysis of raw data is needed to investigate which areas face the highest levels of stress.

Food and livelihoods assistance

According to FSLA 2023 survey data, food and livelihood assistance varies across the country. Food assistance comprises a far larger share; livelihoods assistance remains insignificant. The average percentage of the population not receiving any food assistance in the previous six months differs among districts and governorates, ranging from as high as 95 percent in Socotra and around 81 percent in Ad Dali', Sana'a City and Dhamar to as low as 47 and 45 percent in Al Mahwit and Ma'rib, respectively, and 51 percent in Al Hodeidah. In Hadramawt governorate, some districts reported only 11 percent of households not receiving any food assistance in the previous six months. This compares to 94 percent in Ar Raydah wa Qussay'ar and Ad Dis districts, in the same governorate.

The statistical distribution of food assistance, measured by standard deviation and variance, is more significant for those receiving assistance within the last month. This suggests a higher degree of concentration and declines in assistance received within two to three months, more so for assistance received within six months, indicating less concentration and more widespread distribution. The data show that some districts, on average, receive substantial amounts of and more frequent assistance, while others are neglected.

A regression analysis was used to investigate the relationship between the percentage of the population receiving food and livelihoods assistance (as independent variables) and the

percentage of households in different IPC phases, namely, FCS, HDDS and HHS, as dependent variables. The results do not yield a perfect regression model fit for each dependent variable with only one independent variable (food assistance or livelihoods assistance). When both independent variables are included, however, and non-linearity and collinearity are adjusted for, the model yields a significantly better fit. While the analysis shows weak correlation between the percentage of the population receiving food assistance in the last six months and IPC food security indicators, it shows strong correlation with the relative availability of sustainable means of livelihoods, including stable government income (e.g., Aden) and/or relatively sustainable value chains, such as wheat in Al-Qatn and Tarim districts, henna in Ghail Bawazeer district and fishery in Ash Shihr district, all of which scored significantly better on IPC food security indicators.

Sources of income and livelihoods

There are significant disparities between IRG- and DFA-controlled areas in terms of sources of primary income. Casual labour is the main source for nearly 54.2 percent of the population in northern governorates, exceeding 50 percent in all governorates except Al Mahwit (25 percent), Al Jawf (33 percent), Sa'dah (30 percent) and Ma'rib (45 percent). Only 3 percent of people in the northern governorates relies on government salaries and/or pensions as a primary source of income, ranging from 1 percent in Hajjah to 11 percent in Ma'arib. On average, Sana'a City and Ma'arib have the highest percentages relying on government salaries and/or pensions as a primary source of income, at 11 and 7 percent, respectively. Unlike in governorates in DFA areas, government salaries/pensions are key sources of primary income for around 32.5 percent of the population in governorates under the IRG, ranging from 77 and 57 percent in Socotra and Aden, respectively, to 13.4 percent in Al Hodeidah.

The second most important source of primary income in southern governorates is casual labour, for 26.1 percent of the population, followed by own production (subsistence) for 15.3 percent. Subsistence production in northern governorates is not a key primary or secondary source of income. Humanitarian assistance is by far a more significant (primary and/or secondary) source there. It is the second largest primary source of income for around 18 percent of the population in northern governorates, compared to only 6.7 percent in southern governorates.

There is high irregularity in both primary and secondary sources of income across all governorates. Only a small proportion of the population reported having regular or seasonal (which is somewhat predictable and stable) primary or secondary sources of income. This has dire consequences for household abilities to plan and/or sustain minimum living standards, regardless of the size of income received. Income is highly irregular even when key sources of primary income are supposed to be stable (e.g., private sector and professional jobs, and government salaries and pensions). This can be explained by overall economic and political instability and poor and erratic economic growth. The irregularity of primary and secondary income in northern governorates is much higher than in southern governorates.

Sources of vulnerability

Sources of vulnerability were assessed based on FSLA data in response to a survey question: "During the past six months, what were the main drivers that significantly affected the household's ability to produce/purchase/access sufficient food?" While designed to assess shocks and constraints faced by households, the question also points to the main sources and causes of vulnerability as perceived by households.

Sources of vulnerability varied considerably across governorates and districts. Most respondents in southern governorates identified economic factors, including low income, high food inflation, a

lack of job opportunities and rising fuel prices, as the primary sources of their vulnerability. Conflict and a lack of security were reported by 7.4 percent of households, yet ranked after food inflation (60.5 percent) and a lack of job opportunities (14.2 percent). More respondents in northern governorates identified war, conflict and related blockades as the main sources of vulnerability, although the formulation of the survey question, which included the blockade and sanctions on the DFA, may have contributed to inflating the numbers of responses. On average, 48.7 percent of all respondents in northern governorates, compared to only 7.4 percent in IRG-controlled areas, ranked war, conflict and related blockades as the leading cause of vulnerability, followed by economic factors, namely, the lack and irregularity of income opportunities and access to credit (23.3 percent) and inflation affecting food, fuel and health services (13.5 percent). Insufficient and irregular humanitarian assistance was ranked fourth as a source of vulnerability.

It is important to note that while significance of sources of vulnerability, measured by the percentage of households, varies considerably across governorates and districts. Additionally, the formulation of the question in the survey, which includes the blockade and sanctions on the DFA, when asking respondents on the shocks and constraints (used as an indicator for source of vulnerability) may have contributed to inflating the numbers of responses.

Overview of current support to Yemen

Support to Yemen is delivered via humanitarian or development assistance. According to the World Bank,¹ the distinction between these two types of assistance is clear in terms of settings, duration and impact, objectives and financing, and types of benefits provided. Since the beginning of the conflict, humanitarian assistance has been largely delivered by the World Food Programme (WFP) and other United Nations agencies as well as local organizations, such as the Yemen Social Fund for Development (SFD), the Public Works Project (PWP) and the Small and Medium Enterprise Promotion Service (SMEPS). Development assistance is usually delivered by United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) through livelihood support projects. While most projects attempt to integrate humanitarian and development approaches, including by addressing emergency needs and providing livelihood support to prepare for post-conflict recovery and reconstruction, there has been, understandably, a stronger focus on humanitarian assistance. This is evident from FSLA data, interviews with development and implementing partners, and the mapping of current projects in Yemen.

Food assistance does not seem to have a positive impact on the livelihoods and resilience of households. High operational costs, which include transport, security and distribution to remote areas, accompany logistical challenges and risks related to conflict and black-market sales. Cash-based assistance has been recognized as a more efficient and effective mode of intervention.

Cash assistance is provided by most initiatives in Yemen, including through unconditional cash transfers, conditional cash transfers, cash-for-nutrition, direct cash transfers, wage employment (cash-for-work) programmes or vouchers (or e-vouchers). This humanitarian relief approach puts more focus on wider coverage than on substantial assistance and lasting gains.

Livelihood support initiatives emphasize rebuilding or rehabilitating infrastructure such as roads, agricultural land, irrigation systems, schools and health facilities, and engage the war-affected population in economic activities, utilizing their skills, experience and assets. Many projects and programmes include the development of market opportunities, links with local or regional markets and the private sector, the development of micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), access to resources and infrastructure, and vocational trainings. Several projects include capacity

¹ World Bank, Social Protection at the Humanitarian Development Nexus : Insights from Yemen, 2021 and World Bank. IDA's Role in an Increasingly Complex Global Aid Architecture. 2024

development components for central or local institutions. United Nations organizations and international NGOs lead on livelihood interventions due to greater access to development expertise, funding and resources.

Geographical coverage is complicated. The ongoing conflict makes it challenging to maintain accurate and comprehensive data on the reach of existing projects. Numerous partners operate in Yemen, delivering a variety of projects and programmes, with diverse geographical emphases depending on objectives, implementation and management modalities, funding, security and logistical factors. Some implementing partners conduct activities in selected governorates linked to specific project designs (for example, targeting areas with IDPs or remote districts), while others work across wider regions and cover all 22 governorates. Project locations and targets can shift or change due to emerging needs and evolving priorities as well as restrictions on access to certain areas.

Mapping of livelihood interventions from 2018 to 2023

This report provides a detailed mapping of livelihood interventions from 2018 to 2023, based on information available from open sources and interviews conducted with key development partners. The list of initiatives is not exhaustive. Further, the limited availability of information, particularly progress reports and independent evaluations, makes it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of ongoing projects. Where possible, information on progress, impacts, risks and challenges is reflected under each project. As of November 2023, 142 aid organizations, including 9 United Nations organizations, 90 national NGOs and 43 international NGOs were actively implementing the Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan across all districts. The humanitarian response has been scaled up impressively and slowed the collapse of basic services while containing the negative impacts of food insecurity and reversing high levels of acute malnutrition.

Concluding remarks

The ongoing humanitarian crisis in Yemen has resulted in a focus on immediate food assistance. But there is a critical need to transition from relief-based aid to long-term development strategies. These should be based on accurate economic information, essential for designing interventions aimed at supporting livelihoods, employment, and economic growth at local and national levels. The conflict, which has fractured the country into two distinct economic zones controlled by the DFA and IRG, has resulted in significant disparities in purchasing power, inflation and access to income. DFA-controlled regions face higher vulnerability due to limited livelihoods, steeper food prices and greater inflation driven by restrictive import policies and a weakened currency. IRG areas benefit from more stable sources of income, such as government salaries, but also show signs of increased dependency on foreign aid.

The analysis in this report reveals a weak correlation between the amount of humanitarian aid and food security improvements. Cash assistance programmes offer only short-term relief, often leading to inflation and not addressing the root causes of vulnerability. Governance issues, logistical challenges and bureaucratic barriers complicate aid delivery, especially in remote or hard-to-reach areas.

Varying causes of vulnerability, even within the same governorates, indicate a need for more micro- and community-level assessments and projects, and differentiated approaches that consider local specificities. In general, however, the sustainability and stability of livelihoods is crucial and should be more systematically factored into project design. For example, while war and conflict were identified as the most prominent source of vulnerability in northern governorates, those were ranked way low on the list in the IRG controlled areas, where key economic and developmental factors (e.g., lack and irregularity of employment, income and livelihoods opportunities and inflation) were the most prominent.

FSLA data analysis indicates a geographical concentration of assistance. While some districts and communities receive substantial amounts, others receive little or no assistance at all. This was confirmed by the mapping of projects and stakeholder interviews. There is a high degree of overlap and duplication among interventions, including based on geographical location and types of beneficiaries. Several reports and interviews pointed out that the same recipients often receive assistance through different projects and sources. There are few local implementing partners in Yemen, and they are carrying out projects on behalf of all donors and international organizations, resulting in duplication and overlap through attempts to reduce transaction costs as well as a tendency to avoid communities that are remote and/or are costly to access.

Various projects suffer from design flaws due to a relief approach as well as implementation shortcomings. The latter include gaps in implementing partner capacity, project coverage, and the number and selection of beneficiaries. Conditional and unconditional cash transfers, including cash-for-work, have inherent limitations, indicated by the weak correlation between assistance received and food security. Transfers may also provide a false sense of delivering relief even with very limited impacts on livelihoods and local economies. Further, when considerable numbers of beneficiaries in a small district or village receive cash, there will be a short-lived surge in local consumption. If this is not met by a proportional increase in the supply of goods and services, it will feed inflation. Due to the insufficient capacities of local private businesses, a lack of an enabling environment and supportive infrastructure, and the temporary and irregular nature of cash assistance programmes, local business will be either unable or unwilling to increase the output and supply of goods and services or make long-term investments to cater to short-term surges in demand.

While humanitarian and food assistance may have indeed contributed to saving lives, is not sufficient to create sustainable livelihoods. The substantial number of projects and the amount of funding invested into the country will only yield substantial results when sustainability is factored in project design. There is a strong dependency by national and local government institutions that needs to be addressed. Only economic development, including the generation of sustainable and productive private sector, can generate revenues to finance and sustain the functions of government agencies. There is also an observed weak trickle-down effect as the impact of assistance, mostly cash transfers, has a short-term localized impact. This trickle-down effect can only be stimulated through development projects. Granted cash assistance may still be utilized for a limited scope and duration, yet this must be a part of larger interventions that aim at promoting economic development, enhancing productivity and value addition, supporting private sector growth, and hence creating sustainable livelihoods and income generating opportunities as well as enhancing supply of goods and services and generating revenue for the national and local government through taxes.

Moving forward calls for a shift to a development approach. This includes focusing on sustainable livelihoods, value chain development and community-based interventions. Improved coordination among international organizations, better targeting of assistance and efforts addressing economic vulnerabilities are essential to reduce aid dependency and foster long-term resilience. Key recommendations include enhancing data collection, fostering private sector growth, and integrating economic development into humanitarian efforts to create more stable and sustainable local economies.

Policy recommendations

1. Support the structuring of a comprehensive humanitarian–development–peace nexus approach to transition from humanitarian to development assistance wherever possible. This should focus on creating opportunities for sustainable livelihoods, starting at the community level, with a clear strategy to expand to the district, governorate and national

levels. Moving across these levels would allow the piloting and expansion of projects, without resorting to the current approach of creating dedicated pilot projects that may or may not be scaled up. Projects should not be designed as pilots but rather as fully fledged initiatives tailored to a specific level with options for expansion and replication to higher levels. Feasibility studies and background research before designing projects will need to explore scaling up and replication potentials and requirements.

2. In devising a transition from humanitarian to development assistance, it is important to bear in mind that that pre-conflict Yemen was a least developed country with high rates of income and human poverty, vulnerability, inequality and food insecurity. Returning to the pre-crisis situation, which is the best result humanitarian assistance can achieve, should not be the desired outcome. Development assistance, on the other hand, could help address structural developmental challenges that have and continue to hinder the country's development. That does not mean ceasing all humanitarian assistance. Instead, it requires shifting the focus to development assistance and integrating humanitarian assistance into development assistance projects. Further, humanitarian assistance can be redesigned to have sustainable development impacts, such as through creating livelihoods and building community resilience.
3. The transition from humanitarian to development assistance will entail shifting from temporary interventions (e.g., temporary employment, cash-for-work and cash transfers) to more permanent and sustainable solutions. It will also require moving from interventions that yield fast results (e.g., temporary jobs) to those aimed at creating sustainable value chains and ecosystems that will organically generate sustainable employment and livelihood opportunities. The latter approach will not yield quick results. It could, however, generate sustainable and transformational impacts over the medium and longer term.
4. Investment in supporting, developing and promoting promising value chains should utilize a cluster development approach that strengthens industries and services around and/or in proximity to value chains, creating sustainable and productive communities and development ecosystems.
5. Value chain development should be integrated into rural development projects, while investment in infrastructure should focus on elements linked to, and needed by, value chains.
6. Enhancing domestic value added would entail supporting the private sector to move up the value chain and create local value chains.
7. Investments in promising value chains should be diversified and aimed at strengthening linkages among them and supporting shared industries and services, such as finance and logistics, used by more than one value chain.
8. Expanding development assistance from generating employment opportunities to livelihoods opportunities should incorporate self-employment and entrepreneurial activities, particularly in rural areas.
9. An in-depth analysis should evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian/food assistance.
10. Investment in value chains and a market-oriented ecosystem should integrate and balance support to both supply and demand sides. Creating value chains with no sizable demand for products will fail. Enhancing effective demand, through cash infusions, where there is no supply of goods and services will only feed inflation. A balanced approach should diversify and expand market access beyond local communities to districts and governorates within Yemen. It could also seek to tap into exports to regional markets to complement domestic demand, which is expectedly low due to widespread poverty.
11. Investment in supporting the private sector, particularly MSMEs, should strive to enhance its growth and capacity to generate sustainable livelihood opportunities. This will entail addressing various challenges faced by the private sector, including access to finance, markets, input materials, financial and other services, and supportive entrepreneurial

activities. UNDP's recent study on rural income development in Yemen points to an increasing interest in entrepreneurial activities and self-employment.ⁱ Fostering entrepreneurial activities through capacity-building and incubation programmes could lead to the generation of livelihoods through the creation of MSMEs. Integrating these enterprises into value chains and clusters would enhance their sustainability and growth, and contribute to value addition.

12. Scaling up efforts to support and formalize informal businesses and entrepreneurial activities, particularly in rural communities, could enhance their access to services and markets and facilitate their integration into local and national economies. Monitoring their growth and sustainability could contribute to the design of poverty and vulnerability reduction interventions targeting vulnerable groups, who are often concentrated in the informal sector.
13. Bolstering the participation of women and marginalized groups, including IDPs, in economic activities should encompass addressing barriers to participation, including a lack of access to training, microfinance, financial services, markets and supplies.
14. Investment in greater financial inclusion will strengthen the growth and sustainability of the private sector and contribute to poverty reduction. UNDP's recent study on rural income development in Yemen² indicates a favourable environment for digital financial inclusion due to high levels of mobile smartphone ownership.
15. Breaking the dependency cycle and building resilience, particularly in rural and vulnerable communities, calls for investing in social safety nets and climate-smart value chains. Development assistance interventions must incorporate clear exit and sustainability strategies at various levels, starting at the project level.
16. Investment should strengthen governance at the micro and meso levels, through capacity-building and the active engagement of local and district governance institutions in development projects. Strengthened local, district and governorate institutions may also serve as local partners.

² UNDP, Market Study: Rural Income Development in Yemen, 2024



Introduction

Introduction

This report provides a critical mapping and overview of livelihood interventions from 2018 to 2023 to inform the development of a UNDP strategy on livelihoods. The mapping is backed by analysis of available data and interviews with key development partners, implementing agencies and government institutions. The report is not intended to provide an in-depth analysis of the Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA). Such data are scarce and mostly inaccessible. Data analysed in this report are not raw data but provide percentages of households or population shares for key indicators at the district level.

IPC indicators of food security and livelihoods measure the current state at the time of data collection, a result of the combined effects of many factors, such as conflict, inflation, the availability of goods and services (including food) in markets, the exchange rate, and various taxes and customs. Isolating each factor and analysing its impacts, while needed, requires more disaggregated data. IPC indicators take into account differences in purchasing power parity (PPP) and real prices between areas of Yemen controlled by the internationally recognized government (IRG) and de facto authorities (DFA). Future analysis of livelihoods in Yemen will require access to additional existing data and the generation of new data through more fit-for-purpose surveys (e.g., household income and expenditure surveys).

Most projects mentioned in this report are ongoing. Independent impact assessments and evaluations of projects are scarce, with few exceptions, making it difficult to assess project results and impacts.

Background

Yemen, a nation marred by the relentless onslaught of conflict, economic collapse and natural disasters, finds itself in the throes of a severe humanitarian crisis. Twenty years ago, according to a 2003 Household Income and Expenditure Survey conducted by the Government of Yemen with UNDP support, about 27 percent of the population lived below the food poverty line, defined as expenditure necessary to procure the minimum 2,200 calories per person per day. Throughout the pre-war period, Yemen was caught in a situation of modest economic growth that generated few employment opportunities even as the number of workers continually multiplied. Women began joining the labour force in increasing numbers, and rapid population growth resulted in a high ratio of dependents to workers, approaching five to one.ⁱⁱ

Before its current crisis, Yemen was classified as a least developed country grappling with high poverty rates and deeply entrenched socioeconomic challenges, leading to low levels of economic growth and human development. The economy heavily depended on declining hydrocarbon exports; import-driven trade, with about 90 percent of wheat and all rice sourced from abroad; and services such as banking and telecommunications. To finance imports and stabilize the Yemeni currency, the Government relied on foreign currency earned through oil and gas exports as well as remittances from Yemeni workers abroad. Oil and gas revenues supported a significant public sector wage bill and substantial fuel subsidies, but also facilitated corruption, perpetuated fiscal and monetary crises, and left the country susceptible to international fluctuations in commodity prices. Declines in global oil prices led to sharp drops in State revenues, while increases raised income and escalated the cost of fuel subsidies, which surpassed oil export earnings by 2014.ⁱⁱⁱ Once conflict set in, the country fractured into two distinct economic zones, each governed by unique institutions and policies, with increasing disparity between them. These disparities are glaringly evident in FSLA indicators on livelihoods and food insecurity.

All food production in Yemen is declining due to the conflict but cereals have seen the sharpest decrease of any crop over the past decade. Drop-offs have occurred at various paces in different governorates. Overall, in the last 15 years, the peak year for cereal production was 2010 and the

worst year was 2018. The need to maximize monetary income has probably driven a shift away from cereals. But this has deep ecological and social consequences. Rainfed cereals are being replaced by commercial crops using unsustainable pump irrigation. Further, commercial crops favour men's control over farm production and profits.^{iv} This has boosted dependency on imports, particularly for staple commodities such as wheat and rice.

In tandem, a shortage of foreign exchange and exchange rate depreciation have impacted the supply and prices of food imports, contributing to inflation and food insecurity. These have affected IRG and DFA areas in different ways due to large variations in exchange rates, monetary indicators and policies as well as political factors. For instance, the exchange rate for new rial banknotes (used in IRG governorates) on 25 April 2022 was YER 1,040 per United States dollar, while the rate for old rial banknotes (used in DFA areas) was YER 565 per dollar. Prices in dollars in Marib, Mukalla, Seyoun and Taiz were calculated using the same exchange rate reported in Aden, despite varying rates in governorates under IRG control. Although there is a noticeable connection between exchange rate depreciation and rising food prices, historical instances of rial appreciation have not led to declines in food prices. This phenomenon is probably linked to the risk inherent in the rial's volatility. Traders find it challenging to adapt prices to accommodate purchases made at less advantageous exchange rates or to recover losses incurred during periods of rapid depreciation.^v

According to the World Bank,³ 2023 posed additional significant challenges for Yemen's economy, primarily due to the expiration of the United Nations-sponsored truce, which triggered a chain of adverse consequences. Other factors were the war in Gaza and developments in the Gulf of Aden. These events are anticipated to push the economy back into a deep recession. The Red Sea developments and the blockade on DFA ports have severely impacted oil production and exports and imports. Furthermore, a strategic decision to import household butane gas directly into areas under the DFA reduced demand for gas from IRG regions. Compounding these concerns are fluctuating currency values, high inflation rates and heightened social unrest, all of which have hampered the non-oil sector, notably the private sector.

The blockade is also severely impacting foreign currency liquidity and exacerbating existing economic difficulties, including the fiscal position of the IRG in areas under its control. The exchange rate has depreciated to historic lows on Aden's market, leading to price increases despite a global decline in commodity prices. Consequently, World Bank economic projections suggest that Yemen's gross domestic product (GDP) is likely to contract by 0.5 percent in 2023, marking a stark contrast with the 1.5 percent growth of the previous year.

Another economic challenge is the decline in imports, coupled with the redirection of remaining imports from Aden to ports under DFA control in the northern governorates, including Sana, which were reopened as part of the United Nations-sponsored truce.^{vi} Data from the Assessment Capacities Project highlighted a significant 61 percent reduction in imports through the Aden port from January to August 2023, whereas the Hodeida port saw a much smaller 8 percent decrease during the same period. This shift had a notable impact on Aden's role in contributing to Yemen's overall imports.^{vii}

According to a recent report covering all governorates controlled by the IRG, a staggering 82.7 percent of people were living in multidimensional poverty, indicating that more than 8 out of every 10 individuals faced significant deprivation across various aspects of life. The intensity of poverty, measured by the average number of deprivations experienced by those living in multidimensional poverty, stood at 46.7 percent. On average, a poor person experienced over 47 percent of weighted deprivations. Rural areas exhibited higher levels of poverty (89.4 percent) compared to urban areas (68.9 percent). Dali' and Al Bayda had the highest incidences of multidimensional

³ World Bank, Yemen Economic Monitor, Fall 2023: "Peace on the Horizon?"

poverty. Ta'iz governorate, with its sizable population, housed an estimated 40 percent of the multidimensionally poor.^{viii}

While female-headed households exhibited a slightly lower incidence of multidimensional poverty (80 percent) compared to male-headed households (83 percent), the disparity was not statistically significant. Households headed by a divorced person had a lower incidence of poverty, whereas households where the male head had multiple wives experienced higher levels of poverty and greater poverty intensity. Larger households also tended to experience higher poverty rates, with incidences rising from 64.4 percent in smaller households to 86.4 percent and 91.1 percent in households with five to nine members and more than nine members, respectively. Households with members with disabilities faced higher levels of multidimensional poverty compared to those without disabilities (86.4 compared to 81.2 percent).^{viii}



Food security

Food security


Yemen has made some progress in addressing food security issues, leading to a 23 percent reduction in the number of people facing a food crisis or emergency, and a slow but steady decline in the number of food insecure people from 5.3 million in 2021 to 3.2 million in 2023.^{ix} Yet it regressed into heightened severe food insecurity in June 2023.^x While there has been a slight improvement in food insecurity levels in 2023 in areas in the south compared to 2022, the number of individuals experiencing severe acute food insecurity remains alarmingly high across all examined districts. Positive developments reported during the initial period of 2023 (January to May) should be regarded as temporary relief, as the fundamental causes of food and nutrition insecurity are anticipated to worsen or persist at severe levels. Moreover, the population with severe needs was predicted to increase from June to December 2023, solidifying Yemen's position as one of the most food insecure nations globally. Acute malnutrition has worsened throughout 2023, compared to 2022.

The latest IPC food security analysis suggests that around 45 percent of people (approximately 4.6 million) in IRG areas are likely to experience high levels of acute food insecurity, classified as crisis (IPC Phase 3) and emergency (IPC Phase 4) from October 2023 to February 2024.^{xi} This indicates the devastating impact of what has been considered for some years to be the world's worst humanitarian crisis. In 2022, over 4 million people, including 2 million children, were displaced.^{xii} With over 21.6 million people in 2023 in dire need of humanitarian assistance, including 10 million children, the urgency of addressing this unfolding tragedy cannot be overstated.

Some 17.7 million people are estimated to need protection services in 2023.^{xiii} From January 2023 to June 2023, 26 percent of the population experienced a food security crisis (Phase 3) compared to 22 percent in 2012, while 8 percent was in a more acute emergency (Phase 4).^{xiv} In 2022, GDP per capita declined to \$1,025, down from \$2,548 in 2010 (in constant 2015 dollars). Unemployment rates increased from 12.8 to 13.7 percent of the labour force during the same period. Female unemployment surged from 20.3 percent in 2010 to 26.3 percent in 2022, and male unemployment rose from 11.8 percent to 12.5 percent.^{xv} Youth unemployment also saw a notable increase, climbing from 21.8 to 25.6 percent.^{xvi}

Between January and May 2023, approximately 3.2 million individuals, comprising roughly a third of the population in IRG-controlled areas, were categorized as in IPC Phase 3 or higher. They comprised 781,000 people in IPC Phase 4 and 2.45 million in IPC Phase 3.^{xvii} This reflects a 23 percent reduction in the number of individuals in IPC Phase 3 or above compared to the period from October to December 2022, and a 13 percent decline compared to the period from January to May 2022. Of 118 districts assessed, 102 were classified as being in IPC Phase 3 or higher, with 3 districts in IPC Phase 4. Worsening food insecurity is expected between June and December 2023, with the number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above forecasted to increase by 20 percent or an additional 638,500 people (Figure 1).^{xviii} This would bring the total to 3.9 million (41 percent of the population).

Figure 1: IPC-projected acute food insecurity, June to December 2023



Source: IPC 2023a.


Hajjah and Al Hodeidah have been identified as the most vulnerable districts, where food insecurity and acute malnutrition converge to extremely elevated levels.^{xix} In 2023, the exacerbation of acute malnutrition in areas under IRG control was anticipated to result in approximately 500,000 children experiencing acute malnutrition, among whom nearly 100,000 children are expected to suffer from severe malnutrition. Additionally, up to a quarter million pregnant and lactating women and girls are projected to be acutely malnourished. The prevalence of child stunting is alarmingly high at 45.1 percent, affecting over 2 million children under age 5. This condition not only has immediate health implications but also poses long-term risks such as poor cognitive development, low school attendance and achievement, and reduced adult productivity. Critical levels of acute malnutrition (classified as IPC AMN Phase 4) persist in certain regions such as Al Hodeidah Southlands, Ta'iz and Lahj Lowlands. It is expected that acute malnutrition levels will deteriorate further. All 16 analysed zones are categorized as IPC AMN Phase 3 (serious) and above, with seven zones classified as IPC AMN Phase 4 (critical). Overall, the most vulnerable areas are in the lowlands of Al Hodeidah, Lahj, Ad Dali' and Ta'iz, where the prevalence of wasting among children under 5 ranges from 17.1 to 23.8 percent, significantly surpassing the World Health Organization (WHO) emergency threshold of 15 percent.

IPC key indicators (FCS, HDDS and HHS)^{xx} vary significantly across southern governorates and districts (Figure 2 and Appendix **Error! Reference source not found.**Table A.1). Ma'rib has the highest percentage of households (20 percent) in HDDS Phase 3 and HHS Phase 3 (22 percent), Phase 4 (4 percent) and Phase 5 (2 percent). Within the governorate of Ma'rib, the city of Ma'rib recorded the worst HDDS and HHS indicators, with the highest percentage of households in Phases 3, 4 and 5. FCS indicators were worse in Ma'rib compared to other governorates. In Harib, 34 percent of households were in FCS Phases 4 and 5 combined (poor), compared to 24 percent in Ma'rib city, while 44 percent of households in Ma'rib city were in FCS Phase 3 (borderline) compared to 33 percent in Harib. Interestingly, the highest percentage of households in FCS Phases 4 and 5 combined (poor), at 67 percent, is in Al Azariq district in the Ad Dali' governorate,

followed by Tuban district in Lahj governorate (65 percent). Around 3 percent of households in Al Azariq (Ad Dali' governorate) were in HDDS and HHS Phase 3, while 8 percent in Tuban district (Lahj governorate) were in HDDS and HHS Phases 4 and 5. Tuban district had the highest percentage of households in HHS Phase 5 (8 percent). Around 7 percent of households in Khanfar district (Abyan governorate) are in HHS Phase 5 (Appendix Table A.2).

At the other end of the spectrum, residents of Aden and Socotra are relatively better off compared to other IRG-controlled areas based on the FCS, HDDS and HHS indicators. While no households in Aden are in HDDS and HHS Phase 3, 4 percent are in FCS Phases 5 and 6. In the Nine district, across five governorates, namely, Al Wazi'yah and Al Mudhaffar in Ta'iz; Hajar As Say'ar, Ar Raydah wa Qussay'ar and Daw'an in Hadramawt; Jordan and Ar Rawdah in Shabwah; At Tawahi and Al Mu'alla in Aden; and Al Hasayn in Ad Dali, all households are in HDDS Phases 1 and 2. Around 96 and 98 percent of households in Al Qatn and Tarim, respectively, are in HDDS Phases 1 and 2; around 97 percent and 99 percent of households are in HHS Phases 1 and 2 in the two districts, respectively.


Figure 2: Average IPC food security indicators by selected governorates, 2023



Source: IPC Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA) Survey data, 2023a.

Correlation analysis indicates a very weak or no correlation among the three key indicators (FCS, HDDS and HHS) across all districts in IRG-controlled areas, which is possible since the indicators measure various aspects of household food security, using different methodologies. Several factors may contribute to stark variations across different indicators, including continuous internal migration; a high number of IDPs; differences in access to livelihoods opportunities, infrastructure and public services; and the intensity and impact of conflict and random violence. Further analysis of raw data is needed to investigate which areas face the highest levels of stress.


Figure 3: Average IPC food security indicators, governorate level, 2023



Source: IPC Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA) Survey data, 2023a.

Food insecurity in DFA-controlled areas is more severe compared to the southern governorates. On average, higher percentages of households/individuals are categorized in IPC Phases 3, 4 and 5 for all indicators across all DFA governorates and districts compared to southern governorates (Figure 3). No DFA-controlled governorates have an average percentage of households in IPC Phases 1 or 2 that is higher than 80 percent on any indicators. While indicators vary across DFA-controlled areas, similar to the southern governorates, greater shares of people overall are in Phases 3, 4 and 5. Figure 4 demonstrates the greater frequency of a high percentage of households in Phases 4 and 5 across districts in northern governorates compared to southern governorates, and vice versa for Phases 1 and 2.

Figure 4: Comparison of the frequency of high and low phase values across districts, percentage of households



Source: IPC Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA) Survey data, 2023s.

Al Jawf Governorate has the highest percentage of households in HDDS Phase 5 (16 percent), followed by Raymah (8 percent), and Sa'dah and Sana'a City (7 percent each). Raymah governorate has the highest percentage of households in HHS Phase 5 (44 percent), followed by Dhamar (43 percent), Al Mahwit (39 percent), and Sa'dah and Sana'a City (36 percent each). Lahj governorate has the highest percentage of households in FCS Phases 4 and 5 (a staggering 81 percent), followed by Ad Dali' (62 percent), Raymah and Sa'dah (61 percent each) and Al Jawf (49 percent). Districts with the highest percentage of households in HDDS Phases 4 and 5 were As Salafiyah (Raymah) at 95 percent, Ans (Dhamar) at 80 percent, Sabir Al Mawadim (Ta'iz) at 79 percent, Al Mahabishah (Hajjah) at 72 percent and Rajuzah (Al Jawf) at 67 percent. The highest percentages of households in HHS Phase 5 were in Al Hazm (39 percent), Al Khalaq (39 percent), Rajuzah (25 percent) and Kharab Al Marashi (20 percent); all are in Al Jawf governorate. Shares in Al Hujjaylah,

in Al Hodeidah governorate, and Safan, in Sana'a governorate, were 24 percent and 21 percent, respectively. The highest percentages of households in FCS Phases 4 and 5 were in Qatabah (Ad Dali') at 83 percent, Al Qubaytah (Lahj) at 81 percent, Maghrib Ans (Dhamar) at 78 percent, Dimnat Khadir (Ta'iz) at 77 percent, Ans (Dhamar) at 76 percent, Al Humaydat (Al Jawf) at 76 percent each, and Al Marawiah (Al Hodeidah) at 76 percent.

Very few districts had a high percentage of the population in Phases 1 and 2 across the three key indicators. For instance, the highest percentage of households in FCS Phases 1 and 2 was only 61 percent in Alluhayah in Al Hodeidah governorate, and the highest percentage of households in HDDS and HHS Phases 1 and 2 was 98 percent in Qafil Shammar (Hajjah) and 39 percent in Mukayras (Al Bayda). Clearly, the highest reported percentages of households in Phases 4 and 5 across all indicators are significantly above shares in southern governorates. A higher frequency and concentration are evident in governorates such as Raymah, Dhamar, Al Jawf, Ad Dali', Lahj and Al Hodeidah. Unlike in IRG-controlled areas, correlation analysis indicates a stronger correlation among the three key indicators (FCS, HDDS and HHS) across the districts in northern governorates (Appendix Table A.2).

PPP differs between IRG- and DFA-controlled areas. When comparing the prices of food stuff or goods in both areas, the currency or value of the money used to purchase the same item varies. Items are cheaper in many cases in areas under IRG control.^{xxi} Additionally, 90 percent of wheat and all rice are imported. Significant shares of other products are also imported. This puts governorates in DFA-controlled areas at a disadvantage due to restrictions on imports and financial transactions. The DFA charge additional customs in their controlled areas for goods and commodities imported through IRG-controlled ports, increasing prices.




Livelihood and food assistance

Livelihood and food assistance

According to IPC FSLA 2023 survey data, food and livelihood assistance received in various parts of the country varies significantly. The largest proportion of assistance is in the form of food; livelihood support remains very modest.

Figure 5: Average share of the population without any food and/or livelihood assistance in the last six months



Source: IPC Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA) Survey data, 2023a.

In southern governorates, the average percentage of the population without any livelihood assistance in the last six months was close to 100 percent in nearly all governorates (Figure 5). The only districts where more than 10 percent of the population reported receiving livelihoods assistance in the last six months were Ad Dulay'ah (Hadramawt) at 14 percent, Lawdar (Abyan) at 17 percent and Al Mawasit (Ta'iz) at 17 percent.

Average percentages of the population without any food assistance in the last six months diverged significantly among districts and governorates, from as high as 95 percent in Socotra to as low as 51 percent in Al Hodeidah. In Hadramawt governorate, some districts reported only 11 percent of households not receiving any food assistance in the last six months. This compares to 94 percent in Ar Raydah wa Qussay'ar and Ad Dis districts in the same governorate. In Abyan governorate, 27 percent of the population in Sara, compared to 80 percent in Al Mahfad, reported not receiving any food assistance in the last six months.


Table 1: Food and livelihood assistance received by governorate, 2023

Governorate	Food assistance received		Livelihood assistance received
	Average of less than one month ago, percentage	Average of two to three months, percentage	Average of less than three months ago, percentage
Abyan	27	10	2
Ad Dali'	23	17	0
Aden	11	10	0
Al Hodeidah	35	14	1
Al Jawf	17	7	0
Al Maharah	11	4	0
Hadramawt	25	11	1
Lahj	15	24	0
Ma'rib	14	30	1
Shabwah	24	23	0
Socotra	4	1	1
Ta'iz	27	11	2

Source: IPC Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA) Survey data, 2023a.

Figure 6 compares districts with the highest and lowest percentages of the population receiving food assistance. Within southern governments, the highest percentages reporting assistance within the last month were in Dahr, Sarar, Amd, Hajar As Say'ar and Thamud, while the lowest percentages were in At Tawahi, Hawf, Al Masilah, Hadibu, Tarim, Al Mu'alla, Al Wazi'yah, Daw'an, Ar Raydah wa Qussay'ar and Ad Dis. These districts were not necessarily the best or worst performing on the IPC food security indicators. In Al Qatn and Tarim districts, in Hadramawt governorate, only 2 and 13 percent of households, respectively, reported relying on humanitarian assistance as a primary source of income (Table 6); 52 and 39 percent of households reported relying on casual irregular labour, respectively. Only 18 and 14 percent of households reported relying on salaries or pensions from the Government. Yet both districts scored relatively better on IPC food security indicators, with 67 and 73 percent of the overall population, respectively, in FCS Phases 1 and 2; 96 and 98 percent of households in HDDS Phases 1 and 2; and 97 and 99 percent of households in HHS Phases 1 and 2, respectively (Appendix Table A.2).

Figure 6: Selected districts with the highest and lowest percentages of the population receiving food assistance




Source: IPC Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA) Survey data, 2023a.

Similar to southern governorates, nearly all respondents in northern governorates reported not receiving any livelihood assistance within the last 12 months, with very few exceptions. In Ad Dali', Al Bayda and Al Hodeidah governorates, only around 5, 2 and 1 percent of the population, respectively, reported receiving livelihood assistance within the last three to six months.

The percentage reporting not receiving food assistance was as high as 81 percent in Ad Dali', Sana'a City and Dhamar, followed by Raymah (79 percent). The share was as low as 47 and 45 percent in Al Mahwit and Ma'rib, respectively (Figure 7). Districts with the highest percentages of the population reporting not receiving food assistance within the last six months were concentrated in Al Hodeidah (namely, Az Zuhrah, Kamaran, Ad Dohi, Alluhayah and Bayt Al Faqih), in addition to Bani Matar in Sana'a governorate. Districts with the lowest percentages were concentrated in Hajjah (namely, Mustaba, Khayran, Al Muharraq and Kuhlan Afar) in addition to Al Mutun and Al Humaydat in Al Jawf governorate, and Al Odayn and Hazm Al Odayn in Ibb governorate. Interestingly, those districts do not necessarily have the worst IPC indicators, yet they tend to be concentrated in governorates with the worst IPC indicators, such as Al Hodeidah and Sana'a. Governorates with districts reporting the highest percentage of the population receiving food assistance, such as Al Jawf, also have districts with high food insecurity indicators, such as Al Hazm, Al Khalaq, Rajuzah and Kharab Al Marashi.

Figure 7: Average percentage of the population without any food or livelihood assistance in the last six months by governorate



Source: IPC Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA) Survey data, 2023a.

Al-Qatn and Tarim lie in the Wadi districts of Hadramawt Governorate, one of the agricultural areas in Yemen. The two districts have a combined population of about 271,126 people according to IPC 2020⁴ projections, mostly working in agriculture, which explains the high percentage of households reporting casual/irregular and seasonal primary sources of income. Wheat is cultivated widely, along with palms and vegetables. There are six stages of the wheat value chain in Al-Qatn and Tarim districts, with a simple exchange movement among active participants in the value chain (players) and six direct channels interspersed by one broker in most channels. The wheat value chain in both districts provides job opportunities with an average of seven permanent or temporary job opportunities for each player in the chain. Women comprise 21 per cent of labour on average, and the share of employees in the household reaches about 29 percent. Generally, each player in the chain provides an average of 802 working days per year.^{xxii} This demonstrates the importance and impact of livelihood opportunities as a primary source of income, even if they are irregular and/or seasonal, including on food security.

⁴ [Yemen: Acute Food Insecurity Situation October - December 2020 and Projection for January - June 2021 | IPC - Integrated Food Security Phase Classification](#)

In Ghail Bawazeer district, which is also in Hadramawt governorate and had a projected population of 75,360 people in 2019, the main crops are tobacco and henna, both of which are cash crops. The Ghail Bawazeer henna is considered one of the best and most famous kinds in Yemen. There are seven stages in the henna value chain with no strong product exchange movement among players as henna is not the only product that henna traders handle. The henna value chain provides job opportunities for six workers for each player, about 27.5 percent of whom are women. More than half of the employment for each player in the chain is within the family. In general, each player provides 536.5 working days a year.^{xxiii}

Based on FSLA 2023 data on sources of primary income, 36 percent of households rely on government salaries (a significantly higher share than in Al-Qatn and Tarim). Some 28 percent and 4 percent of households depend on casual/irregular labour and own subsistence production, respectively, shares significantly lower than in Al-Qatn and Tarim. While IPC food security indicators for Ghail Bawazeer district are better than average for the southern governorates, they are significantly worse than in Al-Qatn and Tarim. While this measure does not provide enough information to compare the impact of the two value chains in these districts on food security, there are some indications that cash crops are not necessarily the answer, a notion also established in recent literature. The large subsistence production in Al-Qatn and Tarim, compared to Ghail Bawazeer, may have played a role in reducing food insecurity, particularly since wheat is the main crop in both districts.

Fishery is the main source of livelihoods in Ash Shihr, another district in the Hadramawt governorate (located on the coast) with an estimated population of 112,873 people in 2019. That year, there were 7,149 fishermen with 1,300 boats and five fishery associations in Ash Shihr, producing about 16,679 tons of fish and other marine organisms caught by traditional fishing methods, with a total value of YR 8,339,453 million. Ash Shihr is the most important district in the fishery sector in Hadramawt and has the largest fish production. The growth rate in fish production was about 13 percent annually from 2017 until 2020. In 2021, a recession occurred due to natural floods and heavy rain, a shortage of fuel and oil derivatives, difficulty acquiring and maintaining fishing equipment and the impact of COVID-19. Ash Shihr scored worse than Ghail Bawazeer, Al-Qatn and Tarim on the FCS and HHS indicators (52 percent of the population and 73 percent of households, respectively), although 58 percent of the population in Ash Shihr reported having a regular income, comparable to percentages reported by the other three governorates.

Table 2: The statistical distribution of food assistance

	<i>Less than one month ago</i>	<i>A month ago to less than two months ago</i>	<i>Two months ago to less than three months ago</i>	<i>Two-three months ago</i>	<i>Three-six months ago</i>
Southern governorates					
Mean	0.2125201	0.11901626	0.0245963	0.14361256	0.01172693
Standard error	0.01734352	0.01068047	0.00486514	0.01144916	0.00205268
Median	0.15150273	0.08888889	0.00558659	0.11844262	0.00555556
Mode	0	0	0	0.01111111	0
Standard deviation	0.18839884	0.11601958	0.05284889	0.12436969	0.02229787
Sample variance	0.03549412	0.01346054	0.00279301	0.01546782	0.00049719
Kurtosis	0.34261867	4.60861018	26.3493085	2.6554222	17.2751698
Skewness	1.01440739	1.65553948	4.71867075	1.27362145	3.79530907
Range	0.83333333	0.70555556	0.39444444	0.71111111	0.14444444

Minimum	0	0	0	0	0
Maximum	0.83333333	0.70555556	0.39444444	0.71111111	0.14444444
Sum	25.0773722	14.0439193	2.90236303	16.9462823	1.3837778
Count	118	118	118	118	118
Confidence level (95 percent)	0.03434793	0.02115211	0.00963514	0.02267446	0.00406524
Northern governorates					
Mean	0.142399833	0.132703752	0.06600482	-	0.025491808
Standard error	0.010679983	0.009708438	0.0052322	-	0.003004014
Median	0.088888889	0.077777778	0.03910615	-	0.005586592
Mode	0.005555556	0	0	-	0
Standard deviation	0.157688061	0.143343372	0.07725255	-	0.044353732
Sample variance	0.024865524	0.020547322	0.00596796	-	0.001967254
Kurtosis	3.304644116	2.874346291	4.76953672	-	12.51530043
Skewness	1.808116938	1.704864141	1.96661409	-	3.118841208
Range	0.816666667	0.766666667	0.45	-	0.305555556
Minimum	0	0	0	-	0
Maximum	0.816666667	0.766666667	0.45	-	0.305555556
Sum	31.04316357	28.92941788	14.3890512	-	5.557214161
Count	218	218	218	-	218
Confidence level (95 percent)	0.02104978	0.019134907	0.01031244	-	0.00592078

Source: IPC Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA) Survey data, 2023a.

Table 2 shows the statistical distribution of food assistance, measured by standard deviation and variance. In southern governorates, the standard deviation and variance are more significant for those receiving assistance within the last month, indicating a higher degree of concentration. They decline for assistance received within two to three months, and more so for assistance received within six months, indicating less concentration and broader distribution. The data show how assistance is concentrated in some districts receiving large amounts of and more frequent assistance, while others are neglected. Districts with the highest percentage of households in FCS, HDDS and HHS Phases 3, 4 and 5, namely Harib, Ma'rib city, Al Azariq, Tuban and Khanfar, did not necessarily have the highest percentages of people not receiving food and/or livelihood assistance in last six months (Table 3).

In northern governorates, the standard deviation and variance are more significant for those receiving assistance within the last month, indicating a higher degree of concentration, with a decline for assistance received within two to three months and a further drop-off for assistance received within six months, again indicating less concentration and broader distribution. As in southern governorates, some districts receive large amounts of and more frequent assistance while others are neglected. Table 3 shows that most northern districts in IPC Phases 4 and 5 (FCS, HDDS, HHS) have high percentages of people who did not receive food or other assistance. Dimnat Khadir (Ta'iz), Maghrib Ans (Dhamar) and Sahar (Sa'dah) seem to be outliers as despite the low percentage reporting not receiving food assistance within the last 12 months and the high percentage reporting receiving food assistance within the last two to three months, shares in Phases 4 and 5 remain quite high. Livelihood assistance is not expected to play any significant role since around 97 to 100 percent of the population across all districts reported not receiving such

assistance. The percentage of the population in Phases 4 and 5 is high in nearly all districts in the northern governorates.

Table 3: Food and livelihood assistance received by districts with the most severe food security indicators, percentage

Governorate		Ad Dall'	Ma'rib	Abyan	Ma'rib	Ma'rib	Lahj	Ad Dall'	Lahj	Ta'iz	Dhamar		Al Jawf		Al Hodeidah		Sa'dah	Raymah
District		Al Azariq	Harib	Khanfar	Ma'rib	Ma'rib City	Tubahn	Qatabah	Al Qubaytah	Dimnat Khadir	MaghriribAns	Ans	Al Humaydat	Al Hazm	Al Khalaq	Al Marawiah	Sahar	As Salafiyah
Food assistance received	Not received food assistance	42	68	51	77	48	77	42	89	84	37	38	85	83	91	62	86	35
	Less than one month ago	32	13	18	1	1	6	32	4	4	61	14	0	10	3	23	9	12
	A month ago, to less than two months ago	26	10	23	5	7	12	26	4	3	2	45	15	4	6	14	4	22
	Two months ago, to less than three months ago	0	9	3	6	39	2	0	2	8	0	3	0	2	1	0	0	17
	Two to three months ago	26	19	27	11	46	14	26	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	14
	Three to six months ago	0	1	4	11	5	3	0	100	100	100	99	100	100	99	100	100	100
Livelihood assistance received	Not received livelihoods assistance	99	94	98	98	99	99	99	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
	Less than three months ago	0	5	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Less than six months ago	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Six to 12 months ago	1	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	5	5	3	18	18	3	3
FCS	IPC Phases 1-2 (acceptable)	13	33	31	57	31	12	13	17	19	22	17	19	22	52	52	22	22
	IPC Phase 3 (borderline)	19	33	41	34	44	23	19	83	81	77	78	76	76	30	30	76	75
	IPC Phases 4-5 (poor)	67	34	29	9	24	65	67	89	84	37	38	85	83	91	62	86	35
Coping Strategies Index (0-3) (4-18)	IPC Phase 1 (0-3)	2	15	11	4	7	7	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
	IPC Phase 2 (4-18)	77	42	52	42	42	53	26	37	68	5	4	3	13	13	16	3	1

	IPC Phase 3 (19–42)	21	43	37	34	47	38	74	62	32	44	51	59	45	45	59	69	60
	IPC Phase 4 (>42)	0	1	0	20	4	2	0	2	0	50	45	38	42	42	25	28	39
HDDS	HDDS [5–12 food groups] IPC Phases 1–2	38	66	73	93	51	52	19	3	2	5	0	2	0	0	14	2	1
	HDDS (3–4) IPC Phase 3	59	26	27	7	44	41	74	58	34	41	20	40	48	48	53	54	4
	HDDS (0–2 food groups) IPC Phases 4–5	3	7	1	0	4	8	7	39	64	54	80	58	22	22	33	44	95
HHS	HHS (0) IPC Phase 1	79	50	24	56	23	59	1	1	3	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
	HHS (1) IPC Phase 2	16	26	32	21	18	13	2	8	21	3	2	0	11	11	13	1	0
	HHS (2–3) IPC Phase 3	4	23	33	17	41	12	88	89	76	7	62	62	36	36	76	87	61
	HHS (4) IPC Phase 4	0	0	4	4	13	8	10	1	1	14	23	25	14	14	9	2	22
	HHS (5–6) IPC Phase 5	0	0	7	2	5	8	0	1	0	4	13	13	39	39	2	10	17
Livelihood Coping Strategy Index	IPC Phase 1—not employed strategies	10	4	13	1	7	7	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	IPC Phase 2—stress	26	25	22	4	11	29	3	2	15	1	16	1	1	1	13	2	1
	IPC Phase 3—crisis	57	48	61	89	62	48	56	77	74	7	72	79	91	91	45	88	79
	IPC Phase 4—emergency	8	23	4	6	19	16	41	21	11	27	9	20	8	8	42	11	19
	IPC Phase 2 (4–18)*	77	42	52	42	42	53	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	IPC Phase 3 (19–42)*	21	43	37	34	47	38	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	IPC Phase 4 (>42)*	0	1	0	20	4	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: IPC Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA) Survey data, 2023a.

Note: *denotes that an IPC indicator is not available for northern governorates.

A regression analysis for the southern governorates investigated the relationship between the percentage of the population that reported receiving food or livelihood assistance (as independent variables) and the percentage of households in different severity phases of the IPC food security indicators, namely, FCS, HDDS and HHS (as dependent variables). The results do not yield a perfect regression model fit for each of the dependent variables with only one independent variable (food or livelihood assistance). When both independent variables are included in the model, however, and it is adjusted for non-linearity and collinearity, it yields a significantly better fit (Appendix Table A.3). Even so, confirmation that receiving food and livelihood assistance plays a significant role in improving food security at the district level remains inconclusive.

A similar analysis considered data for the northern governorates. It revealed similar inconclusive results, with no perfect regression model fit for each of the dependent variables with only one

independent variable. Including both independent variables in the model and adjusting for non-linearity and collinearity did not yield any significant improvement in the model (Appendix Table A.4). As with the southern governorates, it is inconclusive if receiving food and livelihood assistance plays a significant role in improving food security at the district level.

Many factors can lead to these results, some of which are related to the quality and consistency of data, including the method of data collection, coverage and amount of tabulated data. Interviews with government officials in IRG-controlled areas and representatives from United Nations entities and NGOs administering food and livelihood assistance in both IRG- and DFA-controlled areas indicated several challenges related to the design and implementation of projects. They flagged concerns about the nature, magnitude, conditionality and frequency of assistance; the selection of beneficiaries; sustainability; efficiency in implementation; logistical challenges and risk management. All these factors may lower the impact of food and livelihood assistance, in particular, and development programmes in general, as discussed in the following sections. Challenges due to political instability, security, conflict and the political divide also undermine efforts to improve food security and livelihoods.

Sources of income and livelihoods

Casual labour is the main source of primary income for nearly 54.2 percent of the population in northern governorates, with shares about 50 percent in all governorates except Al Mahwit (25 percent), Al Jawf (33 percent), Sa'dah (30 percent) and Ma'rib (45 percent). On average, only 3 percent of the population in northern governorates relies on government salaries and/or pensions as a primary source of income, ranging from 1 percent in Hajjah to 11 percent in Ma'rib. Notably, on average, Sana'a City and Ma'rib have the highest percentages of the population relying on government salaries and/or pensions as a primary source of income, at 11 and 7 percent, respectively.

Table 4: Primary sources of income, average per governorate, percentage

Governorate	Salary/pension from government sector	Skilled labour/private sector/free profession	Casual labour	Own production	Trade/pe tty trade	Humanitarian assistance	Remittances	Cash crops	Begging	Taxi/motor driver	Collecting/selling scrap
Ad Dali'	3	5	55	2	1	12	1	9	1	9	2
Al Bayda	2	10	53	3	1	10	7	7	1	5	0
Al Hodeidah	1	4	70	5	1	6	2	1	0	7	3
Al Jawf	1	3	33	24	2	28	1	1	1	4	2
Al Mahwit	2	5	25	3	3	45	5	5	1	5	1
Amran	2	2	67	3	2	12	1	5	2	3	1
Dhamar	3	5	61	1	1	18	1	4	1	3	0
Hajjah	1	2	60	1	1	22	1	2	3	4	2
Ibb	3	6	58	2	3	14	3	3	1	6	1
Lahj	2	4	66	0	0	23	0	1	2	2	1
Ma'arib	11	2	45	19	1	16	0	6	0	1	0
Raymah	5	3	62	1	2	16	2	1	1	3	5
Sa'dah	3	4	30	8	2	46	0	3	0	2	1
Sana'a	3	5	53	4	2	14	1	10	2	5	2
Sana'a City	7	13	52	0	4	8	1	1	2	11	3
Ta'iz (north)	4	7	55	1	1	16	1	2	2	8	2

Abyan	54.1	1.6	20.0	11.7	2.5	1.1	7.1	1.7	0.2	n/a	n/a
Ad Dali'	36.5	5.4	25.4	3.0	2.1	11.3	3.3	12.4	0.5	n/a	n/a
Aden	57.0	11.6	24.5	1.2	2.6	1.2	0.9	0.2	0.8	n/a	n/a
Al Hodeidah	13.4	0.8	37.0	31.8	3.1	7.2	0.8	4.7	1.1	n/a	n/a
Al Jawf	22.2	0.0	17.2	56.1	2.2	1.1	1.1	0.0	0.0	n/a	n/a
Al Maharah	26.4	2.6	14.6	43.7	5.6	0.6	5.7	0.4	0.4	n/a	n/a
Hadramawt	21.3	6.3	27.5	27.1	5.4	2.2	9.3	0.9	0.0	n/a	n/a
Lahj	39.0	5.1	21.1	2.6	3.5	17.5	9.5	1.6	0.1	n/a	n/a
Ma'rib	36.2	3.5	32.0	11.9	4.0	5.2	3.1	1.8	2.3	n/a	n/a
Shabwah	28.9	10.5	19.0	10.1	3.7	11.3	15.5	0.9	0.0	n/a	n/a
Socotra	77.1	2.5	4.5	12.6	0.3	0.8	2.2	0.0	0.0	n/a	n/a
Ta'iz	20.2	4.1	49.8	6.1	4.2	9.8	2.4	2.7	0.6	n/a	n/a

Source: IPC Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA) Survey data, 2023a.

There are significant disparities between IRG- and DFA-controlled areas in sources of primary income. Government salaries or pensions are a key source for around 32.5 percent of the population in governorates under the IRG, ranging from 77 percent in Socotra to 13.4 percent in Al Hodeidah. Only an average of 3 percent of the population in northern governorates rely on government salaries and/or pensions as a primary source of income, ranging from 1 per cent in Hajjah to 11 per cent of the population in Ma'arib. The highest percentages are in Aden and Socotra, at 57 and 77.1 percent, respectively. In general higher percentages of people relying on government salaries or pensions are found in key cities/towns across Sana'a, Ma'arib, Sadah and Al Bayda governorates, such as Al Jubah, Jabal Murad, Mahliyah, As Salafiyah, Rahabah, Hajjah City, Al Bayda City, Old City (Sana'a City), Kusmah, At Tahrir (Sana'a) and Sadah.

The second most important source of primary income in southern governorates is casual labour, at 26.1 percent of the population, followed by own production (subsistence) at 15.3 percent. Subsistence production in northern governorates is not a key primary or secondary source of income. It is the main source of income for 24 percent and 19 percent of the population in Al Jawf and M'arib, respectively.

Only 6.7 percent of the population in southern governorates relies on humanitarian assistance as a primary source of income, ranging from 17.5 percent in Lahj to only 0.8 percent in Socotra. Humanitarian assistance is by far a more significant primary and/or secondary source of income in the northern governorates.

Around 1 to 3 percent of Yemenis rely on begging as their main source of primary income across all northern governorates.

Table 5: Secondary sources of income in northern governorates, average per governorate, percentage

Governorate	Salary/pension from government sector	Skilled labour/private sector/free profession	Casual labour	Own production	Trade/pet trade	Humanitarian assistance	Remittances	Cash crops	Begging	Taxi/motor driver	Collecting/selling scrap	No secondary source of income
Ad Dali'	3.6	0.8	3.6	1.4	0.0	18.4	0.4	3.1	1.0	0.6	0.8	66.3

Al Bayda	1.4	1.0	4.8	3.7	0.4	22.5	1.5	0.7	0.1	0.7	0.3	62.9
Al Hodeidah	0.7	0.5	2.5	1.1	0.1	5.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.9	0.6	87.6
Al Jawf	1.1	0.4	7.7	6.3	0.2	19.9	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.5	63.2
Al Mahwit	9.9	0.6	12.5	8.5	1.2	17.7	0.4	2.0	0.9	1.3	0.8	44.3
Amran	1.8	0.6	7.7	3.2	0.4	19.5	0.1	1.5	1.4	0.6	0.5	62.5
Dhamar	0.8	0.3	4.8	1.0	0.1	11.0	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.2	80.6
Hajjah	1.1	0.3	4.5	1.4	0.2	16.1	0.1	0.5	3.4	0.4	2.2	69.8
Ibb	2.5	0.7	4.9	1.5	0.3	17.4	0.7	0.9	0.3	0.8	0.4	69.6
Lahj	0.6	8.9	2.2	0.6	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.6	53.3
Ma'rib	3.2	0.3	6.4	9.2	0.1	36.2	0.2	1.6	0.2	0.3	0.2	42.0
Raymah	2.9	0.1	2.2	0.5	0.0	7.8	0.3	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.3	84.9
Sa'dah	0.2	0.0	0.6	0.4	0.1	4.3	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	94.0
Sana'a	1.7	0.6	7.3	3.1	0.4	13.3	0.2	2.3	1.3	0.7	0.6	68.5
Sana'a City	6.0	0.6	3.8	0.2	0.3	12.7	0.4	0.0	0.8	1.3	1.5	72.4
Ta'iz	0.9	1.1	3.2	1.2	0.2	29.8	0.3	0.3	2.7	0.9	1.2	58.2
Northern governorates average	2.0	0.6	5.0	2.6	0.3	16.3	0.4	0.8	1.0	0.6	0.8	69.7

Source: IPC Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA) Survey data, 2023a.

On average, a larger percentage of households in northern governorates (67.7 percent) doesn't have a secondary source of income, compared to southern governorates (54.4 percent). Al Mahra governorate has the lowest percentage of households reporting a secondary source of income (43.9 percent) while Shabwah has the highest percentage (74.4 percent), as shown in Figure 8. Overall, on average, around 30 percent of the population in northern governorates has a secondary source of income (Table 5). The percentage varies significantly across governorates, ranging from 58 percent in Marib and 56 per cent in Al Mahwit to only 6 percent in Sa'dah.

Humanitarian assistance is the second largest primary source of income for around 16.3 percent of the population in northern governorates, ranging from 6 percent in Al Hodeidah to 46 percent in Sa'dah. Other sources of secondary income, such as skilled labour, private sector jobs, government salaries/pensions and driving taxis, exist but are not as common. Contrary to the common trend in pre-war Yemen, only a small percentage of the population in northern governorates relies on remittances as a primary or secondary source of income (1.9 percent and 0.4 percent, respectively). A 2023 household and market study conducted by UNDP across governorates and regions indicated that only 7 percent of survey respondents received foreign remittances.^{xxiv}

Table 6: Regularity of income by governorate and source of income, percentage of population

Governorate	Primary income			Secondary income ^{xxv}		
	Regular (permanent)	Irregular (casual)	Seasonal	Regular (permanent)	Irregular (casual)	Seasonal
Ad Dali'	4.9	91.0	4.2	0.3	88.2	11.5
Al Bayda	9.6	86.1	4.3	10.4	75.3	14.3
Al Hodeidah	10.4	86.6	3.0	14.5	67.4	13.9
Al Jawf	1.0	85.2	13.8	0.5	77.7	21.8

Al Mahwit	44.4	50.5	5.1	12.3	67.2	20.4
Amran	3.1	89.4	7.5	3.7	83.5	12.8
Dhamar	5.7	91.2	3.1	23.6	66.1	10.2
Hajjah	6.0	90.3	3.7	4.9	87.0	8.1
Ibb	13.8	80.9	5.3	18.5	69.5	12.0
Lahj	10.6	87.2	2.2	0.0	82.1	17.9
Ma'rib	4.7	82.4	12.9	7.9	82.4	9.7
Raymah	6.5	91.9	1.6	16.2	74.0	9.8
Sa'dah	1.1	94.8	4.1	0.3	73.3	13.1
Sana'a	9.1	79.5	11.4	9.2	70.6	20.1
Sana'a City	18.3	80.6	1.1	8.3	84.9	6.9
Ta'iz	9.7	87.8	2.6	2.3	89.7	8.0
Northern governorates average	9.2	85.3	5.5	9.1	76.7	12.9
Abyan	73.1	24.4	2.5	35.5	55.7	8.8
Ad Dali'	58.7	37.9	3.4	47.9	46.6	5.5
Aden	84.1	15.5	0.3	56.5	41.7	1.9
Al Hodeidah	28.3	57.5	14.2	27.5	67.4	5.0
Al Jawf	48.9	39.4	11.7	4.2	76.1	19.7
Al Maharah	54.8	41.6	3.6	40.0	52.7	7.3
Hadramawt	47.8	46.4	5.7	34.7	55.9	9.4
Lahj	80.6	18.1	1.3	52.1	42.4	5.4
Ma'rib	40.4	52.0	7.6	16.3	76.8	7.0
Shabwah	71.7	26.2	2.1	45.0	49.0	6.0
Socotra	53.7	43.2	3.1	7.9	80.2	11.9
Ta'iz	54.6	41.2	4.2	25.7	56.6	17.8
Southern governorates average	61.7	34.6	3.7	38.4	53.0	8.5

Source: IPC Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA) Survey data, 2023a.


Table 6 shows the high irregularity of both primary and secondary sources of income across all northern governorates. Only a small proportion of the population reported having regular or seasonal (which is somewhat predictable and stable) primary or secondary sources of income. This trend has dire consequences for households' ability to plan and/or sustain a minimum living standard, regardless of the amount of income received.

High irregularity of income even where key sources of primary income are supposed to be regular (e.g., the private sector and professional jobs, and government salaries and pensions) can be explained by overall economic and political instability and poor and erratic economic growth. Compared to only 9.2 percent of households in northern governorates, 61.7 percent in southern governorates reported having regular primary income. The lowest percentage was in Al Hodeidah (28.3 percent). In Aden, Lahj and Abyan, 84.1 percent, 80.6 percent and 73.1 percent reported having a regular primary source of income, respectively.

The percentage of households with a regular secondary source of income in southern governorates is low overall, at 38.4 percent, while 53 percent and 8.5 percent reported having

irregular and seasonal secondary income, respectively. In comparison, 91 percent, 76.7 percent and 12.9 percent of households in northern governorates reported having regular, irregular and seasonal secondary income, respectively, despite the high percentage of households with a secondary source of income. The drastically higher irregularity of primary and secondary income in northern governorates compared to southern ones is in line with the high proportion of households relying on stable government jobs or pensions in the latter.

Figure 8: Households with secondary sources of income by governorate, percentage



Source: IPC Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA) Survey data, 2023a.



Sources of vulnerability

Sources of vulnerability

Sources of vulnerability are assessed based on FSLA data, measured as a percentage of households responding to a survey question on the main drivers that over the last six months significantly affected the ability to produce, purchase or otherwise access sufficient food. While the question is designed to assess shocks and constraints faced by households, it also reveals the main sources and causes of vulnerability as perceived by households.

As shown in Table 7, a majority of respondents in southern governorates identified economic factors, including low income, high food inflation, a lack of job opportunities and rising fuel prices, as the primary sources of their vulnerability. Conflict and a lack of security are other factors, reported by 7.4 percent of households, yet ranked third after food inflation (60.5 percent) and a lack of job opportunities (14.2 percent). The significance of sources of vulnerability varies considerably across governorates and districts. For instance, around 78.3 percent of households in Aden compared to only 20.3 percent in Al Hodeidah identified food inflation as the main source of vulnerability. Some 39.9 percent of households in Al Hodeidah described a lack of employment opportunities as a key source of vulnerability, compared to only 8.9 percent in Al Jawf.

Table 7: Key sources of vulnerability by southern governorate, percentage


Source: IPC Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA) Survey data, 2023.

Governorate	Soaring prices of food, high inflation, exchange rate volatility	Lack of work/income opportunities, too few household members working, salary too low	Conflict and insecurity	Less humanitarian assistance received	Exhausted debt levels	Salary delays/irregularity	Lack of food available in the market, long distance to nearest market, lack of access to market	Fuel shortage, high fuel prices	Recent displacement of household	Loss/decrease in level of remittances received	None
Abyan	60.3	15.9	5.1	3.4	3.1	2.5	1.5	1.0	0.1	1.4	3.1
Ad Dali'	54.6	13.4	10.8	1.3	6.7	1.7	0.8	1.5	5.4	0.4	0.8
Aden	78.3	14.6	0.1	0.3	1.2	1.0	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.1	2.4
Al Hodeidah	20.3	36.9	11.4	3.6	5.3	0.0	1.9	0.8	9.2	0.3	0.8
Al Jawf	31.1	8.9	55.0	0.0	0.6	0.6	1.1	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.0
Al Maharah	69.2	9.1	0.9	1.5	3.9	0.8	7.0	2.5	0.6	0.7	2.1
Hadramawt	66.4	11.8	0.9	2.2	1.8	1.5	3.2	4.1	0.4	1.6	3.5
Lahj	67.8	15.4	2.4	2.9	3.4	2.0	0.6	0.6	0.0	1.0	1.2
Ma'rib	45.9	10.6	27.3	1.9	1.1	3.7	1.4	0.7	4.9	0.4	0.8
Shabwah	62.6	13.8	11.1	1.2	1.6	0.9	1.2	1.2	0.5	1.4	1.6
Socotra	47.9	11.4	0.6	0.0	3.6	26.2	0.0	2.8	0.0	0.6	3.9
Ta'iz	40.4	18.2	19.9	4.8	2.4	1.8	0.9	0.9	3.7	0.2	2.6
Southern governorates average	60.5	14.2	7.4	2.3	2.6	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.3	1.0	2.3

Source: IPC Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA) Survey data, 2023.

At the governorate level, households that identify conflict and lack of security as the main source of vulnerability were mostly concentrated in Al Jawf (55 percent), Ma'arib (27.3 percent) and Ta'iz (19.9 percent). While these are averages per governorate, responses varied significantly within each governorate. Figure 9 shows the districts with the highest percentages of households reporting conflict and lack of security as the key source of vulnerability, markedly, Jabal Habashi (Ta'iz), Ayn (Shabwah) and Khab wa Ash Sha'f (Al Jawf). Percentages in these districts exceed the reported averages for their respective governorates by far.

Figure 9: Districts in southern governorates with the highest percentages of households reporting conflict and lack of security as the main source of vulnerability



Source: IPC Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA) Survey data, 2023a.

Compared to the southern governorates, more respondents in the northern governorates identified war, conflict and related blockades as the main sources of vulnerability. On average, 48.7 percent of all respondents in northern governorates, compared to only 7.4 percent in IRG-controlled areas, ranked war, conflict and related blockades as the leading cause of vulnerability, followed by economic factors, namely a lack and irregularity of income opportunities and access to credit (23.3 percent) and inflation affecting food, fuel and health services (13.5 percent). The formulation of the survey question, which includes the blockade and sanctions when asking respondents about shocks and constraints, may have contributed to inflating the numbers of responses.

While households are more consistent in reporting the top three causes of vulnerability in DFA-controlled areas, there are still significant variations. For instance, 85.6 percent of households in Lahj identified war and conflict-related blockades compared to only 19.3 percent in Amran. A lack and irregularity of income opportunities and access to credit was identified by 52.3 percent and 43.8 percent of households in Raymah and Dhamar, respectively, compared to only 3.9 percent in

Lahj. Inflation was pinpointed by 17.3 percent and 16.9 percent of households in Sana'a and Sana'a city compared to 3.5 percent in Lahj and 4.4 percent in Al Jawf (Table 8).


Table 8: Key sources of vulnerability by northern governorate, percentage

Governorate	War and blockade	Lack and irregularity of income opportunities and access to credit	Inflation (food, fuel and health services)	Less humanitarian assistance received	Remnants of war disrupting livelihoods	Recent displacement	Lack of food availability/lack of physical access to market	Pests/diseases, seasonality, weather-related events impacting harvest	Lost/decreased remittances
Ad Dali'	29.6	38.1	12.5	10.6	2.1	1.0	1.0	2.2	0.8
Al Bayda	44.2	23.5	16.5	8.1	3.2	1.7	0.2	0.6	0.8
Al Hodeidah	50.2	15.6	8.4	13.7	9.4	1.4	0.1	0.2	0.2
Al Jawf	71.8	10.2	4.4	4.2	3.2	2.5	0.0	1.2	0.4
Al Mahwit	43.1	17.9	15.6	7.8	0.1	4.3	2.5	3.9	2.4
Amran	19.3	35.6	25.6	10.2	4.1	1.2	1.9	0.7	0.3
Dhamar	29.6	43.8	19.3	3.7	0.2	0.6	0.1	1.1	0.1
Hajjah	45.4	28.2	11.0	8.3	3.1	1.9	0.2	0.3	0.2
Ibb	63.3	15.8	14.5	3.3	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.1	0.2
Lahj	85.6	3.9	6.1	1.1	1.1	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ma'rib	62.4	19.8	7.1	2.4	3.2	3.1	0.2	1.0	0.2
Raymah	22.9	52.3	13.2	7.0	0.9	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.9
Sa'dah	69.6	16.4	3.5	6.2	1.9	0.7	0.3	0.9	0.0
Sana'a	55.8	17.1	17.3	2.6	3.8	1.1	0.8	0.7	0.1
Sana'a City	53.0	24.7	16.9	1.9	0.6	2.0	0.2	0.0	0.2
Ta'iz	50.8	16.2	15.9	7.1	6.1	2.4	0.1	0.1	0.8
Northern governorates average	48.7	23.3	13.5	6.9	3.3	1.6	0.5	0.7	0.4

Source: IPC Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA) Survey data, 2023s.

Akin to southern governorates, a lack and irregularity of humanitarian assistance was ranked fourth in the northern governorates, but by 6.9 percent of households compared to only 2.3 percent in IRG areas. Lost or decreased remittances from family and friends overseas was a key cause of vulnerability for only 0.4 percent. In both northern and southern governorates, remittances do not seem to affect households either because they continue to be stable or they are no longer a significant contributor to household income as was the case before the war. Figure 10 compares the leading causes of vulnerability in IRG- and DFA-controlled areas.

Figure 10: Comparison of the main causes of household vulnerability in southern and northern governorates, percentage



Source: IPC Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment (FSLA) Survey data, 2023.2023a.



Overview of current support to Yemen

Overview of current support to Yemen

Support to Yemen is delivered via humanitarian or development assistance. According to the World Bank,⁵ the distinction between the two is clear in terms of settings, duration and impact, objectives and financing, and benefits provided. Since the beginning of the conflict in Yemen, humanitarian assistance has been largely delivered by WFP, SFD, PWP and SMEPS. Development assistance has been delivered by United Nations entities and NGOs, including through livelihood support projects. While most projects attempt to integrate humanitarian and development approaches by addressing emergency needs and providing livelihood support to prepare for post-conflict recovery and reconstruction, there has been, understandably, a stronger focus on humanitarian elements. This is evident from FSLA data as well as interviews with development and implementing partners, and a mapping of current projects in Yemen.

Food assistance: WFP leads the provision of food assistance in the form of general food distribution and commodity vouchers. Food assistance has been efficient and effective as a short-term emergency relief measure, improving health and reducing malnutrition in targeted populations. Food assistance does not seem to have a positive impact on livelihoods or household resilience, however. High operational costs for transport, security and distribution to remote areas and logistical challenges have made it difficult to reach planned beneficiaries and in some cases have resulted in alleged misuse of food aid. Cash-based assistance is now considered a more efficient and effective approach.

Cash assistance: Most initiatives in Yemen provide cash assistance, including through unconditional cash transfers, conditional cash transfers, cash-for-nutrition, direct cash transfers, wage employment (cash-for-work) programmes or vouchers (or e-vouchers). Cash-based assistance is cost-effective, can stimulate local markets by increasing demand for goods and services, and is seen as a more transparent and easier method to monitor aid. It is largely effective in meeting immediate needs through existing social protection systems but has not been large or extensive enough for households to build up assets or savings.^{xxvi} Due to the humanitarian relief approach that has been adopted, there is more focus on wider coverage than on substantial assistance with a lasting impact.

Livelihood support: Livelihood initiatives stress the rebuilding or rehabilitation of infrastructure such as roads, agricultural land, irrigation systems, schools and health facilities. They engage war-affected populations in economic activities, utilizing their skills, experiences and assets. Many projects and programmes include the development of market opportunities, links with local or regional markets and the private sector, and access to resources and infrastructure. Several include a government training component, vocational training and MSME development, including those by UNDP, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

United Nations entities and international NGOs lead on livelihoods interventions due to greater access to development expertise, funding and resources. For example, UNDP initiatives draw on its expertise in livelihoods and inclusive economic growth, governance, rule of law, peacebuilding, climate change and disaster risk reduction. Initiatives include partnerships with local actors and work across all levels of governance. The fostering of livelihoods and resilience-based development are evident in many initiatives. A structured approach to developing value chains in promising sectors to create sustainable and stable livelihoods opportunities is still in its infancy, however. UNDP has projects that focus on improvement and support to fishery production, coffee

⁵ World Bank, Social Protection at the Humanitarian Development Nexus : Insights from Yemen, 2021 and World Bank. IDA's Role in an Increasingly Complex Global Aid Architecture. 2024

production, harbor rehabilitation, solar microgrid provision as well as conflict-prevention and peacebuilding.

FAO emphasizes initiatives that strengthen livelihoods and market interventions through the management of land and sea resources, climate-smart agriculture, irrigation infrastructure and water governance. Multipartner projects are long-term and aim to increase resilience and improve the livelihoods and income of vulnerable and marginalized communities, including IDPs, returnees, vulnerable host communities, female-headed households, youth, daily labourers, people with disabilities and elderly community members.

The USAID Economic Recovery and Livelihoods Program prioritized support to government financial institutions such as the Central Bank of Yemen, Ministry of Finance, and customs and port authorities, seeking to strengthen policy development and abilities to prepare, manage and monitor the national budget, among other activities. USAID also emphasizes support to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) across different sectors by training and helping them to access loans. It trains farmers and facilitates sales agreements. A few other projects have provided support for microfinance institutions, and involved debt cancelation and the provision of grants, including start-up grants for business creation and block grants.



Geographic coverage

Geographic coverage

The ongoing conflict in Yemen makes it challenging to maintain accurate and comprehensive data on the geographical coverage of existing projects. Numerous partners deliver projects and programmes that vary by geographical focus, objectives, funding, and security and logistical factors. Some implementing partners carry out activities in selected governorates linked to a specific project designs (for example, targeting areas with IDPs or remote districts). Others work across wider regions or cover all 22 governorates. Project locations and targets can shift or change due to emerging needs and evolving priorities as well as restricted access to certain areas. National humanitarian and development programmes implemented by WFP with the support of SFD and PWP cover all governorates.^{xxvii} Such programmes provide cash transfers and in-kind assistance and aim to reach a wide number of recipients. Most project activities operate in several governorates in both IRG- and DFA-controlled areas without specific patterns.

Mapping of livelihood interventions from 2018 to 2023

As of November 2023, 142 aid organizations, including 9 United Nations entities, 90 national NGOs and 43 international NGOs, were actively implementing the Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan across all districts.^{xxviii} The humanitarian response has scaled up impressively and slowed the collapse of basic services. The food security situation has slightly improved and levels of acute malnutrition declined. WFP reached more than 5.2 million people with in-kind food assistance and approximately 17,700 people with cash-based transfers across Yemen in November 2023.

The information for this mapping of livelihood initiatives was collected from secondary sources, including project documents, published reports, reviews, assessment and impact reports, and information available on websites. Most projects are from 2018 onward. The list of initiatives is not exhaustive, and it is difficult to evaluate their effectiveness due to limited information or evaluations. Where possible, information on progress, impacts, risks and challenges is reflected.

Yemen Emergency Crisis Response Project (2016–2022)

- *Implementing agency:* UNDP
- *Budget:* \$887 million (World Bank/International Development Association)
- *Geographic coverage:* 22 governorates

Impact:^{xxix} The project resulted in 450,257 persons benefitting directly from short-term employment, and 1,988,148 indirect beneficiaries (family members of workers) gaining from income support. Some 63,332 individuals benefitted from farm, fishery and animal production-based wage employment (short- or long-term, including informal). The project also provided training and work experience to youth, which is likely to contribute to future employability. Young graduates were trained and provided with short-term employment opportunities in diverse sectors: Nearly 4,900 youth (45 percent female) worked as facilitators/advocates for community socioeconomic development, 2,771 youth (51 percent female) as short-term teachers and over 15,200 youth (73.5 percent female) as community health workers. The project supported some 5,804 microfinance clients. On average, 1,426,761 households benefitted from 10 payment cycles of cash transfers, and 9,113,064 from unconditional cash transfers under social safety net programmes, exceeding the target of 8 million.

Replication effect: Farmers not supported by the project saw the benefits and replicated the farming technologies/techniques introduced by using remittances. The replication effect increased job opportunities and food security in these communities. The project helped strengthen links within communities and between local populations and IDPs, and contributed to reducing conflict, mainly over scarce resources such as water. Certain project activities (under cash-for-nutrition)

were largely oriented to women; a few thousand women were provided with identification cards. A World Bank partnership with United Nations entities delivered effective interventions during conflict by leveraging complementarities between humanitarian and development efforts.

Partnerships with local, politically neutral institutions that coordinated with local stakeholders in targeting beneficiaries were instrumental in achieving rapid results through the emergency response. Well-established networks with government officials, civil society and NGOs helped garner political buy-in and mitigate political interference, threats and insecurity. This approach allowed the project to be efficient and effective in implementation, highlighting the importance of tapping into existing local resources and partnerships to maximize the development impact. Despite the overall positive impact, project outcomes did not connect with broader value chain support. Social cohesion results were not part of a larger stabilization approach. Microinfrastructure or rehabilitation project results were not part of local development plans and so were not institutionalized with potential support for their maintenance.

Challenges: Different challenges affected implementation, related mostly to external factors. Conflict escalation in Marib, AlJawf, Al-Baidha and Raymah governorates in 2021 forced the cancellation of subprojects in these areas. Red-tape stalled authorization to access areas in the northern governorates controlled by the DFA, which led to delays or cancellation of activities. Fiduciary challenges, such as instances of fraud; operational challenges, such as fighting; and country level challenges, such as outbreaks of cholera, COVID-19 and flooding all presented obstacles to implementation.

Vocational and Business Skills Training and Support Project—Phase I (2020–2022), Phase II (May 2023 to July 2024)

- *Implementing agencies:* UNDP and SMEPS
- *Budget:* \$3 million (Phase I), \$4 million (Phase II) (KSRelief)
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* Direct: 1,533; indirect: 8,946 (Phase II)
- *Geographic coverage:* Abyan, Aden, Al-Dhalea, Al Maharah, Hadramawt, Lahj, Marib, Shabwah and Taiz

The project aimed to build the vocational and technical skills of conflict-affected young men and women, enhance the business and entrepreneurial skills of youth through training, and support value chain development in highly promising business areas. The project expanded from three training areas in Phase I to five areas in Phase II: food processing, textiles and handloom crafts, vocational skills (car mechanics, carpentry, cell phone repairs and home appliance maintenance), veterinary services, and solar energy system installation and maintenance.

Impact of Phase I:^{xxx} Phase I covered six districts in Hadramawt and Lahj governorates. Under it, 1,043 beneficiaries received business and entrepreneurial training; 1,051 gained technical skills training; and 1,039 acquired small in-kind grants to start or continue their own businesses. The training and in-kind support contributed to the sustainability of results through new skills. This was confirmed by interviewed beneficiaries during the project evaluation; they continued to use new skills in their work or businesses regardless of changes in economic or other external factors. The project empowered young men and women in rural areas by equipping them with tools to thrive. Beneficiaries gained valuable vocational, technical and business skills, enabling them to establish their own businesses and generate income. This not only improved their livelihoods but also fostered self-reliance within their communities. The project's approach was multifaceted. It provided comprehensive training, encompassing the knowledge, attitudes and behaviour aspects of business. This was complemented by support for market linkages, microcredit training and in-kind grants for essential tools and materials. A holistic approach addressed structural constraints and helped young people gain access to resources and knowledge.

The project's impact extended beyond individual empowerment. By fostering entrepreneurship and local service delivery, it contributed significantly to broader economic recovery and livelihood restoration efforts. This 'build-back-better' approach aimed to strengthen community resilience and well-being in the long term. By focusing on targeted interventions, the project ensured that vulnerable populations, especially women, gained access to sustainable income opportunities. This addressed their immediate household needs and enabled them to provide vital services to their communities.

The project's success, evident in its expansion to Phase II, demonstrated its effectiveness in empowering rural youth, fostering a more vibrant and resilient rural economy, and addressing critical needs with timely interventions. Interviews with beneficiaries and stakeholders confirmed that training materials, trainers and staff were well-equipped, and management arrangements were effective. The main challenges to the sustainability of project objectives were macroeconomic in nature, including increased prices of oil derivatives, basic food commodities, tools, production inputs and raw materials such as fishing tools and wood, as well as fluctuations in the local currency, the unavailability of materials in the market and the ongoing war and instability. Frequent power cuts jeopardized the operations of small businesses as many depend on electricity for production or product preservation.

Phase II is expected to deliver training on the above five areas and provide start-up grants to over 1,500 prospective entrepreneurs with viable business plans upon completion of vocational and business training. The geographical coverage of the project expanded to 9 governorates and 24 districts.

Yemen Emergency Social Protection Enhancement and COVID-19 Response Project (2020–2026)

- *Implementing agencies:* UNDP, UNICEF
- *Budget:* \$710.90 million (World Bank)
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* See below
- *Geographic coverage:* 22 governorates

Results:^{xxxii} The project has two components: unconditional cash transfers and geo-focused support to reduce food insecurity and malnutrition. As of the end of August 2023, it completed six of seven payment cycles of unconditional cash transfers to 1.42 million beneficiary households. Under the geo-focused support component, 85,330 households, against a target of 106,500, received cash assistance and started benefiting from awareness sessions on nutrition. These households included 91,798 women and 136,485 children. The number of direct beneficiaries of wage employment reached 50,959 out of a target of 155,208; the number of people with access to basic services was 1.04 million (of which half were women) against a target of 1.12 million; the number of MSMEs supported was 4,830 against a targeted 10,009; and the number of people provided with access to improved sanitation services to reduce water-borne diseases was 57,001 out of a target of 272,845.

Overall, there is notable progress towards achieving the project's development objectives amid a highly volatile security and political situation. The main challenges include high temperatures, heavy rainfall and flooding in some areas; cash flow and liquidity replenishment, which was observed in some governorates such as Abyan, Hajjah, Ta'iz, and Al Jawf; premature closure of some payment sites, which is not in compliance with financial service provider agreements; and a few payment sites reportedly serving recipients of other projects at the same location established for cash recipients.

Strengthening of Institutional and Economic Recovery in Yemen (2020–2023)

- *Implementing agency:* UNDP
- *Budget:* \$39.68 million (European Union)
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* N/A
- *Geographic coverage:* 8 governorates and 40 districts (initially as per project document)

The project aims to improve economic and social well-being by building resilience and good governance and supporting private sector development. It has two components. The first, institutional resilience, seeks to empower local authorities through modular demand-driven capacity development and a multi-purpose Local Resilience & Recovery Fund to preserve and adapt service delivery infrastructure. The second, economic resilience (implemented in Aden, Hadramawt, Sana'a and Al Hodeidah), entails analysing value chains in promising sectors; empowering producers, private sector entities and microfinance service providers through skills development, capital support, job creation and employment; recovering market infrastructure; supporting microfinance service providers to connect with producers; and assisting the Yemeni Private Sector Cluster.

Qat-to-Coffee for Climate Resilience and Human Security (2021–2023)

- *Implementing agency:* UNDP
- *Budget:* \$262,000 (Swedish International Development Agency [SIDA] and SDG Climate Facility)
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* N/A
- *Geographic coverage:* Yafe district, Lahj governorate

The project aimed to promote sustainable coffee production and value chains in Yemen as a high-value alternative crop to reduce groundwater exploitation, enhance livelihood opportunities and empower women. Activities included carrying out a value chain analysis of qat production, with a focus on income benefits and livelihood opportunities, and identifying how this can be used to promote coffee as an alternative. The analysis informed the introduction of pilot climate-resilient Yemeni coffee varieties and sustainable water resource management practices as an alternative to unsustainable qat production in select communities. The project also supported outreach and the communication of the results of the value chain analysis to relevant key stakeholders at the national and international levels to enable scaled-up results.

Results: The value chain analysis identified concrete programming recommendations to enhance coffee production and value chains. Sixteen farmers received training on coffee production and were provided with coffee seedlings and small-scale infrastructure (rainwater harvesting systems, coffee cleaning and grading equipment and other specific equipment), based on consultations with coffee experts and communities.

Renewable Energy for Improved Health Services and Livelihood Opportunities in Yemen (March 2022 to June 2023)

- *Implementing agency:* UNDP
- *Budget:* \$463,769 (Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development)
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* Indirect, approximately 205,000 individuals
- *Geographic coverage:* Abyan, Aden, Hajjah, Lahj and Sana'a

The project promoted economic and empowerment models for women and youth using solar microgrids. Groups of women in selected districts operated solar microgrid stations. Approximately 240 solar panels were installed on the rooftops of four hospitals, including in Hajjahs and Sana'a.

Resilient and Sustainable Livelihoods for Rural Yemen (2022–2029)

- *Implementing agency:* FAO
- *Budget:* \$16 million (Global Environment Facility)
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* Indirect, 100,000 people
- *Geographic coverage:* Al-Mahrah, Socotra and Hawf

The project aims to support the establishment and monitoring of spatial plans across three land- and seascapes. The plans will incorporate community-based management principles, complimented by government oversight. This will assist in moving current ‘open access’ management regimes to more sustainable and regulated management designed to promote nature-based solutions. A second objective is to assist private sector stakeholders to gain meaningful experience and knowledge in applying improved practices by building the capacities of government, civil society and private sector partners. A third prong is to facilitate knowledge management, financing, monitoring and governance by identifying long-term funding needs and linking financing to assurances that certain needs are met post-project. The project seeks to build capacities to monitor the impacts of project investments so that results are delivered efficiently and effectively. It will help create a platform so stakeholders can continue monitoring efforts post-project to advance results, capture lessons and inform future decision-making.

Sustainable Fisheries Development in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden (October 2022 to July 2026)

- *Implementing agencies:* UNDP, Regional Organization for the Conservation of the Environment of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden (regional component)
- *Budget:* \$41.2 million (World Bank)
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* Direct, 5,600 fishers; indirect, 29,400 people
- *Geographic coverage:* Aden, Al Mahrah, Hadramawt and Taiz governorates

The project aims to support and improve fishery production and quality by reducing post-harvest losses and promoting interaction and networks among women/men fishers, micro- and small fish processors, wholesalers and retailers to improve access to markets in targeted coastal areas. It will also support developing local governance systems and knowledge to effectively manage fisheries and bolster climate resilience in line with the fishery sector strategy of Yemen.

The expected outputs are to strengthen the fishery value chain and develop capacity for effective fishery management. Some 4,200 fishers and micro- and medium enterprises will benefit from voucher inputs/microgrants to develop fishery value chain activities. Other beneficiaries are 920 youth through supply chain enablers and MSMEs. Support to 35 fishery associations and cooperatives includes matching microgrants for improved production, and 480 fisherwomen will be provided with enhanced skills and grants to establish fishery enterprises and access market opportunities. Nine fishery infrastructures will be rehabilitated/restored. A total of 10,000 Individuals is expected to benefit from training and capacity-building to develop the fishery value chain, responsible fishing practices and fishery management, and to better understand the nutritional benefits of fish.

Results:^{xxxii} According to the World Bank, as of November 2023, satisfactory progress has been made with some delays. For the regional component, a study on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, fish spawning and by-catch was underway. The hiring of consultants for fisheries statistics and stock assessment was almost final. Awareness-raising events were organized in some States. In Yemen, a tender for the rehabilitation of the landing site is expected. Entering the second year of implementation, the challenges and limitations reported are mostly attributed to high political, governance and macroeconomic risks.

Fishery Harbor Rehabilitation and Value Chain Development in Aden Phase II (January 2023 to December 2026)

- *Implementing agency:* UNDP
- *Budget:* \$20.7 million (Germany, Credit Institute for Reconstruction [KfW])
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* Direct, 2,100 households; indirect, 500,000 people
- *Geographic coverage:* Aden

This project aims to rehabilitate the Aden Fishery Harbor to restore its functionality and improve the lives of the local community, contributing to food security and increased economic opportunities.

The project will support increased access to affordable, quality fish for the community through the rehabilitated facilities and the reactivation of the fish supply and value chain. It will support fishers to increase the supply and improve the quality of landed fish, facilitate the integration of women in processors producing for local markets, and foster the creation of contractual linkages between fishers' organizations and processors.

Progress: Preparatory studies and coordination have been completed. A needs assessment has been conducted on the Aden Fishery Harbor.

Social Protection to Provide Social Cohesion in Vulnerable Communities in Yemen (June 2023 to November 2024)

- *Implementing agency:* UNDP
- *Budget:* \$2 million (King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre)
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* Direct, 1,114; indirect, approximately 1,189,5881
- *Geographic coverage:* Aden, Hadramawt and Lahj governorates

The project aims to strengthen the capacity of local authorities and vulnerable communities to respond to shocks, risks and conflict through customized trainings on conflict prevention, dispute resolution, advocacy and peacebuilding. It seeks to restore and stabilize the livelihoods of targeted vulnerable Yemenis through vocational skills and technical support and business start-up grants for MSMEs. It will also help to strengthen local mechanisms for peacebuilding and social cohesion through the increased participation of youth and women in community-based structures.

Emergency Agricultural and Livelihood Support in Marib and Sa`adah Governorates (2023–2024)

- *Implementing agency:* FAO
- *Budget:* \$4 million (United Nations Central Emergency Relief Fund [CERF])
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* 25,620 people
- *Geographic coverage:* Marib and Sa'adah governorates

The main objective of this project is to provide food security to vulnerable communities affected by conflict. The project provides cash assistance via a 'cash-plus' approach, which includes the provision of in-kind agricultural inputs together with season-specific cash assistance to mitigate food insecurity and malnutrition in the most vulnerable households. The project extends humanitarian assistance to 25,620 people, including 12,580 women and 13,040 men. They comprise 5,000 persons with disabilities.

Emergency Livelihood Assistance Through the Distribution of Emergency Agriculture and Livestock Kits in Hajjah and Taiz Governorates (2023–2024)

- *Implementing agency:* FAO
- *Budget:* \$2 million (CERF)
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* 24,500 people
- *Geographic coverage:* Hajjah and Taiz governorates

The project targets 24,500 host community members with the provision of seeds, small ruminants and cash distributions as well as quick refresher trainings on good agricultural practices and livestock husbandry.

Rural Livelihood Development Project (2022–2024)

- *Implementing agency:* FAO
- *Budget:* \$2.3 million
- *Geographic coverage:* N/A

The project aims to improve food and nutrition security, increase agricultural production and build resilience to climate risks by adopting climate-smart technologies. It targets women and youth, and seeks to enhance smallholder farmers' adaptive capacity to climate change, increase their agricultural productivity and income, and promote sustainable farming practices.

Emergency Support to Protect the Agriculture-, Livestock- and Fishery-Based Livelihoods of Highly Vulnerable Conflict- and COVID-19-Affected Populations in Yemen (2022–2024)

- *Implementing agency:* FAO
- *Budget:* \$8 million (King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre)
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* 34,500 conflict-affected households
- *Geographic coverage:* N/A

The project aims to deliver critical support to fishers, farmers and pastoralists to enable them to continue food production both for household consumption as well as to sell in local markets. This is expected to enhance food availability and access, thereby reducing acute food insecurity and aiding the recovery of agricultural livelihoods and household incomes. It should also enhance the nutritional value of household and community-wide food baskets. The project will distribute critical inputs to support crop production, livestock production and fisheries to build the resilience of beneficiary households in the mid- to long-run, at both the household and community levels. These inputs will be distributed alongside training on good practices in agriculture, animal husbandry and fish handling.

Providing Agricultural and Pastoral Livelihood Support for Responding to Immediate Needs of Internally Displaced Persons and Host Communities (2021–2024)

- *Implementing agency:* FAO
- *Budget:* \$7 million (Government of Japan)
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* 189,490 people
- *Geographic coverage:* Al Dhale'e, Al Hodeidah, Dhamar, Lahj and Taiz governorates

The project intends to bolster rural livelihoods and enhance the food security and nutrition of highly vulnerable households impacted by ongoing conflict. This will be achieved by increasing the availability of irrigation water for affected farming households through the rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure and the installation of modern water conveyance systems to increase agricultural productivity. The project will employ local community members for much of the rehabilitation and

construction work implemented through the project. Livestock production will also be supported through the distribution of high-quality animal feed concentrates as well as by training community animal health workers to improve livestock health services. Internally displaced households will benefit from the provision of fuel-efficient stoves to enable safe cooking.

Emergency Desert Locust Response Project (2020–2024)

- *Implementing agency:* FAO
- *Budget:* \$25 million (World Bank)
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* 20,820 people, 5,485 affected households
- *Geographic coverage:* Shabwah, Seyoun, Aden, Sana'a and Al-Hodeida

The project aims to control the desert locust outbreak, support livelihoods in locust-affected areas and strengthen Yemen's preparedness for future locust infestations. Project components include: (1) surveillance and control, comprising early warning, control measures (biopesticides for hopper bands, pesticides for swarms) and risk reduction; (2) livelihood protection and rehabilitation, including immediate relief (cash-for-work) and longer-term support for farmers and livestock owners; and (3) coordination and early warning preparedness by strengthening national capacities for early warning and response and establishing five new desert locust control centres and early warning systems.

Results^{xxxiii} have included the establishment of extensive surveillance and monitoring systems, beyond the project's target. These have generated valuable information about locust breeding areas and movements. Eleven land and water infrastructure subprojects were completed in four governorates. A total of 5,367 workers were involved with 121,240 person-days of input; 20,820 direct beneficiaries gained from labour or improved community assets.

In terms of rehabilitating agricultural and pastoral livelihoods, more than 5,485 affected households were supported with agricultural input packages, such as feeds, seeds, livestock and beehives. The project was delayed initially due to difficulties in obtaining clearances for activities in the northern governorates. The construction of the desert locust control centers stalled due to a variety of hurdles (identification of government-owned sites, obtaining land permits, lengthy negotiations with the authorities on the types of construction and difficulties deploying vehicles financed by the project).

Resilience Programme in the Irrigation and Agricultural Sector (2021–2023)

- *Implementing agency:* FAO
- *Budget:* \$20 million (KfW)
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* 130,000 people
- *Geographic coverage:* Dhamar, Abyan and Hadramawt governorates

The programme aimed to enhance livelihoods through a variety of activities. These included the rehabilitation of farm irrigation infrastructure, job creation and income generation via cash-for-work projects as well as measures to strengthen water governance in project districts. The project engaged with communities to increase climate resilience, reduce conflicts over water and conduct training programmes on disaster risk reduction.

Progress: A report that analyses water-related conflicts in Abyan (Khanfar and Zinjibar districts), Dhamar (Jabal Al-Sharq district) and Hadramawt (Al-Qatn and Shibam districts) governorates was published, building evidence, knowledge and understanding of water conflicts. It provided conflict-sensitive programming recommendations. In Hadramawt governorate, activities included strengthening and cleaning canal banks and weirs, and rehabilitating protective structures. It is expected that nearly 3,500 households will directly benefit from cash-for-work earnings. Modern

irrigation systems (drip irrigation networks, conveyance systems, greenhouses, floppy sprinkler systems and hydroponic units) were provided to cover 342 hectares of irrigated land and benefit 1,116 farming households. Eight water user associations were established, and training was conducted on financial and technical reporting as well as on resolving water-related conflicts.

Joint Actions for Food Security and Nutrition in Yemen (2021–2024)

- *Implementing agencies:* FAO, UNICEF, WFP
- *Budget:* \$4.6 million (European Union)
- *Geographic coverage:* N/A

The goal of the project is to enhance food and nutrition security, social cohesion and livelihood resilience, contributing to reduced reliance on humanitarian assistance. The project aims to increase access to nutritious and diversified food in target communities by raising agricultural productivity, guiding the recovery of food systems, and expanding access to water, markets and basic productive infrastructure. It will also help to improve nutrition through access to safety nets for the most vulnerable households and individuals, particularly pregnant and lactating women and malnourished children, and ensure they are referred to complementary forms of assistance. The project aims to improve governance capacity and the collective management of resources by local institutions and community groups, and to empower them to manage natural resources and community infrastructure and to mitigate conflict risks.

Supporting Resilient Livelihoods, Food Security and Climate Adaptation in Yemen (March 2022 to February 2025)

- *Implementing agencies:* FAO, ILO, UNDP, WFP
- *Budget:* \$49.3 million (SIDA, European Union)
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* 847,000 people
- *Geographic coverage:* Hajjah, Hodeidah, Saada, Lahj, Abyan, Mahweet and Taiz

The programme will contribute to reducing vulnerabilities and improving community resilience and self-reliance in targeted areas through components on: local governance and social cohesion, renewable energy, short-term employment and livelihoods, agricultural value chains, skills and entrepreneurship development, food assistance for assets/training and climate adaptation.

Supporting Resilient Livelihoods, Food Security and Climate Adaptation in Yemen (February 2019 to March 2022)

- *Implementing agencies:* FAO, ILO, UNDP, WFP
- *Budget:* \$51.8 million (SIDA, European Union)
- *Geographic coverage:* Hajjah (districts of Abs, Bani Qa'is, Aslem), Hodeida (Bajil, Az Zuhrah, Al Marawi'ah), Lahj (Tuban, Tur Al Bahah, Al Musaymir), Abyan (Zingibar, Lawder, Sarar, Khanfir), Taiz (At Ta'izlyah, Ash Shamayatayn) and Sana'a (Al Hamyah Ad Dakhiliyah)

Impact: The programme unlocked employment opportunities for vulnerable targeted beneficiaries, and improved communities' resilience, livelihoods and income, food consumption and coping strategies.^{xxxiv} Some 19,499 participants in food-assistance-for-assets activities received monthly cash transfers benefiting 136,493 direct beneficiaries through improved access to food and the meeting of immediate basic needs. Around 10,100 smallholder farmers were provided with seeds to produce staple cereals, and 25,740 livestock producers gained livestock feed. The project improved livelihoods and food security through emergency employment for 6,798 individuals, which comprised cash-for-work activities and the rehabilitation of 38 community/market assets. Over 5,000 people were supported with grants to help establish microbusinesses, reaching over 28,000 indirect beneficiaries. Up to 3,500 individuals benefited from an apprenticeship

intervention and business training. The project built and rehabilitated 262 community/market assets. Around 150 initiatives at the village level, 68 at the subdistrict level and 8 at the district level improved access to basic services and community infrastructure. Also, 192 public facilities were solarized to resume critical functions in schools, health centres and public offices.

The project's targets were exceeded in components including food/cash-for-assets interventions, food-assistance-for-assets and cash/food transfers, and cash transferred to targeted beneficiaries. Training for farmers (entrepreneurship skills and financial literacy, value chains, livestock fattening and health, dairy product processing and marketing), provision of agricultural inputs, restoration of community-based and market assets and participation in cash-for-work activities reached about 50 to 70 percent of project targets. Many setbacks were attributed to governance systems (obtaining implementation permits from authorities in DFA areas took up to two years in some cases), movement constraints and the poor economic situation. A lack of access to finance and markets, high transportation costs and low purchasing power hindered small business creation, growth and expansion after project implementation. Fuel shortages, local restrictions, bans on the distribution of seeds and a lack of a clear handover strategy added to operational challenges.

Yemen Food Security Response and Resilience Project (2021–2025)

- *Implementing agencies:* UNDP, FAO, WFP, International Committee of the Red Cross
- *Budget:* \$127 million (initial, 2021), \$150 million (additional funding, 2023) (World Bank, International Development Association)
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* See below
- *Geographic coverage:* Abyan, Al Bayda, Al Dhale'e, Al Hodeidah, Al Jawf, Amran, Dhamar, Hajjah, Lahj and Taiz (with 77 targeted districts)

The objective is to improve the availability of and access to food and nutritious diets, both in the short and medium term, for targeted households, and to enhance Yemen's capacity to respond to food insecurity. The project has five components. The first entails improving household incomes through cash-for-work related to agricultural production infrastructure and climate resilience. A cash-for-work programme provides employment opportunities directly to beneficiary labourers from communities in the project area. Small-scale infrastructure-related works are implemented through selected locally sourced contractors expected to create employment opportunities for the communities.

A second component is increasing the production and sale of nutritious crops, livestock and fish products. This supports smallholder farmers and producers to invest in productive assets and helps improve their capacity to better commercialize their products and enter new markets. A third component involves improving the nutritional status of vulnerable rural households, while a fourth builds capacity for food security management and climate resilience. The latter includes activities to significantly strengthen both households and the public sector in food security crisis planning and response.

Implementation progress:^{xxxv} As of the end of 2023, the first component was underway in 94 project sites, generating around 442,629 person-days of employment for around 14,617 community workers, including 2,318 women. Community-based agricultural production infrastructure has improved income opportunities for around 50,000 people, who now have access to their fields, can use irrigation for crops and are better protected from floods. Activities under component two have supported more than 100,000 households with livestock vaccination campaigns. Component three has completed activities related to immediate nutrition support, with high levels of satisfaction reported among around 740,000 women and children who were beneficiaries. The project experiences high governance, macroeconomic and fiduciary risks.

Strengthening Resilience and Participation at the Local Level in Yemen Programme (2019–2026)

- *Implementing agency:* German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ) and local partners
- *Budget:* N/A (Germany, Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development [BMZ], GIZ)
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* See below
- *Geographic coverage:* Ibb, Dhamar and Hadramawt governorates

The programme implements field projects with the following results.

Upgrading local capacities to provide basic services through 30 small-scale measures directly benefitted over 220,000 people. This entailed equipping 14 schools, rehabilitating or installing water infrastructure in five villages and providing medical equipment to six hospitals. Public administration and self-help trainings were offered to 1,400 participants, along with capacity development for the Yemeni Association for Quality of Health Services and Development.

To improve income and food security for rural households, a cash-for-work-plus programme provided vocational training to 150 women and young men to produce face masks and weave traditional clothing. Water infrastructure irrigation canals were constructed; 1,800 vulnerable rural families received improved potato and onion seeds; 200 families were trained on beekeeping and honey production; and vaccination campaigns cared for the animals of smallholder households.

Increasing income security in artisanal fishing households involved training 1,000 fishers on using GPS systems and providing equipment such as ice boxes for cold chain storage. Cash-for-work-plus measures included training 60 young men on boat maintenance and engine repair, and 85 women on weaving and repairing fisher nets and drying and salting fish.

Fostering social cohesion at the local level entailed training 79 employees (53 percent women) from 45 local civil society organizations on conflict management and resolution, violence prevention (particularly youth), human rights and psychosocial support, as well as project planning, organizational steering and management, and monitoring and evaluation systems. Across 11 local communities in Ibb, 225 vulnerable people from multiple social groups took part in rehabilitating wells and water networks.

Improving Food and Nutrition Security for Resilience in Yemen (2022–2026)

- *Implementing agency:* GIZ and local partners
- *Budget:* N/A (BMZ, GIZ)
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* See below
- *Geographic coverage:* Al Mahwit and Lahij governorates

The project supports farmers who are active in dairy farming and mixed crop cultivation (intercropping) in coffee fields; provides training and advice on skills for a hygienic and nutrient-rich diet (production, storage, further processing and consumption); offers training, small-scale construction measures and remunerated jobs (cash-for-work) to increase resilience to extreme weather events in smallholder agriculture; and cooperates with local companies to develop structures that can anchor and expand measures over the long term.

Promoting the Private Sector and Employment (2019–2024)

- *Implementing agency:* GIZ and local partners
- *Budget:* N/A (BMZ, GIZ)
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* See below
- *Geographic coverage:* Sana'a, Aden and Hadramaut governorates

The project supports start-ups and local micro- and small enterprises in the information technology and solar sector through financial support and workshops. It supports microfinance institutions in developing services aimed in particular at women's needs, and develops and implements training courses on financial literacy, the installation and maintenance of photovoltaic solar power systems, heating, ventilation, air conditioning and industrial electricity.

Building Resilience Through Integrated Community-based and Humanitarian Systems Transformation and Leadership in Yemen Project (2023–2027)

- *Implementing agencies:* CARE International Yemen, Save the Children, Yemen Family Care Association and six other national partners.
- *Budget:* \$76 million (United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office)
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* 275,000 people
- *Geographic coverage:* 10 governorates

The project targets the most vulnerable households to ensure they can access sufficient nutrition. The project intends to provide access to secure income through project activities directed towards women, girls, people living with disability, and other marginalized groups, including IDPs. A consortium will work together to create up to 140 village saving groups to empower women to make decisions and invest in their own businesses. Activities will combine the elements of social protection, livelihood development and financial inclusion, based on unconditional and conditional cash assistance, livelihood support through training and asset transfers, access to finance through village savings and loan associations, capacity development for existing social protection systems through greater coordination and referrals, and early warning, early action and rapid response during crises.

Yemen Humanitarian Fund (managed by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA])

- *Funding provided by multi-donor funding with a large contribution from USAID*
- *Budget:* N/A

The Yemen Humanitarian Fund receives unearmarked contributions from donors throughout the year. Funds are allocated to eligible partners through an inclusive and transparent process. There are two types of allocations: standard and reserve. The Fund offers a standard allocation once or twice a year through a call for proposals to support collectively identified needs aligned with strategic objectives and priorities in the Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan. Reserve allocations are launched as needed in response to sudden onset humanitarian needs and specific crises.

Restoring Education and Learning Project (2020–2024)

- *Implementing agencies:* UNICEF, WFP, Save the Children
- *Budget:* \$47.4 million (World Bank, Global Partnership for Education)
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* 600,000 children
- *Geographic coverage:* Aden and Lahj, Al-Dhale governorates (not the complete list)

The project seeks to maintain access to basic education, improve conditions for learning and strengthen education sector capacity in selected districts. As of the end of August 2023,^{xxxvi} the

project had reached close to 600,000 children with date bars and high-energy biscuits, 33,000 regular and 2,160 rural female teachers with salary support, 20,500 students with learning assessments, 11,250 students with remedial education and 363 schools with infrastructure improvement packages (out of which 175 schools completed rehabilitation activities as of July 2023). It provided more than 8,300 grade 1 to 3 teachers with training on core teaching skills.

Economic Recovery and Livelihoods Program (2020–2023)

- *Implementing agency:* The Pragma Corporation
- *Funding provided by USAID*
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* N/A
- *Geographic coverage:* N/A

Results: The project supported macroeconomic stability and private sector competitiveness. Working with Yemen’s macroeconomic institutions—the Central Bank of Yemen, Ministry of Finance and Customs and Port Authorities—the project helped to develop macrofinancial policy and address trade transit barriers to unlock commercial, investment and humanitarian assistance flows. The project also created entrepreneurial opportunities that encouraged people to invest in labour and local resources to generate jobs and increase productivity.

Among other achievements, the project helped over 2,000 Yemenis secure stable jobs in the healthcare, education, textile and garment, light manufacturing and agriculture/agribusiness sectors. It assisted 7,380 SMEs to access \$27.2 million in loans from partner financial institutions. Delivery of 186 training sessions to more than 5,800 farmers on modernized farming techniques improved product quality, enhanced production and supported increased rural household incomes.

Gateway to Education (2019–2024)

- *Implementing agency:* Save the Children
- *Funding provided by USAID.*
- *Geographic coverage:* N/A

The project focuses on assisting the Yemen Ministry of Education to strengthen education actors with ongoing trainings and follow-up, providing materials to support literacy, numeracy and active learning. It helps to reduce conflict-induced trauma through the integration of social and emotional learning. Restoring school routines restores feelings of normalcy and trust and helps increase enrolment. The project has expanded inclusive approaches that empower all girls and boys to complete their education.

Yemen Communities Stronger Together Program (2018–2022)

- *Implementing agency:* Global Communities
- *Funding provided by USAID*
- *Geographic coverage:* N/A

The project engages local communities in efforts laying the foundation for a peaceful and effective transition process in Yemen. The objectives are to engage communities and build capacity by training local leaders and organizations on conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and providing grants for initiatives promoting women's participation, youth engagement and innovative approaches. The project promotes peace stabilization activities in government-controlled areas, helps local authorities understand and respond to community needs, and builds capacities for authorities to manage resources, communicate effectively and demonstrate accountability.

Integrated Modalities to Promote Agriculture, Cash-for-Work and Training in Yemen (2020–2021)

- *Implementing Agency:* Global Communities
- *Geographic coverage:* Aden, Lahj and Al Dhale'e

Results: The programme addressed the urgent multisector humanitarian needs of 21,742 vulnerable, conflict-affected Yemenis in Aden, Lahj and Al Dhale'e governorates. It sought to improve household food security and livelihoods by restocking critical agricultural inputs, including seeds, tools, fodder and livestock. In addition, the programme focused on increasing household income in vulnerable households through market-driven vocational training and cash-for-work opportunities as well as asset-building groups and measures aimed at livelihood restoration. Activities improved access to safe water and hygiene knowledge and practices in targeted communities.

Yemen Emergency Food Assistance Program (2020–2021)

- *Implementing agency:* Global Communities
- *Funding provided by:* USAID
- *Geographic coverage:* Aden and Al Dhale'e

Results: The programme met immediate basic food needs of 4,297 Yemeni households (30,079 individuals) through market-based interventions using e-vouchers. From July 2020 to June 2021, it provided 2,741 highly vulnerable households with eight rounds of food vouchers and 1,556 newly displaced households with three months of food vouchers as part of a rapid response mechanism.

Business Resilience Assistance for Value-Adding Enterprises Yemen (2019–2022)

- *Implementing agency:* SMEPS
- *Budget:* \$8.2 million (Islamic Development Bank)
- *Targeted beneficiaries:* 1,503 people
- *Geographic coverage:* Sana'a, Aden, Hadramawt, Ibb and Taiz

The project focused on building women's skills and business resilience. It supported MSMEs owned or managed by women by providing matching grants and advisory services.

Yemen Education Sector Plan 2024–2030 Support (2023)

- *Implementing agency:* United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
- *Budget:* \$766,944 (World Bank)

This project supported the Ministry of Education, in cooperation with Yemen education partners, in developing an Education Sector Plan for 2024–2030.

Cash-for-Work: Promoting Livelihood Opportunities for Urban Youth in Yemen (2018–2021)

- *Implementing agencies:* UNESCO and SFD
- *Budget:* \$10.7 million (European Union)
- *Geographic coverage:* N/A

The project promoted livelihood opportunities for youth in Yemen through urban regeneration activities, including the restoration of buildings in historic urban centres. Strategic interventions included urban rehabilitation, youth engagement and the employment of 4,000 urban youth, and creative industries development.

Promotion of Social Stabilization Through Improving the Access of Internally Displaced Persons and Their Host Communities to Income-Generating Activities in Yemen (2021–2023)

- *Implementing agency:* United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
- *Budget:* \$650,000 (Japan)
- *Geographic coverage:* N/A

The project aimed to support vulnerable people, including IDPs, host communities and others, affected by COVID-19. It provided quick impact technical and soft-skills training. This aligned with labour market and beneficiary needs, helping participants to start or join income-generating activities.

Vocational Training Project for Income Generation in Shabwah, Hadramaut, Al-Mahrah, Hajjah and Sana'a (2023)

- *Implementing and funding agency:* Qatar Red Crescent Society
- *Budget:* \$416,344
- *Geographic coverage:* Shabwah, Hadramaut, Al-Mahrah, Hajjah and Sana'a

The project sought to improve the living conditions of 4,683 beneficiaries. It involved the provision of vocational training and production resources for the breadwinners of 669 families to help them earn incomes in professions such as tailoring, fishing, beekeeping, livestock herding, and the maintenance of solar panels and smartphones.

Project on Promoting Economic Resilience in Yemen (2020–2023)

- *Implementing and funding agency:* European Union and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

The specific objectives were to: (1) enable key central level economic institutions to lead economic recovery and create conditions for private sector development; (2) strengthen capacity for economic data collection and analysis; (3) promote resilience and private sector development, focusing on job creation and the employment of youth, women and IDPs; and (4) facilitate donor coordination and policy coherence in the economic sector.

Yemen Relief and Reconstruction Foundation

The Yemen Relief and Reconstruction Foundation (YRRF) was established to provide relief to those in need in Yemen. It reaches the most inaccessible areas, whether due to geography or security risks. Multiple projects enable poor and vulnerable families to generate income in a sustainable way to improve their food security, self-reliance and dignity in a time of severe deprivation.

IPC Integrated Food Security Phase Classification

The IPC analysis is a comprehensive and evidence-based tool that assesses the severity of food insecurity across various population groups. It is a collaborative effort among humanitarian organizations, government entities and other stakeholders in Yemen.

DIEM-Monitoring System and High Frequency Monitoring system

- *Implementing agency:* FAO
- *Donors:* USAID, European Union

DIEM-Monitoring collects, analyses and disseminates data on shocks and livelihoods in countries prone to multiple shocks. It aims to inform decision-making by providing regularly updated information on how different shocks are affecting the livelihoods and food security of agricultural

populations. The monitoring system consists of primary data collected from households and key informants—including agricultural input vendors, food traders and agriculture extension officers—on a periodic basis (approximately every four months). Data are collected through computer-assisted telephone interviews and face-to-face interviews in contexts that allow field access.

Food Security Information Network, Phase 3 (2019–2021)

- *Implementing agency:* Steering Committee (FAO, WFP, International Food Policy Research Institute, IPC, Famine Early Warning Systems Network, Joint Research Centre)
- *Budget:* \$6.3 million (European Union)

The programme addresses the main challenges associated with food security and nutrition information collection, analysis and management systems by supporting a sustainable Food Security Technical Secretariat and food security and nutrition governorate focal units. A third phase of the initiative focuses on expanding programme coverage from 12 to all 22 governorates.



Mohammad Nasser on his cabbage farm in Ans, Dhamar Governorate | Photo Credit: UNDP 2020

Concluding remarks

Concluding remarks

While FSLA data provide a good overview of the situation in Yemen, they are still, and understandably, focused on assessing the extent of the food crisis and guiding relief interventions. Yemen lacks accurate basic economic data, including macroeconomic data (e.g., national accounts) and data on household income and expenditure, poverty, labour market demand and structures, employment and the labour force. These data will be crucial to steer the graduation from a relief to a development approach and to design interventions to create sustainable livelihood and employment opportunities, and stimulate local economies as well as overall national economic growth.

Additionally, these data are required to analyse the impacts of the numerous factors contributing to food insecurity and the lack of livelihood opportunities as well as to explain disparities between DFA and IRG areas and among different governorates and districts. More in-depth studies are needed to understand the relationship between sources of livelihoods, including economic activities tied to specific value chains, and degrees of vulnerability at the district level. This would help to pinpoint causes of vulnerability and the challenges and bottlenecks that hinder the adequacy and sustainability of livelihoods.

The ongoing conflict in Yemen has increasingly fragmented the country into two distinct economic zones, each governed by its unique set of institutions and policies, with mounting disparities between them. These disparities are glaringly evident in FSLA indicators on livelihoods and food insecurity. In general, the livelihoods situation has deteriorated more in DFA areas compared to IRG ones, with higher and more widespread vulnerability in the former. This can be attributed to several factors, including differences in PPP and the cost of goods, particularly food items. Often, items are more affordable in IRG-controlled areas.

Moreover, a sizable portion of essential staples like wheat and rice is imported, which places DFA areas at a disadvantage due to restrictions on imports and financial transactions. The DFA imposes additional customs duties on imported goods and commodities, consequently driving up prices. Since FSLA data suggest that inflation is among the chief causes of food insecurity, it is important to highlight the substantial difference in monetary policies and instruments between DFA and IRG areas, as these lead to disparities in inflation and exchange rates. Additionally, the impact of the conflict varies, with governorates in DFA-controlled areas exhibiting more pockets of extreme vulnerability.

The different causes of vulnerability among districts even within each governorate indicate a need for more micro- and community-level assessments and projects, and differentiated approaches and implementation arrangements that consider local specificities. Analysis of the sources of vulnerability demonstrates that the sustainability and stability of livelihoods are crucial elements that should be factored into project design. Overall, strong indications suggest that stable livelihoods have a far more significant positive impact on improving food security compared to humanitarian and food assistance.

The data analysis shows a very weak correlation between the level of food assistance received and the severity of food insecurity and vulnerability (measured by IPC indicators) at the district level. Stable sources of income, particularly in southern governorates, have led to relatively lower levels of vulnerability. Income and livelihood irregularity in northern governorates, by contrast, are drastically higher than in IRG areas. Stable jobs and sources of income, such as government salaries and pensions, do not seem to be as common in northern governorates. The scope of the informal economy is expected to be larger in DFA areas as indicated by the higher percentage of respondents with casual, irregular and seasonal livelihoods. It is also possible that the market and overall nature and scope of effective demand in IRG areas allows for more livelihoods in the

informal economy. A high percentage of households in the southern governorates, however, relies on government salaries and pension, income from work as professionals and skilled labour.

Humanitarian and food assistance are more prominent sources of income for households in DFA areas. This is not due to the higher share of assistance received by households there but to the lack and irregularity of other income sources. The large influx of aid that the IRG receives has contributed to relatively more public sector jobs and better and more stable salaries and pensions for government employees and civil servants. Nonetheless, it has also produced an alarmingly high degree of dependency on foreign aid.

FSLA data analysis indicates a geographical concentration of assistance. While some districts and communities receive large amounts of assistance, others receive very little or no assistance at all. The mapping of projects and interventions and stakeholder interviews confirmed this finding. There is also a high degree of duplication among projects and interventions, including overlaps based on location and groups of beneficiaries. Several reports and interviews point out that the same recipients often receive assistance through different projects and sources.

Only a few local implementing partners operate in Yemen, and they are conducting projects on behalf of all donors and international organizations. This creates tendencies to use duplication and overlap to reduce transaction costs, and to avoid communities that are situated in remote areas and/or are costly to access. Often, the same lists of beneficiaries are used for different projects. Despite several efforts to better coordinate the humanitarian and development work of donors and international organizations, such as technical and coordination working groups set up under the Yemen Partners Group Technical Team's humanitarian-development-peace nexus coordination structure (e.g., the Food Security, Agriculture and Livelihood Working Group and the Fisheries Subworking Group), more measures are needed to improve coordination, build synergies, and avoid duplication and overlap. This is essential to improve coverage and maximize impact.

While war and conflict were identified as the most prominent source of vulnerability in northern governorates, it was ranked way low on the list in the IRG controlled areas, where key economic and developmental factors (e.g., lack and irregularity of employment, income and livelihoods opportunities and inflation) were the most prominent. The inclusion of the blockade and sanctions in a survey question asking about shocks and constraints likely inflated the numbers of responses. Yet even in northern governorates, economic factors remained high on the list of causes of vulnerability. This underlines the need to graduate from a purely humanitarian relief approach to a development one.

Various projects seem to suffer design flaws due to an overemphasis on a relief approach and implementation shortcomings, such as the capacity of implementing partners and gaps in the coverage and selection of beneficiaries. Conditional and unconditional cash transfers, including cash-for-work, have their own inherent limitations. By providing a false sense of relief, even as they achieve very limited impacts on livelihoods and local economies, transfers may contribute to the observed weak correlation between assistance received and food security. Further, when a substantial number of beneficiaries in a small district or village receives cash through these programmes, there will be a short-lived surge in local consumption that, if not met by a proportional increase in the supply of goods and services, will feed into inflation. Due to the limited capacities of local private businesses, a lack of an enabling environment and supportive infrastructure, as well as the temporary and irregular nature of assistance programmes, local business will be either unable or unwilling to increase output and the supply of goods and services or otherwise make long-term investments to cater to such short-term surges in demand.

While humanitarian and food assistance may contribute to saving lives, it is not sufficient to create sustainable livelihoods. Projects and funding will only yield stepped-up results when sustainability is factored into project design and the objective becomes economic development, including to

create a vibrant and productive private sector. The observed weak trickle-down effect of assistance, mostly cash transfers, has had mainly a short-term and localized impact. Cash assistance may still be used for a limited scope and duration but must be a part of larger interventions to promote economic development, boost productivity and value addition, support private sector growth, stimulate sustainable livelihoods and income-generating opportunities, and enhance the supply of goods and services, all of which can in turn generate revenue for national and local governments through taxes.

The 2024 Humanitarian Response Plan^{xxxvii} has a targeted and risk-informed focus reflecting the recommendations of the 2021 Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Yemen Crisis.^{xxxviii} The evaluation report offered valuable insights into the country's aid efforts, highlighting both successes and areas for improvement. Its findings are still highly relevant to more recent initiatives.

Early wins: Between 2017 and 2021, scaled-up food and cash assistance significantly improved food security. Yet recent funding cuts threaten this progress. Funding for the critical Humanitarian Response Plan shrunk to \$1.8 billion in 2023, a 62 percent drop from \$4.1 billion in 2019.^{xxxix} Major donors such as Denmark, Germany, the United Kingdom and the European Union have significantly reduced their contributions, while the United States of America, the largest contributor, cut its aid by 23 percent. Gulf nations including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have withdrawn most of their funding. A few countries have commendably increased their contributions but cannot bridge the immense funding gap. At the organizational level, WFP's Strategic Plan (2023–2025), for example, was only 14 percent funded as of January 2024, with most available resources allocated to food security and nutrition assistance.^{xl}

Beyond the numbers: While the initial surge in aid saw an impressive rise in numbers served, concerns about the quality and accessibility of assistance are still highly relevant. Shortcomings in consulting local communities, limited data transparency and outdated beneficiary lists are among the issues that raise questions about whether the most vulnerable are truly being reached. Additionally, geographical disparities exist, and protection services and livelihood support lag behind food, cash and voucher assistance in coverage and funding. District- or governorate-level data on service and supply distribution are not always available or limited, or give selective numbers and require deeper analysis.

Governance and coordination complexities: The ability of initiatives to achieve their aims and outcomes heavily depends on overcoming numerous hurdles faced by implementing agencies. Organizations grapple with issues of governance, bureaucracy and economic instability, including fluctuating currency, fuel scarcity and crumbling infrastructure. The divided control and administration between the IRG and DFA adds other challenges. Humanitarian access is impeded by bureaucratic delays and restrictions on the movement of aid workers. Coordinating efforts across two separate administrative territories remains difficult. Data collection is hampered by access limitations and logistical hurdles.

A timely and effective response will require unimpeded access for aid workers and resources to reach the most vulnerable through targeted food assistance programmes. Scaling up funding support for the 2024 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan is crucial, especially considering increasing needs and potential reversals in progress. Simply addressing immediate needs is not enough, however. Building long-term resilience requires robust livelihood support and social protection. By investing in communities, particularly in improved and climate-smart agricultural practices, diversified income sources and strengthened social safety nets, initiatives could accelerate development, break the cycle of dependence on emergency aid and become the foundation for sustainable recovery. In short, integrated programmes need to address both immediate needs and long-term challenges.

The urgency of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen has predictably led to a stronger focus on food and humanitarian assistance and less attention to livelihood assistance and support. It has favoured wider coverage over more focused and substantial assistance. At the same time, the large magnitude of the crisis coupled with resources constraints has made assistance irregular. Most programmes provide very modest support, mostly through some form of conditional and/or unconditional cash transfers to a large number of recipients. Often, there are no sustainability mechanisms or exit strategies. The result has been to minimize impacts on households receiving assistance. This pattern likely contributes to the observed weak correlation between assistance received and food security. A significant percentage of households identify the irregularity of assistance as a cause of vulnerability, particularly in northern governorates. While humanitarian and food assistance may save lives, is not sufficient to create sustainable livelihoods.

Graduating from a humanitarian relief to a developmental mode would put more focus on creating sustainable livelihood opportunities with wider community impact, and adopt a clear strategy to scale up district, governorate and country-wide development impacts. Several projects have already started shifting their focus to livelihood generation, mostly through employment, yet while still utilizing a relief approach. A development approach would create sustainable and productive ecosystems that can organically generate livelihood opportunities. This requires developing value chains and using a cluster development approach that extends to activities in surrounding communities that support value chain actors, hence, creating sustainable communities.

Moving forward calls for combining area-based and value chain-based approaches, focusing on promising value chains, and supporting the rebuilding, rehabilitation and accumulation of community assets, capacities and knowledge bases. It necessitates expanding beyond the micro level. While some macro-level interventions, such as providing capacity-building to central Government agencies and supporting policy formulation and planning processes, may still be premature, interventions at the meso level, such as those supporting local and district governance institutions, may be appropriate and have positive trickledown effects in enhancing sustainability. Some macro-level support, with clear risk mitigation measures, should also be considered (e.g., supporting and enhancing the capacities of the central statistical agency).



Policy recommendations

Policy recommendations

1. Support the structuring of a comprehensive humanitarian–development–peace nexus approach to transition from humanitarian to development assistance wherever possible. This should focus on creating opportunities for sustainable livelihoods, starting at the community level, with a clear strategy to expand to the district, governorate and national levels. Moving across these levels would allow the piloting and expansion of projects, without resorting to the current approach of creating dedicated pilot projects that may or may not be scaled up. Projects should not be designed as pilots but rather as fully fledged initiatives tailored to a specific level with options for expansion and replication to higher levels. Feasibility studies and background research before designing projects will need to explore scaling up and replication potentials and requirements.
2. In devising a transition from humanitarian to development assistance, it is important to bear in mind that pre-conflict Yemen was a least developed country with high rates of income and human poverty, vulnerability, inequality and food insecurity. Thus, graduating into the pre-crisis situation, which is the best result humanitarian assistance can achieve, should not be the desired outcome. Development assistance, on the other hand, could help address structural developmental challenges that have and continue to hinder the country's development. That does not mean ceasing all humanitarian assistance. Instead, it requires shifting the focus to development assistance and integrating humanitarian assistance into development assistance projects. Further, humanitarian assistance can be redesigned to have sustainable development impacts, such as through creating livelihoods and building community resilience.
3. The transition from humanitarian to development assistance will entail shifting from temporary interventions (e.g., temporary employment, cash-for-work and cash transfers) to more permanent and sustainable solutions. It will also require moving from interventions that yield fast results (e.g., temporary jobs) to those aimed at creating sustainable value chains and ecosystems that will organically generate sustainable employment and livelihood opportunities. The latter approach will not yield quick results. It could, however, generate sustainable and transformational impacts over the medium and longer term.
4. Investment in supporting, developing and promoting promising value chains should utilize a cluster development approach that strengthens industries and services around and/or in proximity to value chains, creating sustainable and productive communities and development ecosystems.
5. Value chain development should be integrated into rural development projects, while investment in infrastructure should focus on elements linked to, and needed by, value chains.
6. Enhancing domestic value added would entail supporting the private sector to move up the value chain and create local value chains.
7. Investments in promising value chains should be diversified and aimed at strengthening linkages among them and supporting shared industries and services, such as finance and logistics, used by more than one value chain.
8. Expanding development assistance from generating employment opportunities to livelihoods opportunities should incorporate self-employment and entrepreneurial activities, particularly in rural areas.
9. An in-depth analysis should evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian/food assistance.
10. Investment in value chains and a market-oriented ecosystem should integrate and balance support to both supply and demand sides. Creating value chains with no sizable demand for products will fail. Enhancing effective demand, through cash infusions, where there is no supply of goods and services will only feed inflation. A balanced approach should diversify and expand market access beyond local communities to districts and

governorates within Yemen. It could also seek to tap into exports to regional markets to complement domestic demand, which is expectedly low due to widespread poverty.

11. Investment in supporting the private sector, particularly MSMEs, should strive to enhance its growth and capacity to generate sustainable livelihood opportunities. This will entail addressing various challenges faced by the private sector, including access to finance, markets, input materials, financial and other services, and supportive entrepreneurial activities. UNDP's recent study on rural income development in Yemen points to an increasing interest in entrepreneurial activities and self-employment.^{xii} Fostering entrepreneurial activities through capacity-building and incubation programmes could lead to the generation of livelihoods through the creation of MSMEs. Integrating these enterprises into value chains and clusters would enhance their sustainability and growth, and contribute to value addition.
12. Scaling up efforts to support and formalize informal businesses and entrepreneurial activities, particularly in rural communities, could enhance their access to services and markets and facilitate their integration into local and national economies. Monitoring their growth and sustainability could contribute to the design of poverty and vulnerability reduction interventions targeting vulnerable groups, who are often concentrated in the informal sector.
13. Bolstering the participation of women and marginalized groups, including IDPs, in economic activities should encompass addressing barriers to participation, including a lack of access to training, microfinance, financial services, markets and supplies.
14. Investment in greater financial inclusion will strengthen the growth and sustainability of the private sector and contribute to poverty reduction. UNDP's recent study on rural income development in Yemen⁶ indicates a favourable environment for digital financial inclusion due to high levels of mobile smartphone ownership.
15. Breaking the dependency cycle and building resilience, particularly in rural and vulnerable communities, calls for investing in social safety nets and climate-smart value chains. Development assistance interventions must incorporate clear exit and sustainability strategies at various levels, starting at the project level.
16. Investment should strengthen governance at the micro and meso levels, through capacity-building and the active engagement of local and district governance institutions in development projects. Strengthened local, district and governorate institutions may also serve as local partners.

⁶ UNDP, Market Study: Rural Income Development in Yemen, 2024

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Appendices

Table A.1 Average IPC key indicators in southern governorates in 2023, percentage

Governorate	HDDS			HHS					FCS		
	Average of HDDS (5–12 food groups) IPC Phases 1–2	Average of HDDS (3–4 food groups) IPC Phase 3	Average of HDDS (0–2 food groups) IPC Phases 4–5	Average of HHS (0) IPC Phase 1	Average of HHS (1) IPC Phase 2	Average of HHS (2–3) IPC Phase 3	Average of HHS (4) IPC Phase 4	Average of HHS (5–6) IPC Phase 5	Average of IPC Phases 1–2	Average of IPC Phase 3 (borderline)	Average of IPC Phases 4–5 (poor)
Abyan	87	13	1	59	24	15	1	1	47	38	15
Ad Dali'	78	20	1	63	17	20	0	0	27	34	39
Aden	98	2	0	59	17	23	0	0	78	16	6
Al Hodeidah	96	3	0	44	19	34	2	1	85	11	4
Al Jawf	90	9	1	57	29	14	0	0	72	22	7
Al Maharah	91	8	1	67	21	11	0	0	75	17	8
Hadramawt	94	6	0	74	16	9	0	0	75	20	5
Lahj	83	16	1	77	15	8	1	1	38	38	23
Ma'rib	77	20	3	52	20	22	4	2	48	35	17
Shabwah	86	13	0	79	13	7	1	0	53	34	13
Socotra	87	11	2	100	0	0	0	0	49	27	24
Ta'iz	86	14	1	60	21	18	1	0	53	31	16

Table A.2: IPC food security and livelihood indicators by district and governorate, percentage

Governorate	District	FCS			HDDS			HHS				
		IPC Phases 1–2 (acceptable)	IPC Phase 3 (borderline)	IPC Phases 4–5 (poor)	HDDS (5–12 food groups) IPC	HDDS (3–4) IPC Phase 3	HDDS (0–2 food groups) IPC	HHS (0) IPC Phase 1	HHS (1) IPC Phase 2	HHS (2–3) IPC Phase 3	HHS (4) IPC Phase 4	HHS (5–6) IPC Phase 5

					Phases 1-2		Phases 4-5					
Abyan	Khanfar	31	41	29	73	27	1	24	32	33	4	7
	Zinjibar	36	34	30	75	24	1	45	29	15	7	3
	Jayshan	29	36	34	44	53	2	51	31	18	0	0
	Rassd	40	45	15	94	4	1	85	11	4	0	0
	Sibah	70	30	1	99	0	1	77	18	4	1	0
	Ahwar	86	14	0	99	1	0	31	40	28	1	0
	Lawdar	56	41	3	98	2	0	91	6	4	0	0
	Al Mahfad	50	45	5	97	3	0	71	23	6	0	0
	Mudiyah	27	60	13	96	4	0	52	15	33	1	0
	Sarar	72	23	6	92	8	0	82	11	7	0	0
Al Wadi'	25	48	27	85	15	0	46	45	9	0	0	
Ad Dali'	Qa'tabah	33	35	32	79	17	4	23	33	42	1	1
	Al Azariq	13	19	67	38	59	3	79	16	4	0	0
	Ash Shu'ayb	28	30	42	90	9	1	67	27	5	0	0
	Ad Dali'	21	39	39	67	32	1	20	14	66	0	0
	Al Hasayn	33	37	29	100	0	0	89	9	2	0	0
	Jahaf	34	44	22	95	5	0	100	0	0	0	0
Aden	Kritar - Sirah	88	11	1	99	1	1	67	13	17	1	2
	Dar Sa'd	89	9	2	98	2	1	34	21	44	1	1
	Ash Shaykh Othman	89	7	4	99	1	0	37	24	37	1	1
	Al Mansurah	74	19	7	98	2	0	56	26	17	1	1

	Al Mu'alla	76	21	3	99	1	0	79	11	9	1	1
	Al Burayqah	60	21	19	89	9	1	44	24	32	0	0
	At Tawahi	75	20	5	100	0	0	90	5	4	0	0
	Khur Maksar	73	23	3	99	1	0	64	13	22	1	0
Al Hodeidah	Hays	88	8	3	96	4	1	38	16	43	2	2

	Al Khukhah	82	14	4	97	3	0	51	23	24	1	0
Al Jawf	Khab wa Ash Sha'f	72	22	7	90	9	1	57	29	14	0	0
Al Maharah	Al Ghaydhah	78	11	11	92	6	2	63	21	13	2	2
	Hawf	73	21	6	96	4	1	62	31	4	2	2
	Haswin	71	21	9	86	13	1	87	8	4	0	1
	Al Masilah	74	19	7	84	12	3	65	23	12	0	0
	Man'ar	53	24	23	72	25	3	79	17	3	0	0
	Hat	92	7	1	99	1	0	57	26	16	0	0
	Sayhut	95	5	0	98	2	0	54	24	22	0	0
	Shahin	81	12	8	95	5	0	51	28	20	1	0
	Qishn	56	35	9	92	8	0	87	8	5	0	0
	Hadramawt	Hajar	65	14	21	80	19	1	57	8	31	2
Ghayl Bawazir		72	21	7	99	1	0	81	12	6	1	1
Wadi Al Ayn		78	19	2	98	2	0	78	11	10	1	1
Brum Mayf'ah		67	21	13	97	3	0	63	19	17	0	1
Al Qatn		67	31	2	96	4	0	89	8	2	0	1
Al Abr		72	19	9	91	9	1	100	0	0	0	0
Hajar As Say'ar		100	0	0	100	0	0	99	1	0	0	0
Ar Raydah wa Qussay'ar		99	1	0	100	0	0	20	38	42	0	0
Daw'an		71	22	7	100	0	0	72	14	14	1	0
Sah		90	9	1	99	1	0	97	3	1	0	0
Sayun		94	5	1	99	1	0	96	3	1	0	0
Rakhyah		67	28	5	99	1	0	91	7	2	1	0
Amd		82	17	1	99	1	0	44	51	5	0	0
Al Mukalla City		92	8	1	99	1	0	72	21	7	1	0
Rumah		88	12	1	99	1	0	90	4	6	0	0
Tarim		73	26	2	98	2	0	84	15	1	0	0
Al Mukalla		78	20	2	98	2	0	64	28	8	0	0
Haridah		89	10	1	98	2	0	88	8	4	0	0
Zamakh wa Manwokh		99	1	1	97	3	0	90	8	3	0	0
Thamud		67	29	4	97	3	0	51	17	33	0	0

	Ad Dis	96	3	1	97	3	0	28	34	36	2	0
	Ash Shihr	52	36	12	94	6	0	73	20	7	0	0
	Ghayl bin Yamin	30	59	11	92	8	0	62	36	3	0	0
	Yab'uth	55	45	0	90	10	0	87	6	7	0	0
	Al Qaff	99	1	0	89	11	0	99	1	0	0	0
	Ad Dulay'ah	54	44	2	82	18	0	87	12	2	0	0
	Shibam	58	37	4	78	22	0	59	34	6	1	0
	As Sawm	48	31	21	77	23	0	68	31	2	0	0
Lahj	Tuban	12	23	65	52	41	8	59	13	12	8	8
	Halmin	29	43	28	83	17	1	91	6	3	0	1
	Al Qubaytah	12	35	53	57	43	0	96	3	0	0	1
	Al Had	28	56	16	94	4	1	94	3	3	0	0
	Yahr	48	31	21	93	6	1	71	27	2	0	0
	Al Musaymir	37	26	37	84	15	1	76	11	13	0	0
	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah	57	28	14	91	8	1	39	29	32	1	0
	Al Maflahi	46	39	15	66	33	1	96	3	1	0	0
	Habil Jabr	53	37	9	97	3	0	71	28	1	0	0
	Al Malah	68	24	8	94	6	0	79	16	5	0	0
	Tur Al Bahah	30	50	20	93	7	0	53	25	22	1	0
	Radfan	44	42	13	92	8	0	94	4	2	0	0
	Al Hawtah	49	48	3	85	15	0	49	37	14	0	0
	Yafi'	38	47	15	84	16	0	99	1	0	0	0
	Al Maqatirah	24	47	29	81	19	0	83	12	6	0	0
Ma'rib	Ma'rib City	31	44	24	51	44	4	23	18	41	13	5
	Ma'rib	57	34	9	93	7	0	56	21	17	4	2
	Harib	33	33	34	66	26	7	50	26	23	0	0
	Raghwan	72	28	0	98	2	0	81	13	6	1	0
Shabwah	At Talh	13	70	17	87	13	0	81	6	10	1	3
	Mayfa'ah	42	29	29	70	26	4	68	17	14	0	1
	Radum	51	20	29	66	34	0	69	9	21	0	1
	Markhah Al Olya	1	75	24	65	35	0	20	55	24	0	1

	Arma'a	72	27	2	86	12	2	99	1	0	0	0
	As Sa'id	46	32	22	87	12	1	67	25	8	0	0
	Nisab	19	63	18	73	26	1	49	40	9	2	0
	Bayhan	60	26	14	87	12	1	81	15	4	0	0
	Jardan	71	29	0	100	0	0	97	2	1	0	0
	Ar Rawdah	73	27	0	100	0	0	99	1	0	0	0
	Ayn	91	7	2	98	2	0	97	2	1	0	0
	Habban	67	31	2	96	4	0	97	2	1	0	0
	Dahr	42	47	12	95	5	0	85	8	7	0	0
	Markhah As Sufla	79	18	2	94	6	0	93	6	1	0	0
	Osaylan	79	18	3	93	7	0	93	4	2	0	0
	Ataq	60	29	11	90	10	0	76	21	3	0	0
	Hatib	32	37	31	82	18	0	70	7	8	16	0
Socotra	Qalansiyah wa Abd Al Kuri	44	18	38	79	17	4	99	1	0	0	0
	Hadibu	55	35	10	96	4	0	100	0	0	0	0
Ta'iz	Al Misrakh	44	28	28	75	24	1	69	14	14	2	1
	Al Ma'ifer	31	40	29	79	21	1	39	20	37	3	1
	Jabal Habashi	47	43	10	93	6	1	57	33	8	1	1
	Mashr'ah Wa Hadnan	48	43	8	92	8	0	66	12	20	1	1
	Dhubab	73	9	18	81	19	0	68	9	22	0	1
	Sabir Al Mawadim	31	45	24	80	15	5	32	27	39	2	0
	Al Mawasit	43	37	20	69	29	1	68	24	8	0	0
	Mawza'	56	30	14	92	7	1	22	28	49	1	0
	Al Wazi'yah	85	13	2	100	0	0	77	16	7	0	0
	Al Mudhaffar	73	24	3	99	1	0	83	11	6	0	0
	Al Qahirah	79	21	1	99	1	0	73	17	10	0	0
	Salah	68	25	7	96	4	0	62	28	10	0	0
	Ash Shamayatayn	45	34	21	84	16	0	61	17	21	1	0
Al Makha	54	27	19	83	17	0	57	28	16	0	0	
As Silw	24	39	37	64	36	0	63	26	11	0	0	
Ad Dali'	Bajil	0	34	66	15	51	34	0	0	62	33	5

	Bayt Al Faqih	17	25	58	22	45	33	16	3	66	1	13
	Zabid	13	58	29	49	47	3	12	3	78	7	0
	Qatabir	3	30	67	7	48	45	1	7	77	11	5
Al Bayda	Radman	7	24	69	21	30	49	6	8	79	8	0
	Rada	11	23	66	16	47	37	3	11	84	2	0
	Al Quraishyah	30	44	26	64	36	0	9	10	76	5	0
	Wald Rabi	26	58	16	66	34	0	8	6	77	9	0
	Al Arsh	26	47	26	61	22	18	3	1	88	1	7
	Sabah	40	52	8	79	20	1	0	2	97	1	0
	Ar Ryashyyah	13	27	60	35	51	14	9	27	64	0	0
	Ash Sharyah	7	39	55	39	57	4	7	12	64	16	1
	Al Malajim	3	47	50	17	68	14	0	24	75	1	0
	Mawiyah	11	59	30	16	64	21	13	11	65	10	1
	Sharab As Salam	15	72	13	8	51	40	3	15	78	3	1
	Sharab Ar Rawnah	18	46	36	34	60	6	8	12	71	7	2
	Maqbanah	23	34	43	23	60	17	6	13	68	11	2
	Sabir Al Mawadim	5	22	73	0	21	79	3	21	77	0	0
	Dimnat Khadir	1	22	77	2	34	64	3	21	76	1	0
	Salah	15	60	25	29	55	16	11	9	71	9	1
	At Taiziyah	8	62	30	12	34	54	4	18	66	12	0
	Sami	4	28	68	15	61	24	8	6	75	8	3
	Khab wa Ash Shaf	11	72	17	46	40	14	1	7	64	15	13
	Al Humaydat	3	22	76	2	40	58	0	0	62	25	13
Al Hodeidah	Wusab Al Aali	32	35	34	11	45	44	6	6	79	7	2
	Wusab As Safil	29	25	46	5	47	48	3	4	79	9	4
	Dhamar City	26	37	37	35	47	18	14	11	49	13	14
	Mayfaat Ans	4	28	68	8	36	56	1	3	75	14	7
	Ans	5	19	76	0	20	80	0	2	62	23	13
	Dawran Anis	6	39	55	2	31	67	2	2	78	14	4
	Al Manar	37	44	19	10	60	30	3	6	71	12	8
	Baqim	3	30	67	7	48	45	1	7	77	11	5

	Razih	3	24	73	2	55	42	0	0	81	6	13
	Shadaa	3	27	70	4	69	27	0	0	87	4	9
	Majz	0	63	37	3	40	57	0	1	73	20	6
	Sahar	3	22	75	2	54	44	0	1	87	2	10
	As Safra	1	34	65	5	76	19	1	0	82	17	0
	Al Hashwah	0	27	73	3	38	59	0	3	81	3	12
	Kitaf wa Al Boqa	4	38	58	4	49	47	0	2	80	6	13
	Sadah	2	39	59	7	61	32	0	1	93	5	1
	Hamdan	13	44	43	19	69	11	10	19	52	17	3
	Arhab	10	40	50	27	65	8	21	17	47	11	3
	Nihm	5	26	69	28	63	9	0	6	66	21	8
	Bani Hushaysh	13	49	38	55	43	2	13	9	70	7	0
	Sanhan wa Bani Bahlul	36	44	20	71	27	2	10	21	64	5	0
	Bilad Ar Rus	19	48	33	53	42	5	2	12	66	21	0
	Bani Matar	12	54	34	58	38	3	7	9	76	9	0
	Al Haymah Ad Dakhiliyah	59	22	19	59	34	7	26	21	48	6	0
Al Jawf	Aslam	44	45	11	54	44	2	10	14	69	7	0
	Qafil Shammar	57	28	16	98	2	0	1	3	65	29	2
	Aflah Al Yaman	3	25	72	12	69	19	1	8	61	31	0
	Al Maghrabah	16	42	42	21	53	26	10	10	73	7	0
	Kuhlun Afar	18	47	34	28	54	17	0	1	78	21	1
	Sharas	9	48	43	33	36	31	0	1	73	18	8
	Mabyan	3	44	53	5	73	22	2	0	68	29	1
	Ash Shahil	40	53	7	88	11	1	0	5	75	19	1
	Kuaydinah	2	30	68	3	44	52	1	2	76	20	2
	Wadrah	20	57	23	31	61	7	0	3	62	35	0
	Bani Qays	21	53	26	56	32	12	2	2	83	11	2
	Ash shaghadirah	23	53	24	69	28	2	0	2	89	8	1
Al Mahwit	Old City	13	49	38	20	42	38	0	8	86	6	0
	Shuub	12	34	54	34	52	14	7	4	50	20	18
	Azaal	13	49	38	3	44	53	1	11	82	6	1

	As Safiyah	12	34	54	6	56	38	7	6	67	16	4
	As Sabin	36	44	20	26	31	42	19	12	45	12	12
	Al Wehdah	36	44	20	24	34	42	12	8	53	10	17
	At Tahrir	36	44	20	11	69	20	9	7	68	11	6
	Main	12	34	54	12	63	24	6	6	73	13	2
	Ath Thawrah	13	49	38	50	48	2	6	3	63	19	8
Amran	Nati	2	42	57	0	100	0	38	49	13	0	0
	Maswarah	2	42	57	11	88	1	26	37	37	0	0
	As Silw	23	34	43	8	66	27	2	3	83	10	2
	Hayfan	23	34	43	1	51	48	2	5	91	2	1
	Rajuzah	7	47	47	2	29	69	1	1	55	18	25
	Khayran Al Muharraq	8	34	57	60	37	2	2	14	76	8	0
	Al Mahabishah	4	41	54	2	27	72	0	0	78	20	2
	Al Mina	10	55	35	62	36	2	0	2	80	15	3
	Jabal Ash sharq	32	35	34	13	82	5	17	12	62	8	1
	Damt	25	40	36	14	69	16	11	16	69	3	1
	Al Husha	4	42	53	2	72	26	2	4	89	4	1
	As Salafiyah	11	27	62	1	4	95	1	0	61	22	17
	Al Ghayl	5	38	57	19	63	18	0	2	72	23	3
	Al Khalaq	18	52	30	30	48	22	0	11	36	14	39
	Barat Al Anan	7	28	65	2	44	54	0	3	59	19	20
	Abs	4	36	60	2	76	22	0	0	54	42	4
	Kuhlan Ash Sharaf	4	41	54	7	69	24	0	1	56	34	9
	Al Miftah	4	41	54	7	69	24	0	1	56	34	9
	Az Zuhrah	1	37	62	8	64	28	3	6	77	14	1
	Al Qanawis	4	28	68	14	41	45	10	18	52	20	1
Dhamar	Al Haymah Al Kharijiyah	50	32	18	62	32	6	14	22	58	6	0
	Manakhah	19	51	30	46	33	21	9	10	58	15	9
	Safan	17	23	61	18	34	48	4	9	39	27	21
	Khawlan	46	37	18	67	31	2	11	38	50	1	1
	At Tyal	54	35	11	77	21	2	11	34	55	1	0

	Bani Dabyan	30	40	30	49	45	6	12	12	61	14	1
	Al Hisn	24	47	28	37	60	3	5	11	75	8	1
	Jihanah	43	41	16	71	27	2	4	26	67	3	0
	Al Qubaytah	0	19	81	3	58	39	1	8	89	1	1
	Majzar	37	57	7	71	28	2	14	32	51	2	1
	Harib Al Qaramish	23	69	8	50	48	2	17	19	63	1	0
	Bidbadah	8	33	58	8	76	16	1	18	73	8	0
Hajjah	Najrah	6	57	37	21	66	13	2	8	58	32	1
	Bani Al Awam	3	61	37	3	84	13	0	0	44	55	1
	Hajjah City	27	59	14	68	31	2	0	1	89	11	0
	Hajjah	28	61	12	76	23	1	0	3	93	4	0
	Washhah	19	39	42	12	42	46	1	1	87	11	1
	Qarah	19	39	42	8	58	34	0	1	81	17	2
	Alluhayah	61	29	10	63	32	4	4	1	83	11	1
	Kamaran	3	54	43	16	82	3	0	0	59	36	4
	As Salif	4	53	43	6	90	4	0	0	56	43	2
	Al Munirah	50	46	4	71	26	3	4	2	89	4	0
	Az Zaydiah	1	37	62	8	64	28	3	6	77	14	1
	Al Mighlaf	4	28	68	14	41	45	10	18	52	20	1
	Ad Dohi	0	34	66	15	51	34	0	0	62	33	5
	Al Hujjaylah	2	39	59	17	73	10	0	0	31	45	24
	Bura	11	33	56	29	56	14	1	10	73	14	2
	Al Marawiah	3	22	76	14	53	33	1	13	76	9	2
	Ad Durayhimi	51	43	6	76	23	1	0	0	82	18	0
	As Sukhnah	21	35	45	19	44	36	17	1	73	4	5
	Al Mansuriyah	17	25	58	22	45	33	16	3	66	1	13
	Jabal Ras	10	54	37	31	66	4	6	1	78	15	0
	Al Hawak	1	39	60	8	65	27	0	3	74	16	7
	Al Hali	10	55	35	28	71	2	0	0	82	2	15
	Al Jarrahi	13	58	29	49	47	3	12	3	78	7	0
At Tuhayta	55	43	2	92	8	0	4	10	71	15	0	

	Al Hada	16	23	61	14	75	11	13	5	77	4	1	
	Jahran	5	36	59	2	35	63	3	4	76	16	2	
	Maghrib Ans	5	17	78	5	41	54	4	3	73	14	4	
	Otmah	23	29	48	23	41	36	12	1	65	3	18	
Ibb	Al Qafr	45	38	17	37	50	13	9	30	53	8	0	
	Yarim	43	42	16	51	43	6	24	20	54	2	0	
	Ar Radmah	23	50	27	12	63	26	32	14	54	0	0	
	A Nadirah	25	40	36	38	47	15	27	30	43	1	0	
	Ash Shair	17	47	37	32	38	30	27	26	47	0	0	
	As Saddah	25	58	17	9	72	18	13	18	68	1	0	
	Al Makhadir	10	38	52	17	47	36	1	1	70	26	2	
	Hobeish	32	39	30	44	52	4	17	24	54	5	0	
	Hazm Al Odayn	53	34	14	63	33	4	32	22	46	0	0	
	Far Al Odayn	7	43	50	2	67	31	0	0	53	41	6	
	Al Odayn	13	53	34	14	70	16	1	2	62	33	1	
	Jiblah	17	46	36	26	65	9	4	17	66	12	0	
	Badan	16	41	42	8	81	11	0	1	78	20	0	
	As Sabrah	4	42	53	28	42	30	1	8	61	30	1	
	As Saiyani	6	57	37	20	63	17	1	13	60	26	1	
	Dhi As Sufal	22	29	49	27	42	31	6	15	72	7	0	
	Mudhaykhirah	3	34	63	7	52	41	1	10	82	7	0	
	Al Mashannah	27	51	23	46	53	2	9	17	67	8	0	
	Adh Dhihar	15	50	36	35	57	8	3	20	73	3	0	
	Ibb	16	50	34	25	71	4	1	4	79	16	0	
	Maswar	17	39	44	26	38	36	12	9	53	25	1	
	Ma'rib	Thula	26	50	24	47	51	2	9	20	68	2	0
		Eyal Surayh	27	40	32	33	22	45	15	16	53	16	1
Khamir		3	40	57	9	39	52	7	10	78	6	0	
Bani Surim		13	47	40	18	44	38	6	7	81	6	0	
Juban		1	25	74	20	75	5	4	18	73	5	0	
Qatabah		1	17	83	19	74	7	1	2	88	10	0	

	Al Jabin	2	30	68	6	64	30	1	4	86	7	2	
	Mazhar	11	27	62	15	26	59	18	0	67	0	15	
	Kusmah	7	37	56	13	60	27	21	14	54	1	11	
	Al Jafariyyah	8	41	51	16	62	23	1	7	87	4	2	
Raymah	Monabbih	3	27	70	4	69	27	0	0	87	4	9	
	Ghamr	0	63	37	3	40	57	0	1	73	20	6	
	Adh Dhahir	12	34	53	13	74	13	0	2	68	24	7	
	Haydan	12	34	53	13	74	13	0	2	68	24	7	
	Saqin	12	34	53	13	74	13	0	2	68	24	7	
Sa'dah	Bilad Attaam	2	30	68	6	64	30	1	4	86	7	2	
	Sirwah	5	23	73	8	68	24	17	15	67	2	0	
	Al Jubah	11	59	30	22	65	13	12	11	68	7	3	
	Rahabah	54	34	12	71	28	2	2	3	91	4	0	
	Harib	11	38	51	16	72	12	1	2	79	18	1	
	Mahliyah	53	44	3	37	62	1	0	2	91	7	0	
	Al Abdiyah	6	61	33	14	82	3	2	9	79	9	1	
	Jabal Murad	18	51	31	23	65	12	19	14	58	4	4	
	Shibam Kawkaban	48	40	12	12	62	26	3	4	75	17	0	
	At Tawilah	36	41	23	21	41	37	6	5	69	20	0	
	Ar Rujum	48	32	20	16	39	45	10	2	69	19	0	
	Al Khabt	37	37	27	19	49	32	2	11	60	27	0	
	Melhan	27	42	32	12	53	36	9	9	63	18	1	
	Hufash	31	54	16	11	63	26	3	4	61	32	0	
	Bani Sad	19	47	34	4	32	64	1	1	69	26	4	
	Al Mahwit City	30	32	38	16	39	46	7	7	68	19	0	
	Sana'a	Al Mahwit	32	42	26	11	49	40	2	6	69	23	0
		Harf Sufyan	37	32	31	37	36	27	22	4	61	9	4
		Huth	27	49	24	22	42	36	28	5	67	1	0
Al Ashah		3	36	62	3	68	29	7	7	75	7	3	
Qafat Odhar		22	34	44	11	32	57	23	2	64	2	9	
Shaharah		11	32	56	4	50	45	3	5	88	3	0	

	Al Madan	11	33	56	7	52	41	10	2	78	10	0
	Suwayr	22	38	40	25	52	23	11	6	79	2	1
	Dhulaymat Habur	21	28	52	16	46	38	14	36	49	1	0
	Dhibain	3	55	42	3	43	54	0	3	77	20	0
	Kharif	4	44	52	12	61	27	2	12	79	6	1
	Raydah	10	29	61	15	36	49	11	9	72	5	3
	Jabal Eyal Yazid	32	32	36	31	56	13	11	16	67	3	3
	As Sudah	12	51	37	13	39	48	7	12	70	4	6
	As Sawd	18	53	29	29	50	21	4	21	73	1	1
	Amran	30	30	41	33	52	15	11	23	56	9	1
Sana'a City	Bani Al Harith	12	34	54	29	68	3	13	8	73	6	0
	Numan	2	42	57	6	39	56	1	17	82	1	0
	As Sawmaah	20	52	28	56	32	12	31	25	44	0	0
	Az Zahir - Al Bayda	7	46	46	48	49	3	9	12	72	7	0
	Dhi Naim	31	48	21	59	40	1	12	10	69	9	0
	At Taffah	5	58	37	22	54	24	8	6	72	15	0
	Mukayras	28	48	24	44	33	23	39	16	45	0	0
	Al Bayda City	9	55	36	21	68	12	15	15	70	1	1
	Al Bayda	8	37	55	26	64	10	34	17	48	1	0
As Sawadiyah	3	24	73	12	37	51	4	4	76	13	2	
Ta'iz	Al Matammah	2	31	68	0	51	49	0	0	46	42	12
	Az Zahir - Al Jawf	7	47	47	9	80	11	0	1	89	10	0
	Al Hazm	18	52	30	30	48	22	0	11	36	14	39
	Al Mutun	7	57	36	10	73	17	0	1	72	26	1
	Al Maslub	5	38	57	19	63	18	0	2	72	23	3
	Kharab Al Marashi	7	28	65	2	44	54	0	3	59	19	20
	Bakil Al Mir	12	34	53	13	74	13	0	2	68	24	7
	Mustaba	4	36	60	2	76	22	0	0	54	42	4
	Kushar	8	34	57	12	57	31	0	3	64	28	6
	Al Jamimah	30	46	24	24	63	13	6	7	85	2	0
Aflah Ash Sham	4	41	54	7	69	24	0	1	56	34	9	

Figure A.1: Regression model statistical variables and correlation preliminary test

Descriptive statistics										
Variable	# Fitted	Mean	Median	Std.Dev.	Root.M. Sqr.	Std.Err. Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Skewness	Kurtosis
FCS	118	0.584	0.592	0.237	0.630	0.022	0.011	1.000	-0.201	-0.850
Food_Assistance_Received	118	0.632	0.663	0.215	0.667	0.020	0.011	1.000	-0.520	0.001
HDDS	118	0.884	0.928	0.129	0.894	0.012	0.378	1.000	-1.631	2.680
HHS	118	0.690	0.706	0.220	0.723	0.020	0.198	1.000	-0.503	-0.534
Livelihood_Assistance_Received	118	0.986	1.000	0.031	0.986	0.002843	0.828	1.000	-3.425	12.817

Correlation matrix (n=118)										
Variable	FCS	Food_Assistance_Received	HDDS	HHS	Livelihood_Assistance_Received					
FCS	1.000									
Food_Assistance_Received	0.125	1.000								
HDDS	0.675	0.115	1.000							
HHS	0.152	-0.147	0.223	1.000						
Livelihood_Assistance_Received	0.123	0.119	0.079	-0.089	1.000					

Table A.3: Regression results

Model: Model 1
Dependent variable: FCS
Independent variables: Food_Assistance_Received, Livelihood_Assistance_Received
Equation:
 Predicted FCS = -0.325 + 0.123*Food_Assistance_Received + 0.844*Livelihood_Assistance_Received

R-Squared	Adj.R-Sqr.	Std.Err.Reg.	Std.Dep.Var.	# Fitted	# Missing	Critical t	Confidence
0.027	0.011	0.235	0.237	118	1	1.981	95.0%

Variable	Coefficient	Std.Err.	t-Statistic	P-value	Lower95%	Upper95%	VIF	Std. Coeff.
Constant	-0.325	0.695	-0.468	0.641	-1.703	1.052	0.000	0.000
Food_Assistance_Received	0.123	0.102	1.204	0.231	-0.079	0.324	1.014	0.112
Livelihood_Assistance_Received	0.844	0.710	1.189	0.237	-0.562	2.250	1.014	0.110

	Mean Error	RMSE	MAE	Minimum	Maximum	MAPE	A-D* stat
Fitted (n=118)	0.000	0.232	0.197	-0.545	0.458	91.0%	0.75 (P=0.052)

Model:

Model 2

Dependent variable:

HDDS

Independent variables:

Food_Assistance_Received, Livelihood_Assistance_Received

Equation:

Predicted HDDS = 0.571 + 0.064*Food_Assistance_Received + 0.277*Livelihood_Assistance_Received

	R-Squared	Adj.R-Sqr.	Std.Err.Reg.	Std.Dep.Var.	# Fitted	# Missing	Critical t	Confidence
	0.017	0.000	0.129	0.129	118	1	1.981	95.0%

Variable	Coefficient	Std.Err.	t-Statistic	P-value	Lower95%	Upper95%	VIF	Std. Coeff.
Constant	0.571	0.381	1.499	0.137	-0.183	1.326	0.000	0.000
Food_Assistance_Received	0.064	0.056	1.146	0.254	-0.047	0.174	1.014	0.107
Livelihood_Assistance_Received	0.277	0.389	0.711	0.478	-0.494	1.047	1.014	0.066

	Mean Error	RMSE	MAE	Minimum	Maximum	MAPE	A-D* stat
Fitted (n=118)	0.000	0.127	0.097	-0.494	0.140	13.0%	5.85 (P=0.000)

Model:

Model 5

Dependent variable:

HHS

	R-Squared	Adj.R-Sqr.	Std.Err.Reg.	Std.Dep.Var.	# Fitted	# Missing	Critical t	Confidence
	0.027	0.010	0.218	0.220	118	1	1.981	95.0%

Variable	Coefficient	Std.Err.	t-Statistic	P-value	Lower95%	Upper95%	VIF	Std. Coeff.
Constant	1.289	0.645	1.998	0.048	0.011	2.567	0.000	0.000
Food_Assistance_Received	-0.141	0.095	-1.492	0.138	-0.328	0.046	1.014	-0.138
Livelihood_Assistance_Received	-0.518	0.659	-0.786	0.433	-1.822	0.787	1.014	-0.073

	Mean Error	RMSE	MAE	Minimum	Maximum	MAPE	A-D* stat
Fitted (n=118)	0.000	0.216	0.177	-0.523	0.360	36.7%	1.11 (P=0.007)













Table A.4: Summary of regression model results for northern governorates

Linear model For FCS	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Run time	2/26/24 2:40 PM	2/26/24 2:46 PM	2/26/24 2:49 PM	2/26/24 2:52 PM
# Fitted	218	218	218	218
Mean	0.166	0.166	0.166	0.166
Standard deviation	0.145	0.145	0.145	0.145
Number of variables	1	1	2	2
Standard error of regression	0.145	0.145	0.144	0.144
R-squared	0.005	0.004	0.025	0.023
Adjusted R-squared	0.000	-0.001	0.016	0.014
Mean absolute error	0.116	0.116	0.115	0.115
Mean absolute percentage error				
Maximum VIF			1.001	1.000
Normality test	***	***	***	***
Coefficients:	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constant	0.196 (0.000)	0.154 (0.000)	-0.312 (0.197)	0.162 (0.000)
Food_Assistance_Received	-0.047 (0.313)		-0.051 (0.276)	
Food_Assistance_Received.Ln		-0.022 (0.350)		-0.022 (0.346)
Livelihood_Assistance_Received			0.518 (0.035)	
Livelihood_Assistance_Received				0.435 (0.043)
Linear model For HDDS	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Run time	2/26/24 3:01 PM	2/26/24 3:03 PM	2/26/24 3:04 PM	2/26/24 3:06 PM
Number fitted	218	218	218	218
Mean	0.244	0.244	0.244	0.244
Standard deviation	0.218	0.218	0.218	0.218

	1	1	2	2
Number of variables	1	1	2	2
Standard error of regression	0.218	0.218	0.218	0.219
R-squared	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001
Adjusted R-squared	-0.004	-0.003	-0.007	-0.008
Mean absolute error	0.173	0.173	0.173	0.173
Mean absolute percentage error				
Maximum VIF			1.000	1.001
Normality test	***	***	***	***
Coefficients:	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Constant	0.263 (0.000)	0.233 (0.000)	0.236 (0.000)	0.136 (0.710)
Food_Assistance_Received	-0.030 (0.669)			-0.031 (0.661)
Food_Assistance_Received.Ln		-0.020 (0.576)	-0.020 (0.577)	
Livelihood_Assistance_Received				0.129 (0.728)
Livelihood_Assistance_Received.Ln			0.129 (0.691)	

Table A.5: Sources of vulnerability in IRG-controlled areas by governate, percentage

Governate	Conflict and insecurity	Displacement: Recent displacement of household	Landmines: Landmines disrupting access to markets, agricultural activities, etc.	Weather: Drought, flooding shocks not related to agricultural activities	Agriculture/livestock/fisheries: Low harvest, pests/diseases, seasonality, weather-related events impacting production	Income: Lack of work/income opportunities, too few household members working, salary too low given price increases	Remittances: Loss/decrease in level of remittances received from friends/family outside of Yemen	Economic access: Food: High prices of food, high inflation, exchange rate volatility	Fuel: Fuel shortages, high fuel prices	Health: Healthcare/medication too expensive, household members not able to work due to health issues	Humanitarian food assistance: Less assistance received, sudden loss of assistance without any reason	Physical access: Lack of food available in the market, long distance to nearest market, lack of access to market	Salaries: Delay/irregularity of salaries	Debt: Unable to purchase on credit/debt, exhausted debt levels	Water and sanitation: No access to safe water and sanitation leading to diarrhoea and other diseases	Sharing: Decrease in help received within the community, from neighbours, friends, etc.	None
Abyan	5.1	0.1	0.5	0.0	0.8	15.9	1.4	60.3	1.0	0.4	3.4	1.5	2.5	3.1	0.5	0.4	3.1
Ad Dali'	10.8	5.4	0.2	0.0	0.4	13.4	0.4	54.6	1.5	2.0	1.3	0.8	1.7	6.7	0.0	0.2	0.8
Aden	0.1	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.6	0.1	78.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	1.0	1.2	0.6	0.1	2.4
Al Hodeidah	11.4	9.2	2.2	0.6	3.6	36.9	0.3	20.3	0.8	2.5	3.6	1.9	0.0	5.3	0.3	0.3	0.8
Al Jawf	55.0	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.9	0.0	31.1	0.0	1.7	0.0	1.1	0.6	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Al Maharah	0.9	0.6	0.2	0.0	0.4	9.1	0.7	69.2	2.5	0.3	1.5	7.0	0.8	3.9	0.6	0.2	2.1
Hadramawt	0.9	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.8	11.8	1.6	66.4	4.1	1.3	2.2	3.2	1.5	1.8	0.1	0.3	3.5
Lahj	2.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	15.4	1.0	67.8	0.6	1.1	2.9	0.6	2.0	3.4	0.2	0.8	1.2
Ma'rib	27.3	4.9	0.1	0.1	0.1	10.6	0.4	45.9	0.7	0.1	1.9	1.4	3.7	1.1	0.1	0.6	0.8
Shabwah	11.1	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.7	13.8	1.4	62.6	1.2	1.5	1.2	1.2	0.9	1.6	0.1	0.1	1.6
Socotra	0.6	0.0	0.0	2.8	0.3	11.4	0.6	47.9	2.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	26.2	3.6	0.0	0.0	3.9
Ta'iz	19.9	3.7	0.8	0.0	0.6	18.2	0.2	40.4	0.9	1.6	4.8	0.9	1.8	2.4	0.3	0.7	2.6
Grand Total	7.4	1.3	0.3	0.1	0.6	14.2	1.0	60.5	1.8	1.1	2.3	1.9	2.0	2.6	0.3	0.4	2.3














Table A.6: Key development partners working in Yemen

<i>World Bank and United Nations entities including UNDP, FAO, UNICEF, WHO, WFP, UNESCO, UNIDO and ILO</i>
<i>International NGOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, Save the Children, CARE International; MERCY Corps, International Rescue Committee, among others.</i>
<i>Donors including (in alphabetical order by country) BMZ (Germany), the Government of Japan, Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, Qatar Red Crescent Society, KSRelief (Saudi Arabia), SIDA (Sweden), Department for International Development (United Kingdom), USAID (United States) and the European Union,</i>
<i>NGOs that work specifically in Yemen and Yemeni local organizations: YRRF, Society for Development and Humanitarian Relief, Yemeni Development Network for NGOs, SFD, SMEPS, PWP, Nasher Organization for Development and Ihya Foundation, among others</i>

Table A.7: List of projects and sources of information

Agency	Initiative	Year	Areas/region covered	Partners	Funding, dollars	Donor	Focus/sources
UNDP	<i>Vocational and Business Skills Training and Support Project—Phase II</i>	May 2023 to July 2024	Abyan, Aden, Al-Dhalea, Al Maharah, Hadramawt, Lahj, Marib, Shabwah and Taizz	UNDP	3.8 million	KSrelief	Market-driven vocational and technical skills for youth Targeted beneficiaries: Direct: 1,533; indirect: 8,946 https://www.undp.org/yemen/projects/vocational-and-business-skills-training-and-support-project-phase-ii https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/ye/2022-Q1-Fact-sheet--English.pdf Project evaluation report (Phase I) https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/detail/21889
UNDP	<i>Social Protection to Provide Social Cohesion in Vulnerable Communities in Yemen</i>	June 2023 to Nov 2024	Aden, Hadramawt and Lahj	UNDP	2 million	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Livelihoods, conflict prevention, peacebuilding Targeted beneficiaries: Direct, 1,114; indirect, approximately 1,189,5881

							as well as strengthening the capacity of national institutions. https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P173582
UNDP	<i>Strengthening of Institutional and Economic Recovery in Yemen</i>	2020–2023	8 governorates	UNDP, SMEPs	39.6 million	European Union	Economic recovery, value chains, private sector development, microfinance https://open.undp.org/projects/00122248
UNDP	<i>Yemen Emergency Crisis Response Project</i>	2016–2022	22 governorates	UNDP, UNICEF	887 million	World Bank, International Development Association	Cash transfers, temporary employment (cash-for-work), support for microenterprises https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P159053 Final report: https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099082923164015722/p159053154192c08f1a9281213e9202e4c1 Final evaluation report UNDP: https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/detail/21956
FAO	<i>Resilient and Sustainable Livelihoods for Rural Yemen</i>	2022–2029	Utoma, Socotra and Hawf	FAO	16 million	Global Environment Facility, Multi-Trust Fund	Land- and seascape management, climate-smart agriculture Targeted beneficiaries: Indirect, 100,000 people https://www.fao.org/3/cb9263en/cb9263en.pdf https://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/news-archive/detail-news/fr/c/1662956/
FAO	<i>Emergency Agricultural and Livelihood Support</i>	December 2023 to	Marib and Sa'adah governorates	FAO	4 million	CERF	Cash assistance, in-kind agricultural inputs, food security. Humanitarian assistance to

	<i>in Marib and Sa'adah Governorates</i>	December 2024					25,620 people, comprising 12,580 women and 13,040 men, who included 5,000 persons with disabilities. https://cerf.un.org/what-we-do/allocation/2023/country/85/23-UF-YEM-61208/23-UF-FAO-034
FAO	<i>Emergency Livelihood Assistance Through the Distribution of Emergency Agriculture and Livestock Kits</i>	January 2023 to January 2024	Hajjah and Taiz governorates	FAO	2 million	CERF	Cash assistance, in-kind agricultural inputs, refresher training on agricultural practices. Targeted beneficiaries: 24,500 host community members https://cerf.un.org/what-we-do/allocation/2023/emergency/27/22-UF-YEM-55728/23-UF-FAO-001
FAO	<i>Rural Livelihood Development Project</i>	2022–2024	N/A	FAO	2.3 million	N/A	Climate-smart agriculture, food and nutrition security, women and youth empowerment Targeted beneficiaries: women and youth, smallholder farmers
FAO	<i>Emergency Support to Protect the Agriculture-, Livestock- and Fishery-Based Livelihoods of Highly Vulnerable Conflict- and COVID-19-Affected Populations in Yemen</i>	2022–2024	Lahj and Taiz governorates	FAO	8 million	KSRelief	Livelihood protection, agriculture, fisheries, livestock, food security, nutrition, market access Targeted beneficiaries: 34,500 conflict-affected households https://www.fao.org/neareast/news/details/Saudi-Arabia's-KSRelief-increases-its-support-for-FAO-emergency-activities-in-Yemen/ar
FAO	<i>Providing Agricultural and Pastoral Livelihood Support for Responding to Immediate Needs of Internally Displaced Persons and Host Communities</i>	2021–2024	Al Dhale'e, Al Hodeidah, Dhamar, Lahj and Taizz	FAO	7 million	Government of Japan	Irrigation rehabilitation, livestock support, fuel-efficient stoves, livelihood protection for IDPs and host communities Targeted beneficiaries: 189,490 people https://www.fao.org/neareast/news/details/Japan-and-FAO-continue-partnership-to-

							enhance-the-food-security-and-nutrition-of-vulnerable-families-in-Yemen/ar
FAO	<i>Emergency Desert Locust Response Project</i>	2020–2024	Aden, Hodeidah, Shabwa, Sieun and Sanaa	FAO	25 million	World Bank	<p>Locust control, livelihood support, early warning preparedness</p> <p>Targeted beneficiaries: 20,820 people, 5,485 affected households</p> <p>https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P174170</p> <p>https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099121923105018557/p1741700fe9dc409a0957b09e67f72cf6ef</p>
FAO	<i>Resilience Programme in the Irrigation and Agricultural Sector</i>	2021–2023	Abyan, Dhamar, and Hadramawt governorates	FAO, UNDP	20 million	KfW	<p>Irrigation infrastructure, cash-for-work, water governance, climate resilience, disaster risk reduction</p> <p>Targeted beneficiaries: 130,000 people https://www.fao.org/family-farming/detail/en/c/1371114/</p> <p>https://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/news-archive/detail-news/en/c/1666903</p> <p>Water-related conflict assessment report: https://yemen.un.org/en/219159-water-related-conflict-assessment-report-resilience-programme-irrigation-and-agricultural</p>
FAO	<i>Improvement of Coffee Production Project</i>	2023–2025	N/A	FAO	347,000		Coffee production improvement
FAO	<i>Sustainable Watershed Management Project</i>	2022–2027	N/A	FAO	17.2 million		Watershed management, governance, resilience, regenerative agriculture
FAO	<i>Emergency Livelihood Assistance</i>	2023–2024	N/A	FAO	600,000	Japan	Food and nutrition insecurity

FAO	<i>Support to the Yemen Food Security and Agriculture Cluster</i>	2023–2024	N/A	FAO	1.4 million	United States	Food security and agriculture cluster support
FAO	<i>Strengthening Evidence-Based Decision Making</i>	2021–2024	N/A	FAO	8.9 million		Food security, nutrition, data analysis, decision-making
Multiple	<i>Supporting Resilient Livelihoods, Food Security and Climate Adaptation in Yemen</i>	March 2022 to February 2025	Hajjah, Hodeidah, Saada, Lahj, Abyan, Mahweet and Taiz	FAO, ILO, UNDP, WFP	49.3 million	SIDA, European Union	Community resilience, social cohesion, clean energy, climate adaptation, livelihoods, food security Targeted beneficiaries: 847,000 people https://www.undp.org/yemen/erry-jp
Multiple	<i>Supporting Resilient Livelihoods, Food Security and Climate Adaptation in Yemen</i>	February 2019 to March 2022	Hajjah, Hodeidah, Lahj, Abyan, Taiz and Sana'a	FAO, ILO, UNDP, WFP	51.8 million	SIDA, European Union	Livelihoods, food security, employment, community assets restoration, climate adaptation, resilience, social basic services, agricultural value chains Targeted beneficiaries: 206,788 Impact assessment report: https://www.undp.org/yemen/erry-jp/publications/impact-assessment-report-supporting-resilient-livelihoods-and-food-security-yemen-joint-programme-erry-ii Final report: https://mptf.undp.org/fund/jye10
Multiple	<i>Joint Actions for Food Security and Nutrition in Yemen</i>	2021 to 2024		FAO, UNICEF, WFP	4.6 million	European Union	Food and nutrition security, social cohesion and livelihood resilience contribute to reducing reliance on humanitarian assistance https://datastore.iatistandard.org/activity/XI-IAT-EC_INTPA-2020-PCC-417943
Multiple	<i>Yemen Food Security Response and Resilience Project</i>	July 2021 to June 2025	Initial: Abyan, Al Bayda, Al Dhale'e, Al Hodeidah, Al Jawf, Amran, Dhamar, Hajjah, Lahj and Taiz	FAO, UNDP, WFP, International Committee of the Red Cross	127 million (initial) 150 million (additional funding as of	World Bank, International Development Association	Improved food availability, nutrition; enhanced food security response capacity https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P176129

					December 2022)		https://www.gafspfund.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/Yemen-Food-Security-Response-and-Resilience-Project.pdf https://www.undp.org/yemen/projects/yemen-food-security-response-and-resilience-project-fsrrp https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/yemen-fao-welcomes-an-additional-million-multi-agency-contribution-from-the-world-bank-to-strengthen-resilience-and-address-growing-food-insecurity/en https://www.fao.org/3/cc6012en/cc6012en.pdf https://www.wfp.org/publications/yemen-food-security-response-and-resilience-project
GIZ	<i>Strengthening Resilience and Participation at the Local Level in Yemen Programme</i>	2019–2026	Ibb, Dhamar and Hadramawt	GIZ, various implementing partners		BMZ	Security, reconstruction, peace, cash assistance, business support https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/369.html
GIZ	<i>Improving Food and Nutrition Security for Resilience in Yemen</i>	2022–2026	Al Mahwit and Lahij governorates	GIZ	N/A	BMZ	https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/369.html
GIZ	<i>Promoting the Private Sector and Employment</i>	2019–2024	Sana'a, Aden, Hadramaut governorates	GIZ	N/A	BMZ	https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/369.html
CARE	<i>Building Resilience Through Integrated Community-based and Humanitarian Systems Transformation and Leadership in Yemen</i>	2023–2027	10 governorates	CARE International Yemen, Save the Children, Yemen Family Care Association, 6 others	76 million	United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office	Cash assistance, food security, household resilience https://www.careinternational.org.uk/news-stories/as-hunger-hits-households-in-yemen-major-new-initiative-announced-to-address-food-insecurity/ Save the Children: https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/document/hunger-programmes-compendium-2023/

							Yemen Family Care Association: https://www.yfca.org/en/news/646
OCHA	<i>Yemen Humanitarian Fund</i>			Managed by OCHA			<p>Unearmarked support for various humanitarian needs as identified in the Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan</p> <p>https://www.unocha.org/yemen/about-yemen-humanitarian-fund</p> <p>Yemen Humanitarian Fund Annual Report 2022</p> <p>https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-fund-yhf-2022-annual-report-enar</p> <p>Infographics (November 2023): https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-response-snapshot-november-2023-enar</p> <p>https://www.unocha.org/news/yemen-womens-union-funding-local-livelihoods</p>
Multiple	<i>Restoring Education and Learning Project</i>	2020–2024	Seven governorates	UNICEF, WFP, Save the Children	100 million World Bank, 52.8 million Global Partnership for Education	World Bank, Global Partnership for Education	<p>Access to basic education, improved learning conditions, strengthened education sector capacity</p> <p>Targeted beneficiaries: 600,000 children</p> <p>https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P175036</p> <p>All Global Partnership Grants: https://www.globalpartnership.org/where-we-work/yemen</p>
USAID	<i>Economic Recovery and Livelihoods Program</i>	2020–2023		The Pragma Corporation	N/A	USAID	Macroeconomic stability, private-sector competitiveness, job creation, entrepreneurship, skills development, agricultural productivity

							Targeted beneficiaries: 2,000 people; 5,800 farmers trained https://pragmacorp.com/erlp/
USAID	<i>Gateway to Education</i>	2019–2024		Save the Children	N/A	USAID	Strengthened, resilient education system to provide safe and equitable access to quality formal education for Yemeni children
USAID	<i>Yemen Communities Stronger Together</i>	2018–2022	Abyan, Aden, Lahj, Taiz and Hadramawt governorates	Global Communities	N/A	USAID	Community engagement, conflict resolution, peacebuilding, women's participation, youth engagement, government accountability Targeted beneficiaries: 400,000 people https://www.usaid.gov/yemen/press-releases/jan-17-2023-usaid-helps-400000-yemenis-better-community-services-and-peaceful-collaboration
USAID	<i>Integrated Modalities to Promote Agriculture, Cash-for-Work and Training in Yemen</i>	2018–2020 Phase I; 2020–2021 Phase II	Aden, Lahj, Al Dhale, Sana'a, Dhamar, Ibb and Taiz governorates	Global Communities	11 million	USAID	Food security, livelihoods, agricultural inputs, vocational training, cash-for-work, asset building, water access, hygiene Final programme report: https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00X287.pdf https://globalcommunities.org/country/yemen/
USAID	<i>Yemen Emergency Food Assistance programme</i>	2020–2021	Aden and Al-Dalhe governorates	Global Communities	N/A	USAID	Emergency food assistance, market-based interventions, e-vouchers. Targeted beneficiaries: Immediate basic food needs of 4,297 Yemeni households (30,079 individuals) https://globalcommunities.org/country/yemen/
SMEPs	<i>Business Resilience Assistance for</i>	2019–2022	Sana'a, Aden, Hadramawt, Ibb and Taiz	SMEPs	8.2 million	Islamic Development Bank,	SME development, women's empowerment

	<i>Value-Adding Enterprises Phase 2</i>						https://smeps.org.ye/projects/13 Phase 1 report: https://icd-ps.org/uploads/files/BRAVE%20Yemen_Report_20211611551554_9726.pdf
UNESCO	<i>Yemen Education Sector Plan (2024–2030) Support</i>	2023–2024	Republic of Yemen	UNESCO	766,944	World Bank	Supports the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Yemen, in cooperation with Yemen education partners, in developing an education sector plan https://core.unesco.org/en/project/727YEM1000
UNESCO	<i>Cash for Work: Promoting Livelihood Opportunities for Urban Youth in Yemen</i>	September 2018 to August 2021	Sana'a, Shibam, Zabid and Aden	SFD	10.7 million	European Union	Livelihood opportunities, urban regeneration https://en.unesco.org/doha/cashforworkyemen https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/cash-work-project-yemen
UNIDO	<i>Promotion of Social Stabilization Through Improving Access of Internally Displaced Persons and Their Host Communities to Income-Generating Activities in Yemen</i>	March 2021 to March 2023		UNIDO	650,000	Japan	Income-generating activities, technical and soft-skills training https://open.unido.org/projects/YE/project-s/
Qatar Red Crescent Society	<i>Vocational Training Project for Income Generation</i>		Shabwah, Hadramaut, Al-Mahrah, Hajjah and Sana'a.	Qatar Red Crescent Society	416,344	Qatar Red Crescent Society	Vocational training Targeted beneficiaries: 4,683 people https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/qrcs-empowers-yemeni-families-make-living-enar
FAO	<i>DIEM-Monitoring System and High Frequency Monitoring Surveys</i>	August 2020 to present	22 governorates	FAO		USAID, European Union	Ten rounds of surveys have been conducted since 2020. Six were DIEM-Monitoring rounds covering income, shocks, agricultural livelihoods, food security and needs. Four High-Frequency Monitoring Surveys utilized the same

							<p>methodology but only included a subset of indicators on income, shocks and food security.</p> <p>https://data-in-emergencies.fao.org/pages/monitoring</p> <p>Results and recommendations: https://www.fao.org/3/cc7989en/cc7989en.pdf</p>
FAO	<i>Food Security Information Network Phase 3</i>	2019–2021	22 governorates	FAO	6.3 million	European Union	<p>An agricultural livelihoods and food security monitoring system</p> <p>https://www.fao.org/policy-support/tools-and-publications/resources-details/en/c/1439648/</p> <p>Monitoring report: https://www.fao.org/3/cb7844en/cb7844en.pdf</p>
WFP	<i>Food Assistance, Cash Assistance, Nutrition Assistance, School Feeding, Logistics</i>		22 governorates	WFP			<p>Monthly situation reports: https://www.wfp.org/publications/yemen-0</p>
WFP	<i>Support Malnutrition Treatment in Yemen</i>	2024		WFP	7.6 million	European Union	<p>https://www.wfp.org/news/eu-provides-eu7-million-support-malnutrition-treatment-yemen#:~:text=The%20European%20Union%20has%20consistently,critical%20needs%20across%20the%20country.</p>
YRRF	<i>Multiple Small-Scale Livelihood Projects in Yemen</i>			YRRF		N/A	<p>YRRF implements various programmes to address poverty, including the distribution of food baskets, income generation projects, education and vocational training, and health and water initiatives</p> <p>Latest updates: https://yemenfoundation.org/updates/</p> <p>Information on initiatives https://globalwa.org/2023/10/tackling-poverty-in-yemen-yemen-relief-and-</p>

							reconstruction-foundations-resilience-initiatives/?blm_aid=47294
European Union– OECD	<i>Project on Promoting Economic Resilience in Yemen</i>	2020–2023		European Union– OECD			Socioeconomic resilience through supporting key economic institutions; private sector development; donor coordination and financing for development https://www.resilience-yemen.org/about/ https://www.oecd.org/mena/competitiveness/promoting-economic-resilience-in-yemen/
IPC	<i>Integrated Food Security Phase Classification</i>	Biannual, annual	Yemen	IPC			Multipartner initiative for improving food security and nutrition analysis and decision-making. Determines the severity and magnitude of acute and chronic food insecurity and acute malnutrition https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156803/?iso3=YEM
CERF	<i>Yemen: All CERF Grants to United Nations Organizations</i>	2023					https://cerf.un.org/what-we-do/allocation/2023/country/85

ⁱ UNDP 2023b

ⁱⁱ Moustafa and Abu Ismail 2005.

ⁱⁱⁱ International Crisis Group 2022.

^{iv} Thomas 2021.

^v ACAPS Analysis Hub 2022.

^{vi} World Bank 2023.

^{vii} ACAPS Analysis Hub 2022.

^{viii} UNDP and OPHI 2023

^{ix} IPC 2021, 2022.

^x This assessment, conducted through the IPC, focuses on 118 districts in southern governorates, utilizing updated evidence on food security and nutrition.

^{xi} See the IPC website: <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156803/?iso3=YEM>.

^{xii} UNOCHA 2023b.

^{xiii} Ibid.

^{xiv} See the IPC website: <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156365/?iso3=YEM>.

^{xv} UNDP 2023a.

^{xvi} See the World Bank's World Development Indicators and the ILO's ILOSTAT, 2023 data.

^{xvii} IPC Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification: 1: minimal, 2: stressed, 3: crisis, 4: emergency, and 5: famine.

^{xviii} IPC 2023a.

^{xix} IPC 2022.

^{xx} The FCS is a WFP corporate indicator collected in all assessments and monitoring activities. It is a composite score based on self-reported information on nine consumed food groups and food frequency (number of days food groups were consumed during the past seven days), weighted by the ascribed relative nutritional importance of different food groups. Based on standard thresholds, households are classified into one of three food consumption groups: poor, borderline or acceptable, with scores of ≤ 21 , 28 and 35, respectively, except in situations of high oil and sugar consumption, for which the cut-offs used for the same groups are ≤ 28 , 35 and 42, respectively. The HDDS relates to the condition of regularly consuming, over a significant period, an amount of food that provides the dietary energy needed to cover the requirements for an active and healthy life. Dietary energy intake is used as a convention and convenience to assess the average energy requirements for a population group. Characteristics that affect requirements include gender, age, body size, body composition and physical activity level as well as unknown factors that produce variations among individuals, as defined by WHO. The energy cut-offs included in the IPC Acute Food Insecurity Reference Table are not intended to be used for empirical assessment of the percentage of the population consuming adequate/inadequate amounts of food. Instead, the indicator acts as a reference for food consumption. The cut-off of 2,100 kilocalories per day is associated with the Household Economy Analysis survival deficit cut-off and borderline FCS. The selected dietary energy requirements are based on average requirements for an average individual (body mass index of 21–22) engaged in a normally active life (physical activity level = 1.75) for Phase 1, with an average of 2,350 kilocalories per day, or based on a sedentary lifestyle (physical activity level = 1.55) for Phase 2 with an average of 2,100 kilocalories per day. The HHS is an indicator developed by Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance. It assesses whether households have experienced problems with food access in the preceding 30 days, as reported by the households themselves. The HHS assesses the food consumption strategies adopted by households facing a lack of access to food. The cut-offs for the HHS are based on the 2015 Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance Household Food Consumption Indicator Study report and alignment with the Acute Food Insecurity Reference Table phase descriptions.

^{xxi} See data on food prices in Yemen on HDX at: <https://data.humdata.org/dataset/wfp-food-prices-for-yemen?>.

^{xxii} UNDP 2022c.

^{xxiii} Ibid.

^{xxiv} UNDP 2023b.

^{xxv} According to IPC classification, secondary income is perceived by survey respondents as complementary income received from activities other than the main activity providing the largest portion of income. Secondary income in this particular case is often humanitarian assistance. Normally

in such surveys the assessment is subjective as respondents' perceptions vary regarding the main source of income and/or main profession and secondary or complementary sources of income. There is no clear definition or classification of primary or secondary sources of income. Sometimes the secondary source of income exceeds the primary, yet the respondent may still consider it secondary due to the fact that it is generated by an activity other than what he/she considers to be the main profession (e.g., government employees having a second job that generates more income yet is still consider to be secondary income).

^{xxvi} Wiggins et al. 2021.

^{xxvii} Ghorpade and Ammar 2021.

^{xxviii} UNOCHA n.d.

^{xxix} See the World Bank's Implementation Completion Report Review at: <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099082923164015722/p159053154192c08f1a9281213e9202e4c1>. See also UNDP's Final Evaluation Report at: <https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/detail/21956>.

^{xxx} See UNDP's Project Evaluation Report, Phase I at: <https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/detail/21889>.

^{xxxi} See the World Bank's Implementation Status and Results Report for December at: <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P173582>.

^{xxxii} See the World Bank's Implementation Status and Results Report for November at: <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P178143>.

^{xxxiii} See the World Bank's Implementation Status and Results Report for September at: <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P174170>.

^{xxxiv} See the final narrative report at: <https://mptf.undp.org/fund/jye10>.

^{xxxv} See the World Bank's Implementation Status and Results Report for December at: <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P174170>.

^{xxxvi} See the World Bank's Implementation Status and Results Report for November at: <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P174170>.

^{xxxvii} UNOCHA 2024b.

^{xxxviii} Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation 2021.

^{xxxix} See the Financial Tracking Service at: <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/248/summary/2023>.

^{xl} WFP n.d.

^{xli} UNDP 2023b.



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